Anti-corruption Institutions: Some History and Theory

  • Avinash Dixit
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)


Corruption is a multidimensional problem that has been pervasive through history. Attempts to fight corruption must likewise be multidirectional. The institutions that have been designed in different societies for this purpose include formal laws, special agencies, community organizations, and combinations; their record of success is varied. This paper examines some prominent examples of such effort, with special attention to campaigns like the ones led from the top that transformed Hong Kong and Singapore, and the bottom-up Addiopizzo movement that has for the last decade organized resistance against the Sicilian Mafia’s extortion. The paper suggests some requisites for success of anti-corruption institutions by analogy with the conditions for success of other self-governing institutions that address other issues like contract enforcement, and places these ideas within a general theoretical framework of collective action.


Corruption Governance Institutions Development 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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