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Single-Stage Election Procedures

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Dominique Lepelley
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Abstract

A discussion is presented regarding the single-stage election procedures Plurality, Negative Plurality, and Borda Rules; with an emphasis on their Condorcet Efficiency, which measures their propensity to elect the Condorcet Winner. A theoretical analysis shows how the Condorcet Efficiency of these voting rules change as the various measures of group mutual coherence change. Both Plurality and Negative Plurality Rules are found to perform very poorly over identifiable ranges of the defined measures of group mutual coherence. While Borda Rule is not always found to be the most Condorcet Efficient single-stage rule in all scenarios, it never performs poorly under any scenario. These theoretical results are then reinforced by empirically-based analysis to show very solid support for using Borda Rule, despite some concerns that have been expressed that Borda Rule requires voters to rank candidates, while Plurality and Negative Plurality Rules do not.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
    • 1
  • Dominique Lepelley
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.University of La RéunionSaint-Denis, Ile de La RéunionFrance

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