Abstract
In this chapter, I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge , that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge , I focus on a particular kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows by this-or-that epistemic standard. Because there is a plurality of epistemic standards, there is a plurality of knowledge relations. In §2, I argue that one can construct an impressive case for standards pluralism. In §3, I clarify the relationship between standards pluralism, epistemic contextualism and epistemic relativism. In §4, I argue that standards pluralism faces a serious objection. The gist of the objection is that standards pluralism is incompatible with plausible claims about the normative role of knowledge . In §5, I finish by sketching the form that a standards pluralist response to this objection might take.
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McKenna, R. (2017). Pluralism About Knowledge. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_7
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