Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information



So far, the author has been dealing with situations where one of the two contracting parties obtains certain private information related to his or her cost or valuation in the post-contractual scenario. However, it often happens that both parties may obtain private information. Therefore, in this chapter, the author extends his previous analyses, by allowing two-sided ex post private information that creates an environment where either party contemplates breaching, despite investing in reliance in their respective valuations.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

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