Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry
- 630 Downloads
In this chapter we extend our basic unilateral investment model discussed in the previous chapter into a setting of two-sided reliance investments in an environment where one of the contracting parties in the post-contracting phase receives information about his or her utility privately.
KeywordsReliable Billing Reliable Investment Restitution Damages Seller's Breach Wrong Expectations
- Bebchuk, L. A. (1984). Litigation and settlement under imperfect information. The RAND Journal of Economics, 404–415.Google Scholar
- Edlin, A. S., & Reichelstein, S. (1996). Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. The American Economic Review, 478–501.Google Scholar
- Rubinstein, A. (1985). A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1151–1172.Google Scholar