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Epistemic Pluralism

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Epistemic pluralism is an emerging area of research in epistemology with dramatic implications for the discipline. The aim of this edited collection is to draw out some of these implications, articulate and explore different versions of the view, consider its motivations and applications, and investigate its connection to other views in epistemology—in particular, epistemic relativism.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA, 92697, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, 406-840, South Korea

    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

Authors
  1. Annalisa Coliva
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  2. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Annalisa Coliva .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Yonsey International Campus, Underwood International College, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

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Coliva, A., Pedersen, N. (2017). Introduction. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_1

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