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Corruption as a Political Phenomenon

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Abstract

Corruption—the appropriate of public resources for private purposes—is a modern phenomenon insofar as modern states are founded on the principle of the strict separation of public and private. This was not the case for much of human history, where “patrimonial” rulers regarded the public domain as a species of private property. Corruption needs to be distinguished from both rent-seeking and patronage/clientelism—in the first case, because many rents have perfectly legitimate uses, and in the second because clientelism involves a reciprocal exchange of favors and can be regarded as an early form of democratic participation. Moving from a patronage-based state to a modern-impersonal one is a fundamentally political act, since it involves wresting power away from entrenched elites who use their access to the state for private purposes. This is what happened during the Progressive Era in the US, and also what explains the relative success of anti-corruption bodies like Indonesia’s KPK.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Johnston (2005: p. 11).

  2. 2.

    An important exception to this was the republican tradition which started in Greece and Rome, and was carried by numerous city states in Italy, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. The very term “republic” comes from the Latin res publica, or “public thing,” denoting that the political order was representative of a larger public good.

  3. 3.

    See Fukuyama (2011).

  4. 4.

    See Fukuyama (2015).

  5. 5.

    Khan and Sundaram Jomo (2000).

  6. 6.

    Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984).

  7. 7.

    Thus Scott (1972) describes a patronage system in pre-democratic Thailand and a clientelistic system in Ghana and India.

  8. 8.

    See the definition given in Piattoni (2001).

  9. 9.

    A classic case was the French foreign minister Tallyrand, who was a highly corrupt individual who was nonetheless a very talented diplomat who helped negotiate the settlement at the Congress of Vienna.

  10. 10.

    See for example: Kolstad and Wiig (2009), Mauro (2004).

  11. 11.

    For more detail on the history of this period, see Chaps. 9–11 in Fukuyama (2014).

  12. 12.

    Recanantini (2011).

  13. 13.

    See for example: Alan Doig et al. (2007), Heilbrunn (2004).

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Fukuyama, F. (2018). Corruption as a Political Phenomenon. In: Basu, K., Cordella, T. (eds) Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_3

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