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Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry

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Abstract

In the bulk of the existing incomplete contract literature initiated by

Keywords

Efficient Breach Wrong Expectations Reliable Damage Restitution Damages Seller's Breach 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

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