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Two-Stage Election Procedures

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Dominique Lepelley
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Abstract

The standard two-stage voting rules Plurality Elimination and Negative Plurality Elimination are evaluated relative to Borda Rule on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency. Theoretical analysis shows that the Condorcet Efficiency of these two-stage voting rules consistently marginally dominate Borda Rule as the various measures of group mutual coherence change. However, it is also found that the probability that either of the two-stage rules will elect a different candidate than the winner by Borda Rule is quite small. Empirically-based analysis reinforces this observation to lead to the general conclusion that the additional effort that is required to use a two-stage voting rule, rather than simply using Borda Rule, is not likely to be worthwhile. Other benefits are considered that result from using Borda Rule rather than a two-stage voting rule.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
    • 1
  • Dominique Lepelley
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.University of La RéunionSaint-Denis, Ile de La RéunionFrance

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