Abstract
This chapter shows how state actors managed to keep control over the earlier described emerging agrarian entrepreneurship. In particular, the analysis provides details on the formal and informal resources available to local government officials of county and township levels to increase their power over local food processing enterprises and retailers. The chapter also demonstrates that although state actors act as individuals steered by their own interests and preferences, a common framework of agricultural modernization, shaped by common goals and common tools, exists, is transmitted from the central level to local levels through various formal and informal channels, holds the state together, and enables officials to act in a coordinated manner in spite of the fragmentation of the Chinese state.
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Notes
- 1.
Original language: 希望各农机企业要宣传好 (xiwang ge nongji qiye yao xuanchuan hao).
- 2.
Original language: “我们是需要政府支持的,这是必须的” women shi xuyao zhengfu zhichi de, zhe shi bixu de.
- 3.
Fen = cent.
- 4.
On a scale going from 1 to 10, 1 meaning that people “completely disagree” and 10 meaning that people “completely agree”, 73 percent of respondents answered 7 or above (World Value Survey, 2010–2014). As a comparison, only 65.9 percent American respondents answered 7 and above. A total of 23.6 percent Chinese respondents answered that they “completely agreed,” compared to 12.6 percent American respondents.
- 5.
Dragonhead enterprises are companies recognized by the Chinese government for their leading role in their industry sectors. The status grants them with certain tax exemptions and other financial support.
- 6.
Expenditures allocated to Grain and edible oil reserves are not steadily increasing. Increase rates vary according to China’s international supply strategy. We can indeed see, for instance, that the budget underwent a tremendous rise in 2009, just after the 2007–2008 international food price crisis (probably to replenish depleted stocks).
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Schwoob, MH. (2018). The Grip of Local States. In: Food Security and the Modernisation Pathway in China. Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65702-8_4
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