Epistemic Relativism and Pluralism

Abstract

Paul Boghossian and Markus Seidel hold that epistemic relativism involves a commitment to the existence of “many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems” that are all equally correct. Boghossian claims to find this view in Richard Rorty’s discussion of the conflict between Galileo and the Catholic Church. Boghossian challenges this commitment by arguing that Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine did not use epistemic systems that differed in this way. I argue that the challenge fails. I also seek to undermine two central assumptions underlying Boghossian’s and Seidel’s criticism of epistemic relativism: the idea that epistemic systems can be clearly separated from non-epistemic systems of beliefs, principles or values; and the notion that epistemic systems have a permanent and fixed structure of principles. I end with some tentative comments on the relationship between epistemic relativism and William Alston’s epistemic pluralism.