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Large-Scale Land Investments in Least Developed Countries pp 261–338Cite as

Tackling Opportunism in LSLIs

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Part of the book series: International Law and Economics ((ILEC))

Abstract

In Chap. 4, we showed that NIE could highlight the sources of opportunism and offered two approaches to tackle it. These approaches were modelled with PAT and CT. We know that control mechanisms are needed to decrease agency costs and to create incentives for parties to draft more complete contracts. We learnt about the institutional structures and the environment in which LSLIs take place, as well as the specific institutional areas in which incentives should be allocated to decrease agency costs. We showed the causal relationship between principal-agent problems and incomplete contracts in LSLIs. We argued that one way to justify why incomplete contracts are signed is pre-existing principal-agent problems. Contracts are incomplete and fail to incentivise parties to behave as required to achieve pre-determined goals and to fulfil IL obligations. Furthermore, we showed why and how violations of HRs to property and to food occur. In Chap. 3 we analysed the mechanisms in IL to protect the rights of affected individuals and investors. We elucidated which obstacles exist in IL from asymmetric levels of protection and how they lead to opportunistic behaviour. For this reason, incentives are allocated asymmetrically and lead to non-compliance and a higher cost for the enforcement of HRL. The opposite is the case in IIL, where correctly allocated incentives effectively protect the rights of investors.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The most obvious example is the study by the ILC: International Land Coalition (2011).

  2. 2.

    ILC (2006).

  3. 3.

    Ruggie (2008), p. 9. In the case of the right to food see: The World Conference on Human Rights on Human Rights; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action [1993] available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/vienna.aspx. Accessed 11 November 2014.

  4. 4.

    An economic approach explaining the costs of renegotiating long-term contracts is offered by: Vidar (2005). An economic paper applying the cost of renegotiation in agency contracts is offered by: Hart and Moore (1988).

  5. 5.

    See the applicable law at Sect. 1.2.2 of this study.

  6. 6.

    The referred restrictions are given by the standards of protection IIAs offers. See Sect. 3.6 of this research.

  7. 7.

    Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).

  8. 8.

    República de Argentina Régimen de Protección al Dominio Nacional sobre la Propiedad, Posesión o Tenencia de las Tierras Rurales Law N° 26.737 2011.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    Lei No. 5.709 Regula a Aquisição de Imóvel Rural por Estrangeiro Residente no País ou Pessoa Jurídica Estrangeira Autorizada a Funcionar no Brasil, e dá outras Providências [1971].

  11. 11.

    Ibid; République Démocratique du Congo Loi N° 11/022 du 24 Décembre 2011 Portant Principes Fondamentaux Relatifs a l’Agriculture 2011; Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. Ministere de l’Agriculture et du Developpment Rural. Instruction Interministerielle 196 [2013] Journal Officiel 48.

  12. 12.

    Loi N° 2013-01 Portant Code Foncier et Domanial en République du Bénin [2013] available at http://actualites.visages-du-benin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/DSL-LOI-PORTANT-CODE-FONCIER-I1.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2014. For a comment of Benin’s land policies see: ibid.

  13. 13.

    Source: GRAIN, ‘Land Ceilings: Reining in Land Grabbers or Dumbing Down the Debate?’ https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4655-land-ceilings-reining-in-land-grabbers-or-dumbing-down-the-debate. Accessed 17 August 2015.

  14. 14.

    These have been the main arguments that investors made with regard to the land reform in Zimbabwe. The case of Zimbabwe approached at Sect. 3.6.2.

  15. 15.

    An analysis of the Situation in Zimbabwe see: Tanzania Investment Centre (2015); Coltart (2008).

  16. 16.

    This are argued by Zimbabwe in the following case: Richardson (2005), p. 1.

  17. 17.

    The most emblematic case related to the reforms is: Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v Zimbabwe [ 2009 ] Award ARB/05/6 (ICSID) at para 55.

  18. 18.

    See Sect. 3.6.2.3 of this study.

  19. 19.

    Article 1105(1) NAFTA reads: ‘Minimum Standard of Treatment: 1. Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including FET and full protection and security.’ Cross (2012).

  20. 20.

    North American Free Trade Agreement [1993] 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605.

  21. 21.

    Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal [1998] 1673 UNTS 126; 28 ILM 657.

  22. 22.

    S.D. Myers, Inc. (Claimant) v Government of Canada (Respondent) [ 2000 ] First Partial Award 40 ILM 1408 at para 103.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania [2007] Award ARB/05/8 (ICSID).

  28. 28.

    S.D. Myers, Inc. (Claimant) v Government of Canada (Respondent) [ 2000 ] First Partial Award 40 ILM 1408 at para 221.

  29. 29.

    Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania [ 2007 ] Award ARB/05/8 (ICSID) at para 332.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Methanex Corporation v United States [ 2005 ] Final Award (Ad hoc UNICTRAL).

  32. 32.

    Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania [ 2007 ] Award ARB/05/8 (ICSID) at para 333 Chapter D page 4 para 7.

  33. 33.

    Methanex Corporation v United States [ 2005 ] Final Award (Ad hoc UNICTRAL) Part IV.

  34. 34.

    Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States [1997] Award ARB(AF)/97/1 (ICSID).

  35. 35.

    Methanex Corporation v United States [ 2005 ] Final Award (Ad hoc UNICTRAL) at para 119.

  36. 36.

    Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States [ 1997 ] Award ARB(AF)/97/1 (ICSID) para 111.

  37. 37.

    Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador [ 2004 ] Final Award UN3467 (LCIA).

  38. 38.

    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2013 (World Investment Report 2013, 2014), p. 111.

  39. 39.

    World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014), p. 12.

  40. 40.

    FAO (2009) at para 4.

  41. 41.

    See Sect. 3.5.3 of this study.

  42. 42.

    Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct, available at http://www.eiccoalition.org/media/docs/EICCCodeofConduct4_English.pdf. Accessed on 14 September 14.

  43. 43.

    The ICMM’s Council bases it activities on ten principles: Implement and maintain ethical business practices and sound systems of corporate governance; integrate sustainable development considerations within the corporate decision-making process; uphold fundamental human rights and respect cultures, customs and values in dealings with employees and others who are affected by our activities; implement risk management strategies based on valid data and sound science; seek continual improvement of our health and safety performance; seek continual improvement of our environmental performance; contribute to conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use planning; facilitate and encourage responsible product design, use, re-use, recycling and disposal of our products; contribute to the social, economic and institutional development of the communities in which we operate; implement effective and transparent engagement, communication and independently verified reporting arrangements with our stakeholders. Source: International Chamber of Commerce Combating Extortion and Bribery International available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2005/ICC-Rules-of-Conduct-and-Recommendations-to-Combat-Extortion-and-Bribery-(2005-Edition). Accessed 14 September 2014.

  44. 44.

    International Council on Mining & Metals (2014).

  45. 45.

    See the following report that was made as a part of the mandate of the G20 in Toronto 2010. It focuses on measures to promote economic growth and resilience, a development agenda and multi-year and action plans: ibid.

  46. 46.

    See: Inter-Agency Working Group on the Private Investment and Job Creation Pillar of the G20 Multi-Year Action on Development (2011), p. 8 and Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (2014).

  47. 47.

    Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (2014).

  48. 48.

    For some examples we recommend: ibid and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008), p. 18.

  49. 49.

    For an analysis on the development of the corporate social responsibility agenda see: Inter-Agency Working Group on the Private Investment and Job Creation Pillar of the G20 Multi-Year Action on Development (2011).

  50. 50.

    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009).

  51. 51.

    See e.g.: FAO (2009) at 5 and ff. and also Utting (2008), pp. 959, 960.

  52. 52.

    We recommend the following study that deals with the question on the scope and economic implications of labelling being promoted from states. FAO (2009).

  53. 53.

    See Inter-Agency Working Group on the Private Investment and Job Creation Pillar of the G20 Multi-Year Action on Development (2011).

  54. 54.

    For an overview on so called B-Corporations that also includes some criticisms we recommend: Crespi and Marette (2003).

  55. 55.

    Reiser (2011), p. 591.

  56. 56.

    This as stated by: Sweet and Mathews (2008), pp. 68, 76.

  57. 57.

    About IILs’ Standards see Chap. 2.

  58. 58.

    See supra footnote: 109 in Chap. 4.

  59. 59.

    Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentina [2005] Decision on Jurisdiction ARB/97/3 (ICSID) at para 95.

  60. 60.

    Probably the most influential paper on this: van Aaken (2014b). See also: Kaplow (1992), p. 557 and applied in IIL see: Scott and Stephan (2006), p. 72 ff.

  61. 61.

    van Aaken (2014b), p. 12.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    It will contribute determinate the predictability of success in litigation. It means that economic actors will used available information—judicial decisions—to anticipate the tribunals’ outcomes.

  65. 65.

    It has been also stated that the stability of the standards in specific contractual relationship might be more volatile than the rules because is will easer to consider a standard up-to-date. Kaplow (1992), pp. 557, 586 ff.

  66. 66.

    van Aaken (2014b), p. 14.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Ruggie (2008), p. 14.

  69. 69.

    Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security [2013] CL 144/9 C 2013/20, p. 8.

  70. 70.

    See Sect. 1.4.

  71. 71.

    Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livehoods and Resources [2010] available http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf. Accessed 25 December 2013, p. 11.

  72. 72.

    This statement goes back to the general assumptions of this research project. See Sect. 1.5.

  73. 73.

    Art. 35 UNCITRAL gives parties the power to instruct the tribunal on the applicable law. It states: ‘1. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law which it determines to be appropriate.’ Dolzer and Schreuer (2008), p. 265.

  74. 74.

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 65/22 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as Revised in 2010 [1976] A/RES/31/98 15 ILM 701 art 35.

  75. 75.

    For similar approach see: Koskenniemi (1997), p. 566.

  76. 76.

    Art 103 UN Charter states that: In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

  77. 77.

    See Sect. 3.6.1.

  78. 78.

    Neumann (2002), p. 72.

  79. 79.

    See i.e. the comments by: Ley 26.737 Régimen de Protección al Dominio Nacional Sobre la Propiedad, Posesión o Tenencia de las Tierras Rurales [2011] art 11.

  80. 80.

    Roberts (2013), pp. 45, 85.

  81. 81.

    United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.

  82. 82.

    Roberts (2013), pp. 45, 85.

  83. 83.

    China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products [2009] WT/DS363/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body) at para 399.

  84. 84.

    Waibel (2011), p. 33.

  85. 85.

    Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 541.

  86. 86.

    van Aaken (2014b), p. 17.

  87. 87.

    Some examples are the US model BIT 2004 and Swiss BITs mention in the preamble their aim to promote development of the parties. Most of IIAs the purpose of the treaties is seen by economic cooperation, economic development or mutual prosperity. See ibid.

  88. 88.

    This as considered in: Salacuse (2010), p. 114.

  89. 89.

    See for example the jurisprudence of the ICJ that states: ‘If there were any ambiguity, the Court might, for the purpose of arriving at the meaning, consider the action which has been taken under the treaty.’ PCIJ Competence of the ILO (N 28) 39. Cf also Brazilian Loans (n 22) 93, 199; ICJ Corfu Channel Case (n 40) 25 that also states ‘The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows […].’

  90. 90.

    Federal Reserve Bank of New York v Bank Markazi [2000] n 19 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal) at para 58; MacLachlan, Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), p. 560.

  91. 91.

    We develop basic notions about the proportionality principle at Sect. 5.4.3.

  92. 92.

    Mclachlan (2008), p. 280.

  93. 93.

    On the problem of inconsistency we highly recommend: Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico [ 2003 ] Award ARB(AF)/00/2 (ICSID) at para 122; Schultz (2014).

  94. 94.

    Gehne (2011) deduces that the short conclusion of the tribunal demonstrated that it failed to give sufficient reasons for its conclusion.

  95. 95.

    The delegation of authorities at domestic level but also in international law is not a new phenomenon. About the rationale behind delegating this authority see: Foster (2009), p. 391.

  96. 96.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/8 (ICSID).

  97. 97.

    Art 20 (3) (b): ‘The competent financial authorities of both Parties shall make themselves available for consultations with each other and shall attempt in good faith to make a determination as described in subparagraph (a). Any such determination shall be transmitted promptly to the disputing parties and, if constituted, to the tribunal. The determination shall be binding on the tribunal.’

  98. 98.

    See for a similar approach: U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty [2012] available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm. Accessed 12 July 2015.

  99. 99.

    In general terms will the outsourcers provide information so that uncertainty in the contractual relationship decreases. As we have shown in previous chapters of this book uncertainty is one of the most relevant problems parties have to deal with by contractual process. See more details supra Sect. 4.5.2.

  100. 100.

    By independent experts is meant that the commissioned do not depend of the contractual parties to produce relevant data. Or course in the very narrow sense, it won’t happen since it is needed that experts are allowed to collect such information, but what is meant is that they expertise is not influenced by local governments.

  101. 101.

    U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty [2012] available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm. Accessed 12 July 2015.

  102. 102.

    Some of these standards are explained infra at Chap. 3.

  103. 103.

    Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v Malaysia [2007] Award on Jurisdiction ARB/05/10 (ICSID Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v Kingdom of Morocco [2001] Award on Jurisdiction ARB/00/4 (ICSID Kardassopoulos v Georgia [2007] Decision on jurisdiction ARB/05/18 (ICSID Agreement Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of Malaysia Concerning the Mutual Protection of Investments (Sweden-Malaysia) [1979] SÖ 1979:17 available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/202/treaty/2484. Accessed 17 September 201 Gruslin v Malaysia [2000] Award ARB/99/3 (ICSID Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn Bhd v Malaysia [ 2007 ] Award on Jurisdiction ARB/05/10 (ICSID Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v Kingdom of Morocco [ 2001 ] Award on Jurisdiction ARB/00/4 (ICSID Kardassopoulos v Georgia [ 2007 ] Decision on jurisdiction ARB/05/18 (ICSID Agreement Between the Government of Sweden and the Government of Malaysia Concerning the Mutual Protection of Investments (Sweden-Malaysia) [1979] SÖ 1979:17 available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/202/treaty/2484. Accessed 17 September 201 Gruslin v Malaysia [ 2000 ] Award ARB/99/3 (ICSID).

  104. 104.

    Deininger et al. (2011), p. xliii.

  105. 105.

    Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livehoods and Resources [2010] available http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf. Accessed 25 December 2013, p. 11; Rabah et al. (2011), p. 5.

  106. 106.

    See Sect. 4.4 ff of this study.

  107. 107.

    One experience from Ghana has been documented by: Sulle and Nelson (2009), p. 36.

  108. 108.

    Simmons (2009), p. 24.

  109. 109.

    The following country-based studies highlight the relevance and the effects of participation of locals: Sulle and Nelson (2009) and Nhantumbo and Salomão (2010).

  110. 110.

    Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livehoods and Resources [2010] available http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-1111138388661/22453321/Principles_Extended.pdf. Accessed 25 December 2013, p. 12.

  111. 111.

    Anseeuw et al. (2012), p. 59.

  112. 112.

    See i.e. World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014), p. 11.

  113. 113.

    Johnson (2014).

  114. 114.

    International Monetary Fund (2007) para 11.

  115. 115.

    World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014), p. xiv.

  116. 116.

    Ibid.

  117. 117.

    Cotula and Tienhaara (2013), p. 299.

  118. 118.

    van Aaken (2013b).

  119. 119.

    van Aaken (2014b), p. 30.

  120. 120.

    For paper analysing the issue of corruption in International Investment Law see: Raeschke-Kessler and Gottwald (2008); Muchlinski (2006), pp. 527, 530.

  121. 121.

    Some relevant examples are: Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v The Republic of the Philippines [2007] Award ARB/03/25 (ICSID) and Metal-Tech Ltd. v Republic of Uzbekistan [2010] Award ARB/10/03 (ICSID); World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v Republic of Kenya [2006] Award ARB/00/7 (ICSID).

  122. 122.

    Robert Azinian and others v Mexico [1999] Award ARB(AF)/97/2 (ICSID) at para 13.

  123. 123.

    Ibid.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    Genin and others v Estonia [ 2001 ] Award ARB/99/2 (ICSID).

  126. 126.

    Plama Consortium Limited v Republic of Bulgaria [2003] ARB/03/24 (ICSID).

  127. 127.

    Robert Azinian and others v Mexico [ 1999 ] Award ARB(AF)/97/2 (ICSID) para 114.

  128. 128.

    This has been stated in some cases by tribunals. Some examples: Noble Ventures Incorporated v Romania [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/11 (ICSID); Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v Tanzania [ 2008 ] Award and Concurring and Dissenting Opinion ARB/05/22 (ICSID) para 486; Methanex Corporation v United States [ 2005 ] Final Award (Ad hoc UNICTRAL) para 9.

  129. 129.

    On delegation in IIL see Roberts (2010), pp. 179, 187.

  130. 130.

    Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt [ 2002 ] Decision on Annulment ARB/98/4 (ICSID) at para 96.

  131. 131.

    For a similar approach see: World Bank and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014), p. 9; Posner (1993), pp. 1, 25.

  132. 132.

    In this context wrongly does not mean that arbitrators are violating any law. It does mean that arbitrators will probably fail by applying the proper law, as it would need to be applied so that parties’ preferences can be realised.

  133. 133.

    As a manner of example we mention: Dolzer (2005), p. 953; Calamita (2013); Meckenstock (2010).

  134. 134.

    See i.e. the following approaches: Roberts (2013), p. 45; Dumberry and Dumas-Aubin (2013).

  135. 135.

    Simma (2011), p. 573.

  136. 136.

    Roberts (2013), pp. 45, 80.

  137. 137.

    See for example the approaches made by: ibid; Hirsch (2006), p. 97.

  138. 138.

    Article 103 NAFTA states: Relation to Other Agreements 1. The Parties affirm their existing rights and obligations with respect to each other under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other agreements to which such Parties are party. 2. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.

  139. 139.

    Annexes III Canadian BIT Model, Art 13 and 16 US BIT Model.

  140. 140.

    On the meaning and function of rules see Sect. 4.5 of this paper.

  141. 141.

    Mbengue, ‘Preamble’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para 1, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1456?prd=EPIL. Accessed 18 August 2015.

  142. 142.

    Salacuse considers that a carefully reading of the preamble provides information on long-term contractual objectives. See: Salacuse (2010), p. 114.

  143. 143.

    Black et al. (2006), p. 1175. One example in the jurisprudence making use of the preamble is the following case: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products [1998] WT/DS58/AB/R (WTO Appellate Body) at § 12.

  144. 144.

    As a manner or example In the case SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Philippines [ 2004 ] Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction and Separate Declaration ARB/02/6 (ICSID) the tribunal used the wording of the preamble to decide in favour of the investment because the BIT was intended to ‘maintain favourable conditions for investments.’ For critics on this decision see: Waibel (2011).

  145. 145.

    van Aaken (2014b), p. 17.

  146. 146.

    Salacuse (2010), p. 227 ff.

  147. 147.

    Model Text of the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at: https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2015.

  148. 148.

    North American Free Trade Agreement [1993] 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 art. 102.2.

  149. 149.

    United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 at art. 426.

  150. 150.

    Roberts (2013), pp. 45, 52.

  151. 151.

    North American Free Trade Agreement [1993] 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 art 102.a-f.

  152. 152.

    Roberts (2013), pp. 45, 80.

  153. 153.

    Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security [2013] CL 144/9 C 2013/20.

  154. 154.

    For different approaches seeking at balance the rights of states and investors see Cordero (2008); Hirsch (2009); Foster (2009), Kriebaum (2006), see also, however in German: Simma (2011), p. 573.

  155. 155.

    Sweet and Mathews (2008), pp. 68, 77.

  156. 156.

    Alexy (2003).

  157. 157.

    van Aaken (2009a), pp. 483, 502.

  158. 158.

    Sweet and Mathews (2008), pp. 68, 76.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    van Aaken (2009a), pp. 483, 504.

  161. 161.

    ILC (2006) at para 411.

  162. 162.

    Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico [ 2003 ] Award ARB(AF)/00/2 (ICSID) at para 122.

  163. 163.

    We refer to: LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [ 2006a ] Decision on Liability ARB/02/1 (ICSID) at para 195.

  164. 164.

    In this case the tribunal made an approach that has been catalogued as ‘undesirable’. In order to interpret the treaty the tribunal applied a ‘standard-desk-dictionary-approach’. The approach made by the tribunal can be found at: Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia [ 2005 ] Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction ARB/02/3 (ICSID) at para 227 ff. For an analysis of the case see: Kurtz (2007).

  165. 165.

    LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [ 2006a ] Decision on Liability ARB/02/1 (ICSID) at para 195.

  166. 166.

    Glamis Gold Ltd v United States [2009] Award IIC 380 (Ad Hoc Tribunal UNCITRAL).

  167. 167.

    One example is the Indian BIT Model 2015 in which new measures are included in order to make interpret the law so that investor can also be accountable for wrongful acts. Such measures were almost inexistent in older BITs. See: Model Text of the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at: https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2015.

  168. 168.

    On the role of NGOs in international law see: Cotula, ‘Regulatory Takings, Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development’ (The Policy Framework for Investment: The Social and Environmental Dimensions), p. 18.

  169. 169.

    For some contributions following this approach see: Boyle and Chinkin (2007); Cafaggi (2011), p. 20.

  170. 170.

    Franck (2005), pp. 1521, 1586.

  171. 171.

    Simmons (2009) in page 79 approaches the success of NGOs and IO based on the support such organisations get from powerful countries that at the same time can influence though coercion.

  172. 172.

    On the correlation between transparency and governance see: Shepard and Anuradha (2011).

  173. 173.

    Shepard and Anuradha (2011).

  174. 174.

    Deininger and World Bank (2003).

  175. 175.

    See Sect. 3.4.2 of this study.

  176. 176.

    Shepard and Anuradha (2011).

  177. 177.

    On the increase of non-state actors promoting governance see: Deininger et al. (2011), p. 140.

  178. 178.

    Keck and Sikkink (1999), p. 89; van Aaken (2009b), p. 33; van Aaken (2010).

  179. 179.

    van Aaken (2013a), p. 227; Cashore et al. (2004).

  180. 180.

    Tladi (2007); Berger 1996.

  181. 181.

    Cashore et al. (2004), p. 10.

  182. 182.

    One example in the are of LSLIs is the contribution of the Land Matrix: Keck and Sikkink (1999), p. 89.

  183. 183.

    Seminal for our approach: International Land Coalition (2011); van Aaken (2014b).

  184. 184.

    For the discussion on formal and in informal enforcement mechanisms see: Kohli et al. (2003), p. 13.

  185. 185.

    van Aaken (2013a), p. 227.

  186. 186.

    Scott and Stephan (2006), p. 28.

  187. 187.

    On the role of governments on market-driven policies see: van Aaken (2009b), pp. 33, 4.

  188. 188.

    Scott and Stephan (2006), p. 98.

  189. 189.

    On compliance involving private actors see Sect. 3.5 of this study and also ibid.

  190. 190.

    Chayes and Chayes (1993), p. 175.

  191. 191.

    Abbott and Snidal (2003), pp. 421, 423.

  192. 192.

    Cashore et al. (2004), p. 20 ff.

  193. 193.

    Ibid.

  194. 194.

    Cafaggi (2012), p. 1.

  195. 195.

    Cashore et al. (2004), p. 219 ff.

  196. 196.

    On evidence that leads to appreciate the relevance of this market mechanism is the Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly that welcomes and support the initiative. See: ibid; see also: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts [2001] A/RES/55/56.

  197. 197.

    Amnesty International (2006).

  198. 198.

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 The Role of Diamonds in Fuelling Conflict: Breaking the Link Between the Illicit Transaction of Rough Diamonds and Armed Conflict as a Contribution to Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts [2001] A/RES/55/56.

  199. 199.

    Kimberly Process (2013).

  200. 200.

    See Sect. 1.5 of this study.

  201. 201.

    On the role of states realising human rights see Sect. 3.5.3 of this study.

  202. 202.

    This is being happening not only in LDCs as for example in Zimbabwe (See: see Sect. 3.5.2 of this study) but also in industrialised countries as i.e. the case Vattenfall v Germany. In this case the Swedish Vattenffall that operates in Germany demanded compensation of 3.7. Billion Euros. The dispute arose after Germany decided to shut down nuclear power industries. The case is still pending.

  203. 203.

    See Sect. 2.2 of this study.

  204. 204.

    See Sect. 1.5 of this study.

  205. 205.

    World Food Programme (2005), p. 3. See with regard to protracted food crises infra at: 5.7.3.

  206. 206.

    See Chap. 1 of this paper.

  207. 207.

    ILC (2001) Arts. 24, 25 and 26 respectively.

  208. 208.

    With regard to the acceptance in the literature see: Sornarajah (2010), p. 464 and see also: ILC (2001). Dolzer and Schreuer (2008) at 183 ff. The Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on State Responsibility stated that: the concept of state of necessity is far too deeply rooted in the consciousness of the members of the international community and of individuals within States. If driven out of the door it would return through the window, if need be in other forms Arangio-Ruiz (2009).

  209. 209.

    Tanzi, ‘State of Necessity’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para 1, http://mpepil.com/ViewPdf/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e786.pdf?stylesheet=EPIL-display-full.xsl. Accessed 20 August 2013; ibid.

  210. 210.

    Article 25 ILC (2001).

  211. 211.

    See references in footnotes: 208 and 209 in this chapter.

  212. 212.

    For similar approach see: Tanzi, ‘State of Necessity’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para 1, http://mpepil.com/ViewPdf/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e786.pdf?stylesheet=EPIL-display-full.xsl. Accessed 20 August 2013.

  213. 213.

    The ICJ confirmed the restrictive approach in the case Gabcíkovo – Nagymaros the restrictive approach in which the character of exceptionality was considered. In Isreali Wall Advisory Opinion the ICJ rejected the argument made by Israel of the need to protect the life of its citizens as an essential interest of the State.

  214. 214.

    In CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina, the tribunal elaborated the argument in which it recognises ‘Necesity’ as CIL but did not consider that Argentina fullfiled the requirements of Article 25 to declare it. For an academic comment on this case see: ILC (2001) comment to para 25 An interesting contribution has been written by: CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/8 (ICSID) at paras. 315 ff. See also: Reinisch (2006).

  215. 215.

    Thjoernelund Hoelck (2008), p. 436.

  216. 216.

    Here some examples of BIT that include NPM provisions: CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/8 (ICSID) see at para 358; Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 311; Model BIT Canada available [2004] at http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2014; Model Text of the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at: https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf. Accessed 17 August 2015.

  217. 217.

    Agreement Between the Government of the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Ghana for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (India-Ghana) [2000] available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/79/treaty/1785. Accessed 16 September 2015.

  218. 218.

    Nowadays BITs include more self-judging NPM Clauses. As manner of example: the US Model BIT 2004 and 1012 in Art. 18 state that: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed… to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the…’.

  219. 219.

    Nolan and Sourgens (2012), pp. 408 and 417. Two relevant cases are: Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 371; CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/8 (ICSID).

  220. 220.

    Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P v The Argentine Republic [2007] Award ARB/01/3 (ICSID), Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic [ 2007 ] Award ARB/02/16 (ICSID); LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [ 2006a ] Decision on Liability ARB/02/1 (ICSID)see para 245; Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine Republic [2008] Award ARB/03/9 (ICSID) at paras 221 et seq; El Paso Energy International Company v Argentina [ 2006 ] Decision on Jurisdiction ARB/03/15 (ICSID) at para 552.

  221. 221.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2007 ] Decision on Application for Annulment ARB/01/8 (ICSID) para 128 ff.

  222. 222.

    Sempra Energy International v Argentina [2010] Decision on Argentina’s Application for Annulment of the Award ARB/02/16 (ICSID) at para 199.

  223. 223.

    As a manner of example, the U.S BIT Modell from 2012 includes the following self-judging NPM provision: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: (1) to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or (2) to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests’. Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 376.

  224. 224.

    U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty [2012] available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm. Accessed 12 July 2015.

  225. 225.

    van Aaken (2014a), pp. 827, 843 et seqq.

  226. 226.

    A very well summarised article that explains the Argentinean crisis: Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 376. Nowadays there are more than forty cases are pending in which Argentina invoked NPM clauses.

  227. 227.

    On the coordination problems between IFM’s policies and BITs see: The Economist, ‘Argentina’s collapse A decline without parallel’ http://www.economist.com/node/1010911/print. Accessed 12.05.2011.

  228. 228.

    International Monetary Fund (2004).

  229. 229.

    ILC (2001) at art 27.

  230. 230.

    With regard to the use of ‘good faith’ as standard in the context of NPM clauses see: Treaty with Argentina concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment (USA-Argentina) [1991] available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43475.pdf. Accessed 9 July 2016 Article XI.

  231. 231.

    For a well elaborated comment on one Argentinian case see: LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [ 2006a ] Decision on Liability ARB/02/1 (ICSID) at paras 208 ff.

  232. 232.

    Reinisch (2006).

  233. 233.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2007 ] Decision on Application for Annulment ARB/01/8 (ICSID).

  234. 234.

    Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P v The Argentine Republic [ 2005 ] Decision on Jurisdiction ARB/01/3 (ICSID).

  235. 235.

    Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic [ 2007 ] Award ARB/02/16 (ICSID) and also Emergencia Publica y Reforma del Regimen Cambiario. Ley de Convertibilidad 23928. Boletin Oficial 29.810, Página 1.

  236. 236.

    In this regarding the Tribunal stated at para 339:

    ‘As the Tribunal has found above that the crisis invoked does not meet the customary law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility, thus concluding that necessity or emergency are not conducive to the preclusion of wrongfulness, there is no need to undertake a further judicial review under Article XI as this Article does not set out conditions different from customary law in this respect.’ Decreto 1570/2001, 1 December 2001. Boletin Oficial 29.787. Página 1.

  237. 237.

    Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P v The Argentine Republic [ 2005 ] Decision on Jurisdiction ARB/01/3 (ICSID) at para 339.

  238. 238.

    CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentina [ 2005 ] Award ARB/01/8 (ICSID) at para 115.

  239. 239.

    LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [ 2006a ] Decision on Liability ARB/02/1 (ICSID).

  240. 240.

    Article 4 CESCR states: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’.

  241. 241.

    As a manner of examples see: Continental Casualty Company v The Argentine Republic [ 2008 ] Award ARB/03/9 (ICSID) at paras 181, as well as General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1976] United Nations Treaty Series 993 available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. Accessed 15 July 2015 Art. 2, Arts. 12, 18, 19, 21 of the General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [2001] CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2.

  242. 242.

    See for example Art. 8 General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1976] United Nations Treaty Series 993 available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. Accessed 15 July 2015. Arts. 12(3), 18(3), 19(3), 21 and 22 of the General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [2001] CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2.

  243. 243.

    See i.e. Arts. 4 and 8 General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1976] United Nations Treaty Series 993 available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. Accessed 15 July 2015 and Arts. 11, 12(2) and 14 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) [1986] OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.

  244. 244.

    See i.e. Arts. 12(3), 18(3) and 19(3) of the General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [2001] CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 and Art. 11 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) [1986] OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.

  245. 245.

    See supra in Sect. 5.4.3.

  246. 246.

    Arts. 14(1), 21 and 22(2) of the General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [2001] CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2.

  247. 247.

    Art. 8 General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [1976] United Nations Treaty Series 993 available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. Accessed 15 July 2015.

  248. 248.

    As can be read from the travaux préparatoires some delegations opposed the inclusion of a general limitation clause since it was considered as unnecessary. Even more unnecessary could be considered the inclusion of a derogation clause. See: Müller (2009), pp. 557, 561.

  249. 249.

    Art. 4 ICCPR reads: ‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’. Commission on Human Rights (1948).

  250. 250.

    Although the wording might differ the principles as such can be considered as the same as the ones we considered previously.

  251. 251.

    No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.

  252. 252.

    General Assembly (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [2001] CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 and (Commission Nationale de Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad; Malawi African Association and others v Mauritania; Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria). The commision has reiterately stated that: ‘contrary to other human rights instruments, the African Charter does not allow for derogation from obligations due to emergency situations. Thus, even a situation of civil war […] cannot be cited as justification for the violation by the State or its authority to violate the African Charter’ ibid; General Comment No. 29. States of Emergency (Article 4) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 at para 1.

  253. 253.

    Malawi African Association and Others v Mauritania, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [2000] Comm Nos 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (ACHPR) at para 84.

  254. 254.

    One prominent example for this position was the decision of the ILO Commission that based on the ‘circumstances of extreme gravity’ and the limitation in scope and duration, considered strictly necessary the derogation of the right contented in the following Conventions: Commission Nationale de Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad [1992] 74/92 (ACHPR) at para 21; and General Comment No. 29. States of Emergency (Article 4) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.

  255. 255.

    For an overview of the discussion see: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) (adopted 09 July 1948) San Francisco, 31st ILC session (09 Jul 1948).

  256. 256.

    Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) (adopted 01 Jul 1949) Geneva, 32nd ILC session (entry into force: 18 July 1951).

  257. 257.

    See footnote: 253 in this chapter.

  258. 258.

    In addition, as reaffirmed by CESCR: ‘First, because core obligations are non-derogable, they continue to exist in situations of conflict, emergency and natural disaster’. Müller (2009), pp. 557, 594 et seqq.

  259. 259.

    United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1969] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. See also: Rosas and Sandvik-Nylund (2001).

  260. 260.

    Müller (2009), pp. 557, 599.

  261. 261.

    An overview of the discussion can be read in: Economic and Social Council, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/CN12/2001/10, 19) para 18.

  262. 262.

    Müller (2009), pp. 557, 593 see also footnote 48 in Chap. 2.

  263. 263.

    In the framework of humanitarian law the notion of food emergencies has been broadly developed. See: ibid.

  264. 264.

    See first chapter at page: 22.

  265. 265.

    For a similar viewpoint regarding the role of humanitarian law see: Müller (2009), pp. 557, 598.

  266. 266.

    World Food Programme (2005), p. 3.

  267. 267.

    Müller (2009), pp. 557, 598; Lillich (1985), p. 1072, at Article 4.

  268. 268.

    Komoremos (2005), pp. 49, 561 the tribunal recognised that: ‘…from 1 December 2001 until 26 April 2003, Argentina was in a period of crisis during which it was necessary to enact measures to maintain public order and protect its essential security interests’.

  269. 269.

    Protracted crisis are defined by the FAO as: ‘Those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provides adequate levels of protection.’ Despouy (1999) paras 69 ff.

  270. 270.

    LG&E Energy Corporation and others v Argentina [2006b] Award ARB/02/1 (ICSID) at para 226.

  271. 271.

    Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010), p. 1.

  272. 272.

    See footnote: 253 in this chapter.

  273. 273.

    See footnote: 266 in this chapter.

  274. 274.

    In a separate contribution we will offer a deep analysis about the possibilities IIL offers to require host states the activation of humanitarian law before undertaking measures affecting foreign investors in case of state of emergencies caused by famines.

  275. 275.

    See page: 155 of this study.

  276. 276.

    See page: 157 of this study.

  277. 277.

    See page: 157 of this study.

  278. 278.

    This following Article 31 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010), p. 1.

  279. 279.

    See page: 169 of this paper.

  280. 280.

    See in page 169 the reference made concerning the case Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2010), p. 19.

  281. 281.

    This as considered by tribunal in: Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P v The Argentine Republic [ 2005 ] Decision on Jurisdiction ARB/01/3 (ICSID) at para 339.

  282. 282.

    See Sect. 5.7.2 of this study.

  283. 283.

    Herewith are IIA referred. The word contract is used to maintain a concordance with the technical vocabulary.

  284. 284.

    See Sect. 1.4 of this study.

  285. 285.

    Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control BIVAC B.V. v The Republic of Paraguay [ 2009 ] Award ARB/07/9 (ICSID).

  286. 286.

    As a manner of example one can mention the potential liability from the cases that Argentina has could be greater than U.S.D 8 billion, which is higher than the entire financial reserves of Argentina in 2002. Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 330. An additional well known case is Arts. 50 et seqq. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States [1965] 17 UST 1270 TIAS 6090 575 UNTS 159. In this case Occidental awarded damages reached US$1.77 billion (US$2.3 billion with interest applied).

  287. 287.

    See Sect. 5.7 of this study.

  288. 288.

    See Sect. 1.4 of this study.

  289. 289.

    See Chap. 5.

  290. 290.

    See Sect. 5.7 of this study.

  291. 291.

    Some scholars have also recommended the incorporation of a ‘margin of appreciation’ approach as developed in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), at footnote 13 in Chap. 1.

  292. 292.

    As stated in the literature: ‘with respect to the U.S. BIT program, however, the U.S. interpretation of NPM clauses as self-judging has been so consistent, open, and notorious since 1984, that any investor expectations that such clauses were not self-judging cannot be legitimate and should not be given significant weight by arbitral tribunals’. Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador [ 2004 ] Final Award UN3467 (LCIA).

  293. 293.

    About internalisation of norms in HRL see: Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 370.

  294. 294.

    See page 313 of this study.

  295. 295.

    To have a notion about the scope of the data collection made by IOs consult: Burke-White and Von Staden (2007), p. 406. For more concrete issues see the data base elaborated by the World Food Program: Goodman and Jinks (2004), p. 620.

    As manner of example, the World Food Programme need to be mentioned: The WPF is a unique network of food security analysts that works closely with national governments, UN partners and more than 2000 national and international NGOs. It is an autonomous programme, with juridical personality. It is a subsidiary of the UN the FAO. The main goal is to inform about the policies and programmes that WFP and its parents adopt in order to fight hunger in different circumstances. The programme has the most advanced technology which includes satellite imagery, geographic information system (GIS) and mobile data collection platforms. The activities of the programme are divided into a range of assessments that allow the identification of famines around the globe. The programme has developed fast reaction policies for cases of emergencies as well as alert assessments that allow the anticipation of the of proper food distribution plans. See: Nunn and Qian (2010); The World Bank (2016) and Shaw (2011), p. xxiii.

  296. 296.

    To have a notion about the scope of the data collection made by IOs consult: Art. VIII World Food Program General Regulations and Rules available at http://one.wfp.org/aboutwfp/how_run/GeneralRegulations_E.pdf [accessed 11.13.2013]. For more concrete issues see the data base elaborated by the World Food Program: Shaw (2011), p. 4.

  297. 297.

    Source: Nunn and Qian (2010).

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    Luis Tomás Montilla Fernández

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Montilla Fernández, L.T. (2017). Tackling Opportunism in LSLIs. In: Large-Scale Land Investments in Least Developed Countries. International Law and Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65280-1_5

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