Is There a Logic of the Ineffable? Or, How Is it Possible to Talk About the Unsayable?
This chapter defends a single, fixed, definite answer to the question: Is there a logic that governs the unsayable? The proposed answer is: “Yes, and no. Or yes-but-not-yes. And/or yes-no.” Each component of this answer is examined and used to generate three laws of what Palmquist terms “synthetic logic”, which correspond directly to the laws of classical (Aristotelian) logic: the law of contradiction (“A = −A”), the law of non-identity (“A ≠ A”), and the law of the included middle (“−(Av-A)”). Ultimately, Palmquist concludes by arguing that we can talk about the unsayable only by assuming that propositions constructed in accordance with these three alternative logical laws can be meaningful.