The first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by the self interest. The workings of this principle may be viewed under two aspects, according as the agent acts without, or with, the consent of others affected by his actions. In wide senses, the first species of action may be called war, the second, contract.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

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