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Corruption, Organized Crime, and Money Laundering

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • Bonnie J. Palifka
Chapter
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

Corruption is often intertwined with international organized crime and is facilitated by money laundering. Self-reinforcing spirals of corruption occur when organized crime infiltrates state institutions. Criminal activity may become so intertwined with corrupt politics and legitimate business, that it is difficult to tell them apart. Cooperation among countries, international institutions, and enforcement agencies is essential. Otherwise, the proceeds of corruption and organized crime will be hidden abroad or in cyberspace. Hence, the anti-corruption agenda should include limits on money laundering and disclosure of the beneficial owners of shell companies. Global institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, need to strengthen their existing efforts in these areas.

Keywords

Beneficial ownership Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Financial Havens Mafias Money laundering Organized crime Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) Shell companies Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (STAR) Vicious spirals 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale Law SchoolNew HavenUSA
  2. 2.ITESM, Campus MonterreyMonterreyMexico

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