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Appraising Electoral Equality: Goodness-of-Fit Criteria

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Abstract

Perfect electoral equality is a conceptual ideal defying reality. A certain degree of inequality must be tolerated in practice. Ways and means are discussed on how to numerically evaluate the inevitable residue of disproportionality. Three approaches are explored. A first approach investigates all-embracing goodness-of-fit criteria; that is, functions that measure a system’s deviation from ideal equality by a single real number. Different criteria are seen to lead to different methods. A second approach applies disparity functions to pairwise comparisons. The aim is to reduce a pending imbalance by transferring a seat from a party that is advantaged to another party that is disadvantaged. A third approach examines whether the parties’ realized shares of seats and ideal shares of seats are as close to each other as could be.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Every reference concludes with a list [A. b, C. d, …] of Sects. A. b, C. d, etc. where the reference is quoted. The chapter “Notes and Comments” is indicated by “N”. The reference sources in the individual sections of Chap. 16 are not repeated here.

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    Friedrich Pukelsheim

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Pukelsheim, F. (2017). Appraising Electoral Equality: Goodness-of-Fit Criteria. In: Proportional Representation. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_10

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