Basics of Economic Theory of Contract



The organisation of the market and the institutions in many ways govern economic relationships and contracts. And any discussion of contract law, without the understanding of the basic mechanism of contracts would be futile. Therefore, in this chapter, we revisit the basics of economic theory of contracts to focus on models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions related to trade between two privately informed agents in well defined institutional settings.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

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