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Economic Analysis of Contract Law pp 191–198Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Concluding Notes

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Abstract

The economic analysis of contract law is a vast subject that synchronises the theory of contract and legal premises. In this book the author has attempted to cover a limited sphere that deals with incomplete contracting under asymmetric information. The work is now summed up.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India

    Sugata Bag

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  1. Sugata Bag
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Bag, S. (2018). Concluding Notes. In: Economic Analysis of Contract Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_7

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-65267-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-65268-9

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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