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Explicationist Epistemology and Epistemic Pluralism

  • Erik J. OlssonEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy book series (PIIP)

Abstract

I discuss Carnap’s method of explication with special emphasis on its application to epistemology. I observe that explication has the advantage over conceptual analysis of not being vulnerable to the so-called paradox of analysis. Moreover, explicationist epistemology is intrinsically immune to the Gettier problem. I proceed to identify three senses in which the former is inherently pluralistic. For example, it allows for a plurality of legitimate and potentially interesting epistemological projects. Finally, I argue that while there are salient affinities with Alston’s theory of epistemic desiderata, beyond a far-reaching commitment to pluralism, there are also important differences. Above all, Carnap’s methodological outlook is reconstructive in ways in which Alston’s is not.

Keywords

Explication Knowledge Justification Pluralism Epistemic desiderata 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLund UniversityLundSweden

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