Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry



In this chapter we extend our basic unilateral investment model discussed in the previous chapter into a setting of two-sided reliance investments in an environment where one of the contracting parties in the post-contracting phase receives information about his or her utility privately.


Reliable Billing Reliable Investment Restitution Damages Seller's Breach Wrong Expectations 
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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

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