Two-Stage Election Procedures
The standard two-stage voting rules Plurality Elimination and Negative Plurality Elimination are evaluated relative to Borda Rule on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency. Theoretical analysis shows that the Condorcet Efficiency of these two-stage voting rules consistently marginally dominate Borda Rule as the various measures of group mutual coherence change. However, it is also found that the probability that either of the two-stage rules will elect a different candidate than the winner by Borda Rule is quite small. Empirically-based analysis reinforces this observation to lead to the general conclusion that the additional effort that is required to use a two-stage voting rule, rather than simply using Borda Rule, is not likely to be worthwhile. Other benefits are considered that result from using Borda Rule rather than a two-stage voting rule.
- Black, D. (1958). The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- de Condorcet, M. (1788a). On discovering the plurality will in an election. In I. McLean & F. Hewitt (Eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of social choice and political theory (pp. 148–156). Hants: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
- de Condorcet, M. (1788b). On the form of elections. In I. McLean & F. Hewitt (Eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of social choice and political theory (pp. 139–147). Hants: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
- de Condorcet, M. (1789). On the form of elections. In I. McLean & F. Hewitt (Eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of social choice and political theory (pp. 169–189). Hants: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
- Gehrlein, W. V., Lepelley, D., & Plassmann, F. (2017, forthcoming). An evaluation of the benefit of using two-stage election procedures. Homo Oeconomicus.Google Scholar
- Lepelley, D., Moyouwou, I., & Samoui, H. (2015). Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules. Social Choice and Welfare. doi: 10.13140/RG.2.1.5075.4961.
- Miller, N. R. (2016). Monotonicity failure in IRV elections with three candidates: Closeness matters. Working paper. Available at http://userpages.umbc.edu/~nmiller/
- Saari, D. G. (1996). The mathematical symmetry of choosing. Mathematica Japonica, 44, 183–200.Google Scholar
- Santucci, J. (2016, October 13). Will ranked-choice voting succeed in Maine? That depends on the Democrats. Washington Post. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/13/will-ranked-choice-voting-succeed-in-maine-that-depends-on-the-democrats/?utm_term=.b638c7d53918
- Seelye, K. Q. (2016, December 3). Maine adopts ranked-choice voting: What is it and how will it work. New York Times. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html?_r=0