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Conclusion: The Origins of “Telecracy”? Some Final Reflections

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Part of the book series: French Politics, Society and Culture ((FPSC))

Abstract

Since de Gaulle’s return to power in June 1958, the increasingly important role of radio and television was the focus of a heated debate; the Fifth Republic was accused of having exercised a suffocating monopoly on the audiovisual system. Though this can hardly be denied, it is important to note that this monopoly had strong roots in the past. Since 1944, the absolute monopoly of the State over radio and television had been enshrined in law. Moreover, this monopoly had been the traditional practice adopted by the government since the end of the Second World War, more precisely ever since Gaston Defferre, Secretary of State for Information under Félix Gouin’s administration (January–June 1946), reorganised the radiophonic system. This was deprived of its own statute and put under the control of the executive. As noted in earlier chapters, in 1947 de Gaulle had been ostracised from the media by Prime Minister Ramadier, a ban which continued for the following 21 governments until he returned to power. During the Fourth Republic, despite political instability, French radio was known as “the most disciplined radio in Europe”. Later, following the political victory of the Republicans and Guy Mollet’s instatement as Prime Minister at Matignon in 1956, the continuation of the Algerian crisis and the disastrous Suez campaign led to stricter political control over television and the press. Though, the press was not directly subjected to the control of the State, there were attempts to “domesticate” it through sanctions and confiscations. In this context, the theory according to which the Fifth Republic marks the beginning of the subjugation of the media to political power appears to be a myth without sound historical foundations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Martin, Radio et TV dans la crise de mai 1968, op. cit., pp. 76–77.

  2. 2.

    Montaldo, Dossier O.R.T.F. 1944–1974. Tous coupables, op. cit., p. 74.

  3. 3.

    De Bussière, Méadel and Ulmann-Mauriat (eds), Radios et télévision au temps des ‘événements d’Algérie’, 1954–1962, op. cit.

  4. 4.

    De Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, I, op. cit., p. 284.

  5. 5.

    Interestingly, almost two-thirds of de Gaulle’s televised speeches between 1958 and 1969 are concentrated in the four years following his return to power (31 speeches between 1958 and 1962). In the following six years it is noticeable he used television far less frequently (22 speeches between January 1963 and April 1969).

  6. 6.

    J-P. Esquenazi, Télévision et démocratie. Le politique à la télévision française, 1958–1990, Paris, Puf, 1999, p. 56.

  7. 7.

    C. Charle, Naissance des ‘intellectuels’, 1880–1900, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1990; for a comparative study see Id., Les intellectuels en Europe au XIX e siècle. Essai d’histoire comparée, Paris, Seuil, 2001. For a study of intellectual power in France with special reference to ‘the three ages’, its dissemination and contribution in shaping public opinion , see R. Debray, Le pouvoir intellectuel en France, Paris, Ramsay, 1979.

  8. 8.

    Sirinelli, Les vingt Décisives, 1965–1985, op. cit, pp. 79–81.

  9. 9.

    After the election, the law scholar Marcel Prélot noted its historical significance: “After condemning the style of the General, the [opposition parties] adopted it and in some cases even more or less successfully developed this style […]. For this reason, December 19th not only marks an important political event, but also the most significant constitutional event since 1877. It represents a point of no return. The vast majority of voters have cast a vote in favour of the ‘President that governs’. This figure has now entered into our political traditions.” M. Prélot, “Après la campagne présidentielle”, in France-Forum, 69–70, 1966, p. 23.

  10. 10.

    C. Angeli, Les nuits de la TV, Nouvel Observateur, 15 December 1965, p. 9.

  11. 11.

    See E. Burin des Roziers, private communication, 12 November 2004. Roziers’ statement is also confirmed by Jean Lacouture, one of the main biographers of the General, who remarked that since 1966 de Gaulle began to spend “more and more time with family in front of television”. Lacouture, De Gaulle, III, op. cit., p. 643.

  12. 12.

    D’Almeida and Delporte, Histoire des médias en France, op. cit., pp. 195–196.

  13. 13.

    P. Breton, “Zoom change le jeu 1966–1968”, in J-N. Jeanneney and M. Sauvage, Les magazines de grand reportage, Paris, INA/Seuil, 1982, p. 71.

  14. 14.

    Pierre Viansson-Ponté, a respected political commentator who was often very critical of the General, admitted that “since the Presidential elections, something seems to be changing, slowly, amid a thousand problems. Some minor isolated audacities, show that as far as television is concerned, people have realised they have exaggerated […]. Complaints about abuses by the Head of State are certainly rarer.” P. Viansson-Ponté, “Vingt ans d’information politique”, in La Nef, 5, 1966, p. 52.

  15. 15.

    Sirinelli, Les vingt Décisives, 1965–1985, op. cit, pp. 110–111.

  16. 16.

    In this respect, the Paris prefect Grimaud has provided confirmation of the increased difficulties in maintaining public order. It is significant that after the initial clashes the authorities decided to forbid the use of radio–telephones in the vicinity of demonstrations. Grimaud, En mai, fais ce qui te plait, op. cit.

  17. 17.

    Sirinelli, Les vingt Décisives, 1965–1985, op. cit, p. 111.

  18. 18.

    Recent historiographical interpretations have shown that the dominant feeling among student protesters towards de Gaulle was not so much hostility, but indifference. Protesters did not challenge de Gaulle’s glorious past, or the fact that he had been at the centre of national life for the last 30 years. At the same time, for young people who had grown up in a consumer society, there was no particular reason to admire him. Unlike their parents and grandparents, they had no direct memories of the Man of the 18th of June, or of the Man that brought peace in Algeria. Sirinelli, Mai 68, op. cit., pp. 257–291.

  19. 19.

    Lacouture, De Gaulle, III, op. cit., p. 664.

  20. 20.

    Pompidou, Pour rétablir une vérité, op. cit., pp. 202–203.

  21. 21.

    A very important factor in the failure of the 27 April 1969 referendum that led to de Gaulle retiring from political life was Pompidou’s unofficial declaration on 17 January 1969: “If de Gaulle retires, I would put myself forward to take his place […]. I do not think this is now a mystery for anyone.” This declaration simplified the task of choosing the candidates. Guichard, De Gaulle face aux crises, op. cit., p. 424.

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Brizzi, R. (2018). Conclusion: The Origins of “Telecracy”? Some Final Reflections. In: Charles De Gaulle and the Media. French Politics, Society and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65642-7_12

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