Abstract
In this chapter I take up the question of how Aristotle understood the relationship between the contemplative life and the active life in contributing to human flourishing and to the political regime. While the connections between Aristotle’s ethics and politics are abundant, there exists a prevalent assumption in the inclusive/dominant debate concerning the interpretation of eudaimonia (human flourishing) that Aristotle’s Politics cannot or should not play a prominent role in helping to understand eudaimonia. On the ‘inclusivist’ reading, eudaimonia is understood as being a composite of all human goods or virtues. On the ‘dominant’ reading, eudaimonia is understood as being a single dominant good, theōria (contemplation). With this chapter I offer a competing interpretation which is in some ways similar to the recent ‘all-inclusive’ reading, but which relies heavily on the connection between Aristotle’s ethics and politics in order to explain how theōria fits into humans’ composite and political nature.
I would like to thank James Duerlinger, Sarah Jansen, Dhananjay Jagannathan, and Ian O’Loughlin for their time in discussing these ideas and their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.
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Notes
- 1.
Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the NE are taken from Hippocrates Apostle’s 1984 translation.
- 2.
Irwin’s 1999 translation.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Ackrill 1980, 27.
- 6.
Ackrill 1980, 27.
- 7.
Ackrill 1980, 29.
- 8.
Nagel 1980, 7.
- 9.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, one of the inclusivists’ arguments is that eudaimonia cannot consist in theōria (contemplation), because humans and God(s) share this ability and therefore it does not fit into Aristotle’s understanding of the specific human ergon (function). In response to this, the defenders of the dominant interpretation have argued that humans are not the same as other composites which are simply a collection of constituent parts. In humans there is a hierarchy of capacities. The most perfect activity for a human is contemplation (theōria) and this is not done for the sake of anything other than itself. The inclusivist picture of eudaimonia does not seem to be able to account for this because contemplation is not simply one constituent joined with others; it exceeds these other activities and capacities in its perfection and is not concerned with them. The activity of theōria is not concerned with achieving an end outside of itself; since it is the highest good, it is done simply for the sake of itself. The ethical virtues then take on “essentially a caretaker function of reason” (Nagel 1980, 12). The practical everyday concerns of humans are important in keeping one alive but they are inferior to the divine activity of contemplation. The dominant account is not denying that humans are composite beings constituted by practical reason (phronēsis) and theoretical reason (theōria); it simply holds that eudaimonia consists in theōria.
- 10.
Liu 2011, 58
- 11.
Liu 2011, 58.
- 12.
Liu 2011, 60.
- 13.
“Sophia is a combination of nous [understanding] and epistēmē [scientific knowledge]; it is epistēmē of the most honorable things [tōn timiōtatōn]” (NE 6.7 1141a18-20). (Irwin’s 1999 translation, with Liu’s amendments).
- 14.
Liu 2011, 61. One constraint that is placed on this ‘all-inclusive interpretation’ is that the contemplator/philosopher will possess all the intellectual virtues except technē (craft or art). In reaching this conclusion Liu relies on passages from the Politics (Pol) in which Aristotle makes clear that craftsmen and artisans are not prime candidates for eudaimonia, because they do not have the requisite leisure time needed to contemplate. This is one aspect of Liu’s all-inclusive interpretation that I believe is mistaken and I will address it in the following section.
- 15.
Irwin’s 1999 translation.
- 16.
Liu 2011, 62.
- 17.
Liu 2011, 62-63.
- 18.
This is based on Aristotle’s proclamation in NE 6.13 that one has all the moral virtues when (if and only if) one has phronēsis (1145a2-3). For Aristotle this is because phronēsis is that which determines what one ought to do in any particular situation by allowing the person to perceive the mean between two excesses and this mean corresponds to the virtues (1106b36-1107a2).
- 19.
In Liu’s defense of the all-inclusive interpretation he spends considerable time responding to the objection that the all-inclusive contemplator/philosopher would neglect acting morally in order to contemplate more often. I take Liu’s preoccupation with this problem as a clear sign that the heart and soul of his interpretation has (or should have) closer ties to a dominant interpretation than an inclusive account. The first reason being that for an inclusivist, this problem of how the contemplator will juggle moral responsibilities with contemplation should not be troubling. They understand eudaimonia to be inclusive of all the virtues (moral and intellectual) and if someone were to neglect the moral virtues in order to contemplate then they would simply not be eudaimon because they would not be demonstrating all of the virtues. The second reason, which I will spell out in more detail in the following section, is tied to the way in which Liu responds to the problem. He attempts to show that the philosopher/contemplator will possess all of the moral and intellectual virtues. I agree with this position, but the clearest way to understand what Aristotle says about this is that they are necessary conditions for, not constituents of eudaimonia.
- 20.
See also NE 2.2 1103b26-32.
- 21.
- 22.
See also NE 1.9 1099b30-1100a3.
- 23.
See: “Such a life, of course, would be above that of a man, for a man will live in this manner not insofar as he is a man, but insofar as he has something divine in him” (NE 10.7 1177b27-28) and “Being human, however, a man will need external resources also; for his nature is not self-suffi cient for contemplation but he needs a healthy body and nourishment and other services [though not an excess, only moderate means]” (NE 10.8 1178b34-9a9).
- 24.
For a nice discussion of the extent to which virtue, virtuous activity, and individuals’ good are shared political activities held in common with other individuals (citizens) see Lott, chapter 9 in this collection.
- 25.
“Since human beings are ‘born for citizenships,’ they will attain their good only in a political community designed to promote their happiness and well-being, and hence giving them opportunities to perform the admirable actions characteristic of courage and the other moral virtues in their highest forms. But citizenship – belonging to the political community – provides not only a framework for the good life, but is itself realized above all by participation in the system of rule by which a city is governed, and which in a political… system will be a matter of taking one’s turn at ruling as well as being ruled by others. Participation in rule is what accordingly enables someone to exercise the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom [phronēsis] in the way that is most important and meaningful” (Schofield 2006, 320).
- 26.
See also NE 10.8 1178a17-19.
- 27.
Lott, in this volume, discusses the claim(s) made by John Cooper – specifically the claim that Aristotelian virtue and happieness are essentially communal and political and that all citizens can be said to be living a “good and excellent life” when they live in a society where the moral and intellectual virtues are posseses by members of the community. Lott argues that this radically communal and political view about virtue is correct with regard to the moral virtues but incorrect concerning the intellectual virtues (and thus incorrect concerning happiness). I agree with Lott, but I believe there is a bit more that could be said. I think some sense can be made of Cooper’s claim that all citizens could be said to be living a “good and excellent life” (a claim that Lott rejects) within my account of Aristotelian eudainonia. Even though non-philosophers lack the dominant virtue of eudaimonia (theōria) they could still be said to be happy, but it would be of a different kind. Instead of sharing in the eudaimonia of contemplation they would be happy in a distinctly human way of participating in the other moral and intellectual virtues. On this model God would be the only being who is said to have unqualified eudaimonia, but humans who achieve all the necessary conditions (the moral and intellectual virtues) and are thus able to contemplate philosophically (theōria) can also be said to eudaimon because they approach as closely as possible to the pure activity of God. These two types of eudaimonia are of the same kind but differ in degree. Howerver, there could be (at least) one further category of individuals – those who are not able to contemplate (i.e., non-philosophers) who can still be called happy in a distinctly human way by exhibiting the moral and some intellectual virtues. This would not be the same kind of happiness that God or the contemplator/philosopher experiences, but it could still be considered living a “good and excellent life.” This seems to be one way to soften and make sense of Cooper’s controversial claims concerning communal and political virtue and happiness.
- 28.
Liu 2011, 62.
- 29.
“As for [unqualified] prudence [phronēsis], it is a virtue proper to a ruler alone; for it seems that the other [virtues] must be common to both rulers and ruled. Prudence [without qualification] is certainly not a virtue of one who is ruled [qua ruled]” (Pol 3.4 1277b26-30). For the Politics I use Hippocrates Apostle and Lloyd Gerson’s translation in Aristotle 1991.
- 30.
This interpretation also helps make sense of Aristotle’s interesting preoccupation with ‘friendship’ in the NE, see books 8 and 9, particularly 9.9.
- 31.
Ackrill 1980, 32.
- 32.
Liu 2011, 64.
- 33.
See e.g. Pol 1.10 1258a22 and NE 10.9 1181b1.
- 34.
See Pol 1.1 1252a1-8 and 3.12 1282b15-18.
- 35.
Ackrill 1980, 29.
- 36.
See n. 26.
- 37.
In addition to the historical relevancy of this debate, there is added importance because many contemporary virtue ethicists take Aristotle’s ethics as their starting point. If my interpretation is correct, and Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood without his politics, then there would seem to be implications for contemporary ethical theories and political philosophy that is rooted in Aristotelian virtue ethics.
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Collins, B.J. (2017). A Political Interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics. In: Cohen de Lara, E., Brouwer, R. (eds) Aristotle’s Practical Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64825-5_10
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