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The Court’s Case Law on Direct Effect of International Agreements (Free Trade Associations, Accession Associations, Development Associations and EEA) and Status of WTO Law

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Abstract

This chapter aims at investigating the symmetries and invariances of the Court’s case law on direct effect in order to suggest a conceptual framework for the recognition or denial of the possibility of direct effect of international agreements in the EU legal order. The chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 2 examines the concept of direct effect, and deals with the formula for direct effect. Section 3 considers the Court’s different approaches towards the (absence of) direct effect of GATT rules and WTO agreements and towards the possible direct effect of provisions of free trade associations, accession associations, development associations, and of provisions of the EEA Agreement. Section 4 establishes that the ‘wording, purpose and nature’ component of the twofold test for direct effect is a method to interpret the objective intention of the contracting parties, which is relevant when considering whether an agreement is capable of having direct effect. Also, the section establishes that the European Courts distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parameters when interpreting the objective intention of the contracting parties. Section 5 suggests that only a holistic approach is adequate to identify the objective intention of the contracting parties, and argues that the Court’s case law on direct effect is a symmetrical phenomenon, as the Court’s different approaches on direct effect can be reconciled. Section 6 turns to the technical aspects of the question of indirect effects—which is an Incurse in this chapter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a recent contribution see Nicolas Rennuy and Peter van Elsuwege, ‘Integration without membership and the dynamic development of EU law: United Kingdom v. Council (EEA)’ (2014) 51 CMLR 935–954.

  2. 2.

    Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration EU:C:1963:1, [1963] ECR 1.

  3. 3.

    See, however: Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:3, [1976] ECR 129, Opinion of AG Trabucchi, para 5, who was reluctant to accept, without reservation, the extension of the concept of direct effect (Van Gend en Loos) and supremacy (ENEL) to any international agreement.

  4. 4.

    For the opposite view: Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘Epilogue: Symbiosis?’ in Jolande M Prinssen and Annette Schrauwen (eds), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine; Proceedings of the Annual Colloquium of the G. K. van Hogendorp Centre for European Constitutional Studies (The Hogendorp Papers, Europa Law Publ. Groningen 2002) 255.

  5. 5.

    Under Lisbon pillar three merged with pillar one. Please note, however, that Haegeman was a first pillar case pre-Lisbon: Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41,[1974] ECR 449.

  6. 6.

    Transformation and implementation of international agreements are two different legal terms that need to be distinguished. I. MacLeod, I.D. Hendry and Stephen Hyett The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 128 Haegeman is linked to the term ‘transformation’.

  7. 7.

    Imposed by Article 9 (3) of Regulation (EEC) No 816/70 of the Council of 28 April 1970 laying down additional provisions for the common organisation of the market in wine [1970] OJ L99.

  8. 8.

    Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, paras 3–5.

  9. 9.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 13; Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719, para 7; Case 30/88 Greece v Commission EU:C:1989:422, [1989] ECR 3711, para 12; Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 41; Case C-321/97 Andersson v Svenska staten EU:C:1999:307, [1999] ECR I-3551, para 26; Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland EU:C:2006:345, [2006] ECR I-4635, para 82; Case C-344/04 The Queen, on the application of International Air Transport Association and European Low Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport EU:C:2006:10, [2006] ECR I-403, para 36; Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and Merck Sharp & Dohme Ldª EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001, para 31.

  10. 10.

    There is a debate on whether the Court adopted a dualistic/or a monistic philosophy towards international law, e.g. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois Trade Law Experienced: Pottering about in the GATT and WTO (Cameron May, London 2005) 171–172. Jacques Bourgeois argues that the Court adopted from Haegeman (Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449) to Racke (Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655) a monistic approach. In the same vein, Robert Schütze, ‘On ‘Middle Ground’ The European Community and Public International Law’ (2007) EUI Working Paper No. 2007/13.

  11. 11.

    Further there is a debate in literature on what ‘integral part’ means (monism vs. dualism): Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod Droit communautaire et droit international public: Etudes des sources internationales de l’ordre juridique des Communautés européennes (Georg, Genève 1979) 104–106 and Ramses A. Wessel ‘Reconsidering the relationship between international and EU law: towards a content-based approach?’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds) International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 7–33 extensively consider the notions of monism and dualism.

  12. 12.

    An international agreement incorporated into the Union’s legal order is, however, not per se directly applicable. Cf. J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect-Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law’ (1972) 9 CMLR 425, 427.

  13. 13.

    Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, para 5; Case C-321/97 Andersson v Svenska staten EU:C:1999:307, [1999] ECR I-3551, para 26; Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos – Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and Merck Sharp & Dohme Ldª EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001, para 31.

  14. 14.

    Gerhard Bebr, ‘Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: from International Fruit Company to Kupferberg’ (1983) 20 CMLR 35, 40.

  15. 15.

    Occasionally, the Court used the terms interchangeably. On direct applicability and direct effect e.g. Jörg Gerkrath, ‘Direct Effect in Germany and France; a Constitutional Comparison’ in Jolande M Prinssen and Annette Schrauwen (eds), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine; Proceedings of the Annual Colloquium of the G. K. van Hogendorp Centre for European Constitutional Studies (The Hogendorp Papers, Europa Law Publ. Groningen 2002) 131–133.

  16. 16.

    J.A. Winter (n 12) 425.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Alicia Hinarejos, ‘On the Legal Effects of Framework Decisions and Decisions: Directly Applicable, Directly Effective, Self-Executing, Supreme?’ (2008) 14 ELJ 620, 625. This distinction between direct applicability and direct effect has been backed by the Court in its case law e.g. Case 41/74 van Duyn v Home Office EU:C:1974:133, [1974] ECR 1337.

  19. 19.

    Direct applicability in cases where the agreement is implemented through national legislation seems problematic: the direct applicability of international treaties may lead the national courts to modify the scope of the implementing legislation by extending or restricting their scope of application; any such extension or restriction might affect the manner in which the national parliament exercises its legislative competences: Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG EU:C:1991:91, [1991] ECR I-935, para 46 (impact of the notion of direct applicability on the division of powers).

  20. 20.

    On the domestic applicability of international treaties (with GATT and the European Social Charter as examples): Albert Bleckmann, Begriff und Kriterien der innerstaatlichen Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge: Versuch einer allgemeinen Theorie des self-executing treaty auf rechtsvergleichender Grundlage (Schriften zum Öffentlichen Recht, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1970); Arnold Koller, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge und des EWG-Vertrages im innerstaatlichen Bereich (Schweizerische Beiträge zum Europarecht, Stämpfli, Bern 1971); Manfred Zuleeg, ‘Die innerstaatliche Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge am Beispiel des GATT und der europäischen Sozialcharta’ (1975) 35 ZaöRV 341, 341–361.

  21. 21.

    “Enforceability” is broader than the notion of creating rights, and allows to successfully rely upon provisions, which do not as such create rights. See Sacha Prechal, ‘Does direct effect still matter?’ (2000) 37 CMLR 1050–51. For further discussion, Thomas Eilmansberger, ‘The relationship between rights and remedies in EC Law: In search of the missing link’ (2004) 41 CMLR 1199, 1202–06; W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 CMLR 501; Matthias Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 34 CMLR 307, 312. See also, for example, Case C-128/92 Banks v British Coal EU:C:1993:860, [1994] ECR I-1237, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para 27. According to Advocate General van Gerven the ‘direct effect’ test is whether the provision is ‘sufficiently operational in itself to be applied by a court.’

  22. 22.

    Cf. Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 22–23 (FTA with Portugal). The quotation stems from: Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719, para 14 (EEC-Turkey AA). Confirmed in: Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 15 (EEC-Morocco CA); Case C-432/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others EU:C:1994:277, [1994] ECR I-3087, para 23 (EEC-Cyprus AA); Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 31 (EEC-Yugoslavia CA); Case C-262/96 Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228, [1999] ECR I-2685, para 60 (EEC-Turkey AA); Case C-416/96 El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 25 (EEC-Morocco CA); Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 39 (EEC-Turkey AA); Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 30 (EA with Poland); Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 31 (EA with Bulgaria); Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 31 (EA with the Czech Republic); Case C-162/00 Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 19 (EA with Poland).

  23. 23.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 20; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110 (spirit, general scheme and terms of GATT agreements); Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 47 (nature and structure of WTO agreements).

  24. 24.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.

  25. 25.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48.

  26. 26.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 26.

  27. 27.

    Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 25–27; Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 54; Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 38; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 39; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I-8615, paras 26 and 28; Case C-162/00 Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 30; Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30; Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others v Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18.

  28. 28.

    Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18, [1976] ECR 129, para 25; Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160, [1994] ECR I-1353, paras 16–19; Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, paras 34–35; Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368,[1996] ECR I-4807, paras 19–20; Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34; Case C-416/96 El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 32; Case C-179/98 Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549, [1999] ECR I-7955, para 14; Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29.

  29. 29.

    Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100–102.

  30. 30.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.

  31. 31.

    Commission Regulations (EEC) Nos 459/70 [1970] OJ L57/20, 565/70 [1970] OJ L69/33 and 686/70 [1970] OJ L84/21, respectively.

  32. 32.

    Before the establishment of the WTO system only the Member States of the Community were formal GATT contracting parties.

  33. 33.

    Reaffirmed in: Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 105.

  34. 34.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 19 and 20.

  35. 35.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27.

  36. 36.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 21; Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and 269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SPI and SAMI EU:C:1983:78,[1983] ECR 801, para 23; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 106; Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, para 26.

  37. 37.

    Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.

  38. 38.

    Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 107 and 108. Cf. Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 26 f. 42.

  39. 39.

    Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 107 and 108 those features preclude individuals from invoking provisions of the GATT 47 before the national courts; and reaffirms as to why the GATT 47 should not be given direct effect.

  40. 40.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 19–27; Case 9/73 Carl Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lörrach EU:C:1973:110, [1973] ECR 1135, paras 28–30; Case 266/81 SIOT v Ministero delle finanze, Ministero della marina mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste and Ente autonomo del porto di Trieste EU:C:1983:77, [1983] ECR 731, para 28; Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and 269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SPI and SAMI EU:C:1983:78, [1983] ECR 801, para 26.

  41. 41.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 26.

  42. 42.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 28.

  43. 43.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.

  44. 44.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.

  45. 45.

    The new system for the settlement of disputes is set out in: Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986–1994) – Annex 2 – Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (WTO) [1994] OJ L336/234.

  46. 46.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119 f. 92.

  47. 47.

    Responsible for dispute settlement: Article IV(3) WTO Agreement.

  48. 48.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29. On the adoption of panel reports: Article 16 (4) of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes.

  49. 49.

    Article XXI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATTS), Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986–1994) – Annex 1 – Annex 1B – General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO) [1994] OJ L336/191.

  50. 50.

    Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986–1994) – Annex 1 – Annex 1A – Agreement on Safeguards (WTO-GATT 1994) [1994] OJ L336/184. The total period of application of a safeguard measure shall not exceed eight years, Article 7 (3) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

  51. 51.

    Compensation and the suspension of concessions continue to be available: see Article 22 (1) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2 to the WTO) and Article 22 (2) for the possibility to conclude agreements on mutually acceptable compensation.

  52. 52.

    Abbreviated: DSU.

  53. 53.

    Article 22 (1) DSU.

  54. 54.

    Article 22 (2) DSU.

  55. 55.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.

  56. 56.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, paras 119–128.

  57. 57.

    Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023, Opinion of AG Elmer, paras 27–30.

  58. 58.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 22–37.

  59. 59.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119.

  60. 60.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 127.

  61. 61.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119 f. 92.

  62. 62.

    Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997] ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 120.

  63. 63.

    Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023, Opinion of AG Elmer, paras 27–30.

  64. 64.

    Council Decision 94/800 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986–1994) [1994] OJ L336/1.

  65. 65.

    Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023, Opinion of AG Elmer, para 29. Critics have argued that Advocate General Elmer did not examine the possible reasons for reconsidering the pre-Uruguay case law, or acknowledged that such reasons existed; e.g. Steve Peers, ‘Constitutional principles and international trade’ (1999) 24 ELRev. 185, 191 and 192; an issue which has been extensively discussed – e.g. Judson Osterhoudt Berkey, ‘The European Court of Justice and direct effect for the GATT: a question worth revisiting’ (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 626–657 – a thorough exploration of the legal, political and economic issues involved in analysing the issue of direct effect and attempt to illustrate the competing considerations facing the Court (that is, opposing views of Advocate General Cosmas and Advocate General Tesauro) in deciding whether to grant direct effect to GATT 94; its purpose is not to advocate a particular position.

  66. 66.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 22–37. In issue was the direct effect of a provision of the TRIPs Agreement.

  67. 67.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 25. In this context the Advocate General could not refrain from criticising the GATT 1947 case law. In his opinion the characteristics of GATT are not very different from those provisions of agreements to which the Court has attributed direct effect (para 27).

  68. 68.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 28–29.

  69. 69.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 30. This approach is also reflected in literature: Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement System—The Impact on the European Community’ (1995) 29 JWT 49, 63; Miquel Montañá I Mora, ‘Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court of Justice of the European Communities to Refuse Direct Effect to the Uruguay Round Agreements?’ (1996) 30 JWT 43, 51; and Philp Lee and Brian Kennedy, ‘The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law’(1996) 30 JWT 67, 78. Philp Lee and Brian Kennedy provide a thorough examination of the changes concerning the provisions relied upon to deny direct effect in International Fruit.

  70. 70.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395.

  71. 71.

    Council Decision 96/386 concerning the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and between the European Community and the Republic of India on arrangements in the area of market access for textile products [1996] OJ L153/47.

  72. 72.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:92, [1999] ECR I-8395, Opinion of AG Saggio, para 18.

  73. 73.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, paras 34–48.

  74. 74.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 47, as referred to by: Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council EU:C:2001:621, [2001] ECR I-8853, para 53; Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307, para 44; Case C-377/98 Netherlands v European Parliament and Council EU:C:2001:523, [2001] ECR I-7079, para 52 (the Rio de Janeiro Convention on Biological Diversity was contrasted with WTO law); Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851, para 53; Case C-307/99 OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen EU:C:2001:228, [2001] ECR I-3159, para 24; Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 93; Case C-76/00 P Petrotub SA and Republica SA v Council EU:C:2003:4, [2003] ECR I-79, para 53; Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd EU:C:2002:741, [2002] ECR I-11453, para 154.

  75. 75.

    [1994] OJ L336/1.

  76. 76.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48.

  77. 77.

    The Court has attracted criticism for denying direct effect to WTO rules: Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘The Chiquita and Van Parys Judgments: An Exception to the Rule of Law’ (2005) 32 L.I.E.I. 449, 462.

  78. 78.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 36.

  79. 79.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 40.

  80. 80.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro.

  81. 81.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 31.

  82. 82.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 31. Moreover, the Advocate General considered if the lack of reciprocity in the recognition of direct effect leads to an absence of reciprocity in the implementation of WTO agreements, but left it to the Court to undertake an abstract evaluation (paras 34 and 35). On that issue see further: Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 44.

  83. 83.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 45.

  84. 84.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 46.

  85. 85.

    Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569.

  86. 86.

    Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2001:470, [2002] ECR I-2569, Opinion of AG Alber, paras 92–96.

  87. 87.

    See Francis Snyder, ‘The gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law’ (2003) 40 CMLR 313–367, at 329–335.

  88. 88.

    See Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2006) 271.

  89. 89.

    Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 86.

  90. 90.

    Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 89.

  91. 91.

    Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 91.

  92. 92.

    Stefan Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union. Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council’ (2000) 3 J.I.E.L. 441–472, at 450–467. Similar arguments have been brought forward by others. See especially Naboth van den Broek, ‘Legal Persuasion, Political Realism, and Legitimacy: the European Court’s Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order’ (2001) 4 J.I.E.L. 411–440; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The status of WTO Law in the Community Legal Order: Some Comments in the Light of the Portuguese Textiles Case’ (2000) 25 ELRev. 293–302.

  93. 93.

    See Griller, above (n 92), at 450–54. The DSU provides that retaliation as well as compensation are mere temporary measures in cases of non-implementation of recommendations and rulings within a reasonable time.

  94. 94.

    AG Saggio in para 23 of his conclusions in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:92, [1999] ECR I-8395 referred to the reciprocity principle also there is a detailed reasoning on reciprocity in paras 31–35 of AG Tesauro’s conclusion in Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603.

  95. 95.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 42.

  96. 96.

    See Griller, above (n 92), at 458.

  97. 97.

    Ibid, at 462.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    See Marise Cremona, ‘Rhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral Context’ (2001) 38 CMLR 359–396, at 371–377.

  100. 100.

    See Allan Rosas, ‘Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council. Judgment of the Full Court of 23 November 1999, nyr.’ (2000) 37 CMLR 797–816, at 808–815.

  101. 101.

    See Mario Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements. Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques. (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, Oxford 2013) 203–217; id., ‘The Enforcement of EU Agreements: Bolstering the effectiveness of Treaty law?’ (2010) 47 CMLR 1719–1756, at 1743–1747; id., ‘The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques’ (2010) 21 E.J.I.L. 83–104, at 95–97.

  102. 102.

    See Piet Eeckhout, ‘Judicial Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some Further Reflections’ (2002) 5 J.I.E.L. 91–110 at 92–101 and id. ‘The domestic legal status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems’ (1997) 34 CMLR 11–58; id., EU External Relations Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 323–383, at 343–350 and 375–378. UNCLOS was a second case of an important multilateral agreement which cannot be relied upon in EU litigation. The Advocate General’s arguments in the discussion of the direct effect of UNCLOS were derived from WTO case law. Eeckhout described that the case law of the Court continued to show openness towards international law, but in his view less than before (the majority of cases which had come before the Courts had been recognised as capable of being directly effective; and were indeed effectively applied in litigation). See at 350–355.

  103. 103.

    See Koutrakos, above (n 88), 271–280, in particular at 274.

  104. 104.

    Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851.

  105. 105.

    Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307.

  106. 106.

    The provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights are an annex to the WTO agreements.

  107. 107.

    Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307, paras 44 and 45. Please note that the German Government found that TRIPS may have direct effect: Deutscher Bundestag 12. Wahlperiode BT-Drucksache 12/7655 (neu), 344.

  108. 108.

    Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851, paras 51–55.

  109. 109.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, paras 42–47. This line of reasoning has since been repeated in: Case C-307/99 OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen EU:C:2001:228, [2001] ECR I-3159, paras 22–26 (as regards GATT 1994). As regards the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (ATBT): Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 93. As regards the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307, para 44 and Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851, para 53.

  110. 110.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, para 72.

  111. 111.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, paras 70–119.

  112. 112.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, para 110.

  113. 113.

    With regard to direct effect the General Court held that: ‘The purpose of the WTO agreements is to govern relations between States or regional organisations for economic integration and not to protect individuals.’ Case T-174/00 Biret International SA v Council EU:T:2002:2, [2002] ECR II-17, para 62.

  114. 114.

    ‘[E]rrors of law (…) [made by the GC] as regards the duty to state reasons and the scope of the judgment in Atlanta v European Community do not invalidate the contested judgment, if the operative part thereof and in particular the rejection of the plea at first instance concerning the SPS Agreement, appears founded on other legal grounds (...)’ Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:517, [2003] ECR I-10497, para 60.

  115. 115.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:517, [2003] ECR I-10497, paras 61 and 62.

  116. 116.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, para 82.

  117. 117.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, para 97.

  118. 118.

    Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion of AG Alber, para 115.

  119. 119.

    Case C-104/97 P Atlanta AG and Others v Commission and Council EU:C:1999:498, [1999] ECR I-6983.

  120. 120.

    Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-315 and the following Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) EU:C:2005:121, [2005] ECR I-1465.

  121. 121.

    Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-315, para 167.

  122. 122.

    Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) EU:C:2005:121, [2005] ECR I-1465, para 53. For detailed analyses of the relevant case law see, for example, Oksana Tsymbrivska, ‘WTO DSB Decisions in the EC Legal Order: Approach of the Community Courts’ (2010) 37 L.I.E.I. 185–202, at 189–196. This article, inter alia, examined the internal effect and status of the WTO DSB decisions within the EU legal order and the relevant case law from the Biret cases to Van Parys as well as the arguments that were accepted as a basis for it.

  123. 123.

    Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA (FIAMM) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies LLC (C-120/06 P), Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Fedon America, Inc. (C-121/06 P) v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476, [2008] ECR I-6513, paras 128 and 129.

  124. 124.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 47. In a GATT 1947 context Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.

  125. 125.

    Report for the Hearing Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719, 3730.

  126. 126.

    See also: Andrea Ott, ‘Thirty Years of Case-Law by the European Court of Justice on International Law – a Pragmatic Approach towards its Integration’ in Vincent Kronenberger (ed), The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 113 et seq. On the different types of association agreements see: Kirsten Schmalenbauch, ‘Article 310 EC’ in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/EGV: Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta; Kommentar (3rd edn Beck, München 2007), para 35. See further, Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP, Oxford 2010) 402–04.

  127. 127.

    The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 (Stockholm Convention) as a reaction against the formation of the EEC. Founding members were: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Finland became an associate member (1961) and later a full member of EFTA (1986). Iceland became a member of EFTA (1970). Liechtenstein acceded in 1991. Denmark and the UK (1972), Portugal (1985), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995) left EFTA to join the EEC/EU. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland remain members of EFTA. Three EFTA members – Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway – join the EEA. On 1 June 2002 the updated EFTA Convention (Vaduz Convention) entered into force. For more information: http://www.efta.int/. When the UK and Denmark left EFTA to become a Member of the EEC (1972) bilateral free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA States were concluded to maintain trade liberalisation (Agreement between the EEC and Austria [1972] OJ L300/2; Sweden [1972] OJ L300/97; Switzerland [1972] OJ L300/189; Liechtenstein [1972] OJ L300/281; Iceland [1972] OJ L301/2; Portugal [1972] OJ L301/165; Norway [1973] OJ L171/2; Finland [1973] OJ L328/2). For a comprehensive review see: E.P. Wellenstein, ‘The Free Trade Agreements between the Enlarged European Communities and the EFTA-Countries’ (1973) 10 CMLR 137.

  128. 128.

    E.g. the former free trade Agreement with Spain [1970] OJ L182/2; with accession to the EEC/European Union the free trade agreements with Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden were terminated; End of validity: 31/12/1985 (Spain and Portugal); 31/12/1994 (Austria, Finland, Sweden). The Agreement between the EEC and Switzerland likewise became applicable to Liechtenstein: Article 1 of the Additional Agreement concerning the validity, for the Principality of Liechtenstein, of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation of 22 July 1972 [1972] OJ L300/281. Free trade agreements with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway remain in force. Article 120 EEA limits the scope of the FTAs with EEA countries, as provisions of the EEA Agreement ‘shall prevail over provisions in existing bilateral or multilateral agreements binding the European Economic Community, on the one hand, and one or more EFTA States, on the other, to the extent that the same subject matter is governed by this Agreement’.

  129. 129.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641.

  130. 130.

    In Case 270/80 Polydor Limited v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329, which concerned the protection of industrial and commercial property rights, the Court was asked whether Article 14 (2) of the FTA with Portugal (at that time not a Member State but a Member of EFTA) was directly effective within the Community. In view of the replies given to the other questions of substance the Court considered it not necessary to reply to this question (see para 23).

  131. 131.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 26.

  132. 132.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.

  133. 133.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673. The EUR-Lex database refers to her as Mr.!

  134. 134.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3675.

  135. 135.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.

  136. 136.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.

  137. 137.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673.

  138. 138.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.

  139. 139.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.

  140. 140.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673.

  141. 141.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 15–16.

  142. 142.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 17–22 (nature and structure of the FTA with Portugal) and paras 23–27 (clear, precise and unconditional).

  143. 143.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 22.

  144. 144.

    In particular the abolition of customs duties and charges of an equivalent effect and the elimination of quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect. Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 24.

  145. 145.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 23–27.

  146. 146.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 18.

  147. 147.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR 3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.

  148. 148.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 19.

  149. 149.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 20.

  150. 150.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362,[1982] ECR 3641, para 21.

  151. 151.

    It is argued that this is the most striking aspect of Kupferberg: Christian Tietje, ‘The Status of International Law in the European Legal Order: the Case of International Treaties and Non-binding International Instruments’ in Jan Wouters, Andre Nollkaemper and Wet Erika de (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 61. On the question of why Kupferberg is so different from International Fruit see also: Gerhard Bebr (n 14); Sara Dillon, International Trade and Economic Law and the European Union (Hart, Oxford 2003) 363–365.

  152. 152.

    Pieter Jan Kuijper and Marco Bronckers, ‘WTO Law in the European Court of Justice’ (2005) 42 CMLR 1313, 1320.

  153. 153.

    Christian Tietje (n 151) 62, who also argues that Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579 (Communities-Russia PA) builds upon Kupferberg.

  154. 154.

    Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and others EU:C:1992:326, [1992] ECR I-4625, paras 26–27 (Article 6 of the FTA EEC-Sweden); Case C-207/91 Eurim-Pharm GmbH v Bundesgesundheitsamt EU:C:1993:278, [1993] ECR I-3723, para 21 et seq (Articles 13 and 20 of the FTA EEC-Austria); Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco A/S v Middelfart Havn EU:C:1997:371, [1997] ECR I-4263, para 33 (Article 18 of the FTA EEC-Sweden).

  155. 155.

    Case 253/83 Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1985:8 [1985] ECR 157, para 20.

  156. 156.

    [1973] OJ L133/2.

  157. 157.

    [1971] OJ L61/2.

  158. 158.

    Case C-432/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others EU:C:1994:277, [1994] ECR I-3087, paras 25 and 27.

  159. 159.

    Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 25–27. In Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719, paras 16, 23 and 25 the Court pointed to the programmatic nature of provisions of the EEC-Turkey AA with the final objective of acceding to the EU, [1964] OJ 217/3687 Recital 3 of the Preamble, and denied direct effect, as the provisions in question, were neither sufficiently precise nor unconditional. In Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 42 the Court held that Article 13 of the EEC-Turkey AA did not establish precise rules. However, Article 41 (1) of the Additional Protocol was sufficiently precise and unconditional to have direct effect (para 54). Also, certain provisions of the Europe Agreements (EAs) establishing an association with countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the final objective to become a member of the Community (Hungary [1993] OJ L347/2 (Recital 15 of the Preamble); Poland [1993] OJ L348/2 (Recital 15); Romania [1994] OJ L357/2 (Recital 17); Bulgaria [1994] OJ L358/3 (Recital 17); Slovak Republic [1994] OJ L359/2 (Recital 18); Czech Republic [1994] OJ L360/2 (Recital 18); Latvia [1998] OJ L26/3 (Recital 22); Lithuania [1998] OJ L51/3 (Recital 22); Estonia [1998] OJ L68/3 (Recital 22); Slovenia [1999] OJ L51/3 (Recital 21)) were sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to be applied by national courts: Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 38 (EA with Poland); Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39 (EA with Bulgaria); Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 39 (EA with the Czech Republic); Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I-8615, paras 26 and 28 (EA with Poland and the Czech Republic); Case C-162/00 Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 30 (EA with Poland); Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30 (EA with Slovakia); Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others v Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18 (EA between the Communities and, respectively, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia).

  160. 160.

    [1963] OJ 26/294 Recital 4 of the Preamble.

  161. 161.

    Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 26 and 27.

  162. 162.

    Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085, paras 17 and 18.

  163. 163.

    Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 14. Confirmed in Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085, para 25.

  164. 164.

    Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 26.

  165. 165.

    Direct effect of Article 6 (1) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 26; Case C-237/91 Kus v Landeshauptstadt WiesbadeEU:C:1992:527, [1992] ECR I-6781, paras 28 and 36; Case C-355/93 Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1994:369, [1994] ECR I-5113, para 11; Case C-434/93 Bozkurt v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1995:168, [1995] ECR I-1475, para 31; Case C-171/95 Tetik v Land Berlin EU:C:1997:31, [1997] ECR I-329, paras 22, 24 and 48; Case C-285/95 Kol v Land Berlin EU:C:1997:280, [1997] ECR I-3069, paras 21 and 29; Case C-386/95 Eker v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1997:257, [1997] ECR I-2697, para 18; Case C-36/96 Günaydin v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:1997:445, [1997] ECR I-5143, paras 24 and 61; Case C-98/96 Ertanir v Land Hessen EU:C:1997:446, [1997] ECR I-5179, para 24; Case C-1/97 Birden v Stadtgemeinde Bremen EU:C:1998:568, [1998] ECR I-7747, paras 19 and 67; Case C-340/97 Nazli v Stadt Nürnberg EU:C:2000:77, [2000] ECR I-957, para 28; Case C-188/00 Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2002:694, [2002] ECR I-10691, para 26; Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01 Abatay and Others and Nadi Sahin v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:2003:572, [2003] ECR I-12301, para 78; Case C-136/03 Dörr v Sicherheitsdirektion Kärnten and Ibrahim Ünal v Sicherheitsdirektion Vorarlberg EU:C:2005:340, [2005] ECR I-4759, para 66; Case C-230/03 Sedef v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg EU:C:2006:5, [2006] ECR I-157, para 33. On the interpretation of Article 6 (2) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-434/93 Bozkurt v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1995:168, [1995] ECR I-1475, para 38; Case C-171/95 Tetik v Land Berlin EU:C:1997:31, [1997] ECR I-329, para 35. Direct effect of Article 7 of Decision 1/80: Case C-355/93 Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1994:369, [1994] ECR I-5113, para 17; Case C-351/95 Kadiman v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:1997:205, [1997] ECR I-2133, para 28; Case C-210/97 Akman v Oberkreisdirektor des Rheinisch-Bergischen-Kreises EU:C:1998:555, [1998] ECR I-7519, para 23; Case C-329/97 Ergat v Stadt Ulm EU:C:2000:133, [2000] ECR I-1487, para 34; Case C-65/98 Eyüp v Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg EU:C:2000:336, [2000] ECR I-4747, para 25; Case C-275/02 Ayaz v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2004:570, [2004] ECR I-8765, para 48; Case C-467/02 Cetinkaya v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2004:708, [2004] ECR I-10895, para 31. Direct effect of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80: Case C-374/03 Gürol v Bezirksregierung Köln EU:C:2005:435, [2005] ECR I-6199, paras 26 and 43. Direct effect of Article 10 (1) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam EU:C:2003:260, [2003] ECR I-4301, paras 66 and 94. Direct effect of Article 13 of Decision No 1/80: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 26. In Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085, para 30 the Court held that Decision No 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council does ‘not contain a large number of precise, detailed provisions’. By its nature, supplementary rules were needed. As the Council had, at the time of the ruling, not adopted such supplementary measures, the Court has held that Articles 12 and 13 of Decision No 3/80 lacked direct effect (paras 23–38, in particular paras 33, 37 and 38).

  166. 166.

    Case C-262/96 Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228, [1999] ECR I-2685, para 74; Joined Cases C-102/98 and C-211/98 Kocak v Landesversicherungsanstalt Oberfranken und Mittelfranken and Ramazan Örs v Bundesknappschaft EU:C:2000:119, [2000] ECR I-1287, para 35; Case C-373/02 Öztürk v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter EU:C:2004:232, [2004] ECR I-3605, para 60.

  167. 167.

    In Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18, [1976] ECR 129, para 25 the Court reached the conclusion that Article 2 (1) of the Yaoundé Convention (association with the African States and Madagascar) conferred the right on individuals not to pay to a Member State a charge having an effect equivalent to customs duties. In Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, paras 34–35 the Court held that the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention (Lomé Convention), which promotes economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States, confers, like the Second AA between the EEC and the African States and Madagascar (Yaoundé), rights on individuals. Provisions of the former EEC-Morocco [1978] OJ L264/2 and Algeria [1978] OJ L263/2 CAs also had direct effect (the Euro-Mediterranean AAs with Algeria [2005] OJ L265/2 and with Morocco [2000] OJ L70/2 replaced the 1970s CAs). Direct effect of Article 41 (1) of the EEC-Morocco CA: Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160, [1994] ECR I-1353, paras 16–19; Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368,[1996] ECR I-4807, paras 19–20; Case C-179/98 Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549,[1999] ECR I-7955, para 14. Direct effect of Article 40 (1) of the EEC-Morocco CA: Case C-416/96 El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 32. See further: Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34 (Article 22 (4) of the EEC-Yugoslavia CA is directly effective); Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29 (Article 23 (1) of the Communities-Russia PA is directly effective).

  168. 168.

    [1994] OJ L1/3 as adjusted by [1994] OJ L1/572 (Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the EEA). On the compatibility of the EEA Agreement with the Treaty: Opinion 1/91 re EEA Agreement EU:C:1991:490, [1991] ECR I-6079 (negative Opinion); Opinion 1/92 EU:C:1992:189, [1992] ECR I-2821 (positive Opinion on the revised EEA Agreement).

  169. 169.

    See the Preamble of the Agreement on the European Economic Area.

  170. 170.

    Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100–102 (Article 10 of the EEA Agreement has direct effect). See also: Walter van Gerven, ‘The Genesis of EEA Law and the Principles of Primacy and Direct Effect’ (1992–1993) 16 Fordham Int’l L.J. 955, 955–989.

  171. 171.

    Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para 102.

  172. 172.

    Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para 101.

  173. 173.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 42.

  174. 174.

    For critique: Jan Wouters and Dries van Eeckhoutte, ‘Giving Effect to Customary International Law Through European Community Law, (2002) K.U. Leuven Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 2002/25, 37 (note 155 and references therein) and 40–41. See also: Naboth van den Broek, ‘Legal Persuasion, Political Realism, and Legitimacy: the European Court’s Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order’ (2001) 4 J.I.E.L. 411, 411 who argues that the structural differences between WTO law and other agreements do not justify denial of direct effect.

  175. 175.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 27.

  176. 176.

    The case law seems not conclusive with regard to reciprocity on the implementation of an agreement (lack of judicial reciprocity) and the autonomous institutional framework to settle disputes (International Fruit Company line of reasoning vs. Kupferberg line of reasoning).

  177. 177.

    In absence of an express provision in the agreement.

  178. 178.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 17; Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 35.

  179. 179.

    Sec Sect. 2.2.

  180. 180.

    Jörg Gerkrath (n 15) 132.

  181. 181.

    In Case 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329, para 18 and Case C-312/91 Procedural issue relating to a seizure of goods belonging to Metalsa Srl. EU:C:1993:279,[1993] ECR I-3751, para 21 the Court has considered it not appropriate to transpose the interpretation given in the context EEC Treaty to provisions of free trade agreements with Portugal and Austria respectively (because the agreement on free trade and the EEC Treaty pursue different objectives). In Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 26–27 (accession association EEC – Greece) and Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and others EU:C:1992:326, [1992] ECR I-4625, paras 23–27 (free trade agreement EEC-Sweden) the Court has considered it appropriate to transpose the interpretation given in the context EEC Treaty to similar provisions of agreements concluded between the Community and non-Member countries.

  182. 182.

    Case 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329, para 15: ‘The provisions of the Agreement on the elimination of trade between the Community and Portugal are expressed in terms which in several respects are similar to those of the EEC Treaty on the abolition of restrictions on intra-Community trade. (…) However, such similarity of terms is not a sufficient reason for transposing to the provisions of the Agreement the above-mentioned case-law, which determines in the context of the Community the relationship between the protection of industrial and commercial property rights and the rules on the free movement of goods. The scope of that case-law must indeed be determined in the light of the Community’s objectives (…)’.

  183. 183.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 30–31.

  184. 184.

    Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18, [1976] ECR 129, paras 22–23.

  185. 185.

    Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 21; Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, para 34; Case C-262/96 Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228, [1999] ECR I-2685, para 72; Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 53.

  186. 186.

    Christian Tietje (n 151) 64. This parameter would not only be legal but also very political; it has been argued that ‘whether or not to accept … the direct effectiveness of a legal rule is political and not legal’ Jan Wouters and Dries van Eeckhoutte (n 174) 41.

  187. 187.

    Association agreements, for instance, are not necessarily unequal treaties, but are, at least to a certain extent, to the advantage of the Community, which dominates, due to its political and legal power, the negotiation and conclusion of the treaties. Within the world trading system the Community is not in a position to dominate the framing of the agreements: the WTO Members pursue their interests by way of compromise. Christian Tietje (n 151) 63.

  188. 188.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641.

  189. 189.

    Gerhard Bebr (n 14) 63.

  190. 190.

    Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 23 (Article 41(1) of the EEC-Morocco CA is capable of having direct effect); Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29 (Article 23 (1) of the Communities-Russia PA has direct effect).

  191. 191.

    Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 21.

  192. 192.

    Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 28.

  193. 193.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 21; confirmed in: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 25.

  194. 194.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 21.

  195. 195.

    On the other hand, one may take the view that any possibility of derogation, which is to be negotiated within a political body, may prevent provisions from being directly effective: they are not sufficiently unconditional to have direct effect. See: Gerhard Bebr (n 14) 64 and 70 who argues that it remains doubtful to what extent the obligations under the free trade agreement in Kupferberg were ‘really unconditional’. The latter view is, however, not in line with the case law of the Court (in Kupferberg the jointly applied safeguard clause did not affect the direct enforceability).

  196. 196.

    For further jurisprudential reflections, see Pieter Jan Kuijper ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement System—The Impact on the European Community’(1995) 29 JWT 49–71; Miquel Montañá I Mora, ‘Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court of Justice of the European Communities to Refuse Direct Effect to the Uruguay Round Agreements?’ (1996) 30 JWT 43–59; Philp Lee and Brian Kennedy, ‘The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law’ (1996) 30 JWT 67–89, cited supra note 69.

  197. 197.

    The European Union respects international law in the exercise of its powers (compliance with rules of customary international law by virtue of an international agreement): Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp EU:C:1992:453,[1992] ECR I-6019, para 9; Case C-405/92 Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL EU:C:1993:906, [1993] ECR I-6133, paras 13–15; Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 45; Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport EU:C:2008:312, [2008] ECR I-4057, para 51; Case C-386/08 Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen EU:C:2010:91, [2010] ECR I-1289, paras 40–42; Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para 90; confirmed by Article 3 (5) TEU (‘strict observance and the development of international law’); Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change EU:C:2011:864, [2011] ECR I-13755, para 101.

  198. 198.

    Article 26 VCLT 1969.

  199. 199.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 35.

  200. 200.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 41.

  201. 201.

    On the concept of efficient breach see e.g.: Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson Remedies in Contract and Tort (Law in Context, 2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 2005) 11.

  202. 202.

    Adheres to the fiction that international treaties, e.g. WTO law, as a contract between members; that is, unitary entities, can be compared to contracts between individuals.

  203. 203.

    The WTO modelled as an efficient breach contract (clausula rebus sic stantibus): Manfred Elsig, ‘The World trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: what does the beast look like?’ (2007) 41 JWT 75, 91 with further references; and the views of Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, ‘Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization’ (2002) 31 JLS 179, 179–204 (advocates of the efficient breach reading of the DSU); the application of efficient breach to international treaties is undeveloped when compared to national law (contract theory).

  204. 204.

    In terms of GATT rules (Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110) and WTO agreements (Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48) direct effect was denied. The possibility of direct effect was accepted for provisions of FTAs (Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 26); acc. associations (Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 25–27; Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 54; Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 38; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 39; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I-8615, paras 26 and 28; Case C-162/00 Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 30; Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30; Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others v Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18); DAs (Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18,[1976] ECR 129, para 25; Case C-18/90 Office national de l’emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160, [1994] ECR I-1353, paras 16–19; Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, paras 34–35; Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368, [1996] ECR I-4807, paras 19–20; Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34; Case C-416/96 El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 32; Case C-179/98 Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549, [1999] ECR I-7955, para 14; Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29) and the EEA Agreement (Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100–102).

  205. 205.

    Piet Eeckhout, ‘The domestic legal status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems’ (1997) 34 CMLR 11, 58.

  206. 206.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781 (GATT 1947).

  207. 207.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069 (GATT 1947). See amongst others, Hans-Peter Folz and Barbara Brandtrer, ‘Nakajima’ (1993) 4 E.J.I.L. 430–432; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The latest on indirect effect of WTO law in the EC legal order: the Nakajima case law misjudged’ (2001) 4 Int Economic Law 597–608; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The ECJ’s Petrotub judgment: towards a revival of the “Nakajima doctrine”?’ (2003) 30 L.I.E.I. 249–266. For critical analysis of the Fediol and Nakajima case-law, e.g. Francis Snyder, ‘The gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law’ (2003) 40 CMLR 313–367.

  208. 208.

    Referred to as indirect effect, by analogy with the rule of consistent interpretation, Nanette A. Neuwahl, ‘Individuals and the GATT: Direct effect and indirect effects of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade in Community Law’ in N. Emiliou and D. O’Keeffe (eds), The European Union and World Trade Law (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 1996) 313–328.

  209. 209.

    Commission Decision (EEC) No 2506/86 of 22 December 1986 (unpublished).

  210. 210.

    Council Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the strengthening of the common commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices [1984] OJ L252/1.

  211. 211.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, para 13.

  212. 212.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781. See for analysis of the judgment: Arthur E. Appleton, ‘Fédération de l’industrie de l’huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v. Commission des Communautés Européennes. Case No. 70/87. Court of Justice of the European Communities, June 22, 1989.’ (1990) 84 AJIL 258–262.

  213. 213.

    Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan [1988] OJ L317/33.

  214. 214.

    See for analysis of the judgment: Fernando Castillo de la Torre, ‘Anti-dumping policy and private interest’(1992) 17 ELRev. 346–348.

  215. 215.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069, para 31. As regards GATT 1947 (Community rules, adopted for the purpose of implementing GATT).

  216. 216.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, paras 19–20 (GATT 1947. Community rules referred to the provisions of GATT).

  217. 217.

    Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany (International Dairy Arrangement) EU:C:1996:313,[1996] ECR I-3989. See for analyses of the judgment: Piet Eeckhout, ‘Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany, [1996] ECRI-3989’ (1998) 35 CMLR 557–566; Noreen Burrows, ‘Interpreting the International Dairy Agreement’ (1997) 22 ELRev. 263–264.

  218. 218.

    Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany (International Dairy Arrangement) EU:C:1996:313, [1996] ECR I-3989, para 52.

  219. 219.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.

  220. 220.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.

  221. 221.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 49.

  222. 222.

    Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise EU:C:2007:547, [2007] ECR I-7723, para 30. In Hermann’s view, given the settled case-law, ‘(…) from Portugal v. Council to Van Parys, the treatment of the ADA in the present case is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, it begs the question whether there is any situation at all in which the use of the Nakajima principle can in fact be made. If not in the case of anti-dumping, where else could we speak of the EC having intended to implement specific obligations arising under the WTO agreements? (…).’ See Christoph Hermann, ‘Case C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 September 2007, Second Chamber [2007] ECR I-7723’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1507, 1515.

  223. 223.

    Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476, [2008] ECR I-6513, para 114.

  224. 224.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, paras 19–22.

  225. 225.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069, para 31.

  226. 226.

    ‘On this point, however, I would observe that the Commission has not, in my view, given any convincing reasons why the Court should review (or remove) the longstanding Nakajima exception in the present case. To begin, it is clear that the Court was fully aware of, and considered, the implications of the reciprocal nature of the WTO agreements in its leading judgments setting out the circumstances in which WTO rules may form a ground of review of Community measures. Thus, for example, in Portugal v Council, the Court recalled that the WTO agreement is (…) founded, like GATT 1947, on the principle of negotiations with a view to “entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” (…). In all such cases, however, the Court none the less confirmed the Fediol and Nakajima exceptions to the general principle that Community measures may not be reviewed for compliance with WTO law. Moreover, the existence of these exceptions does not, to my mind, conflict with what was a primary rationale for the general principle; namely, that according direct effect to WTO rules would ‘deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners.’ (…) In a case where it is clear that a Community measure was specifically intended to implement a particular obligation of WTO law, the Community legislature has essentially chosen to limit its own scope of manoeuvre in negotiations by itself ‘incorporating’ that obligation into Community law.’ See Case C-313/04 Egenberger GmbH Molkerei und Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung EU:C:2005:733, [2006] ECR I-6331, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 64.

  227. 227.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.

  228. 228.

    Case C-313/04 Egenberger GmbH Molkerei und Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung EU:C:2005:733, [2006] ECR I-6331, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, paras 72–76. The General Court points to the fact that applications of the Nakajima case law is not, a priori, limited to areas of anti-dumping. See, Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana Co. BV and Chiquita Italia, SpA v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-315, para 124.

  229. 229.

    Case C-306/13 LVP NV v Belgische Staat EU:C:2014:2465.

  230. 230.

    Joined Cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P Council and Others v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht EU:C:2015:4.

  231. 231.

    Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe EU:C:2015:5.

  232. 232.

    For further discussion, see Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘The relationship between EU law and international agreements: Restricting the application of the Fediol and Nakajima exceptions in Vereniging Milieudefensie’ (2015) 52 CMLR 1059–1077, in particular at 1074–1077.

  233. 233.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.

  234. 234.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.

  235. 235.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.

  236. 236.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 12–15 (GATT 1947).

  237. 237.

    Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, para 5. Cf. Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719, para 7. For a recent discussion, Armin von Bogdandy and Maja Smrkolj ‘European Community and Union Law and International Law’ in Wolfrum, Rüdiger (et al, eds), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP, Oxford 2011), para 9 with further references; or H. G. Schermers, ‘Community Law and International Law’ (1975) 12 CMLR 77, 83–84.

  238. 238.

    Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395.

  239. 239.

    Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 27 f. 45.

  240. 240.

    Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.

  241. 241.

    Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.

  242. 242.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641.

  243. 243.

    Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, paras 14–15.

  244. 244.

    The European Parliament, Resolution on the relationships between international law and the constitutional law of the Member States [1997] OJ C325/26, para 14.

  245. 245.

    See Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘The Constitutional Role of International Law’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd revised edn Hart, Oxford 2011) 137–147.

  246. 246.

    Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.

  247. 247.

    Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449.

  248. 248.

    Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission EU:T:2005:332, [2005] ECR II-3649.

  249. 249.

    Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission EU:T:2005:332, [2005] ECR II-3649, para 224.

  250. 250.

    Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:11, [2008] ECR I-6351, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 24.

  251. 251.

    Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351, para 285. The Court’s attitude has been widely discussed in the literature: Rory Stephen Brown, ‘Executive Power and Judicial Supervision at European Level: Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities’ (2006) 4 EHRLR 456; Helmut Philipp Aust and Nina Naske, ‘Rechtsschutz gegen den UN-Sicherheitsrat durch europäische Gerichte? Die Rechtsprechung des EuG zur Umsetzung “gezielter Sanktionen” aus dem Blickwinkel des Völkerrechts’(2006) 61 ZÖR 587; Sebastian Steinbarth, ‘Individualrechtsschutz gegen Maßnahmen der EG zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Die Entscheidungen des EuG in den Rs. “Yusuf u.a.” sowie “Kadi”’ (2006) ZeuS 269; Andreas von Arnauld, ‘UN-Sanktionen und gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz’ (2006) 44 AdV 201; Christoph Möllers, ‘Das EuG konstitutionalisiert die Vereinten Nationen – Anmerkungen zu den Urteilen des EuG vom 21.09.2005, Rs. T-315-01 und T-306/01’ (2006) 3 EuropaR 426; Luis M. Hinojosa Martínez, ‘Bad Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of the Kadi Judgment’ (2008) 5 IOLR 339; Stefan Griller, ‘International Law, Human Rights and the Community’s Autonomous Legal Order: Notes on the European Court of Justice Decision in Kadi’ (2008) 4 EuConst 528; Deirdre Curtin and Christina Eckes, ‘The Kadi Case: Mapping the Boundaries between the Executive and the Judiciary in Europe’ (2008) 5 IOLR 365; Pierre D’Argent, ‘Arrêt “Kadi”: le droit communautaire comme droit interne’ (2008) 153 JDE 265; Nikolaus Graf Vitzthum, ‘Les compétences législatives et juridictionnelles de la Communauté européenne dans la lutte contre le terrorisme – L’affaire «Kadi»’ (2008) ZeuS 375; Guy Harpaz, ‘Judicial Review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi Dispute’ (2009) 14 E.F.A.Rev. 65; Paul James Cardwell, Duncan French and Nigel White, ‘European Court of Justice, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) Judgment of 3 September 2008’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 229; Marjorie Beulay, ‘Les arrêts Kadi et Al Barakaat International Foundation -Réaffirmation par la Cour de justice de l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique communautaire vis-à-vis du droit international’ (2009) 524 RMCUE 32; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2009) Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 1/09 http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org. Review of the comments on the General Court’s and the Court’s Kadi rulings: Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’ (2009) 28 YEL 533.

  252. 252.

    In Hinarejos’s view the Court took a decidedly dualistic approach. See Alicia Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (OUP, Oxford 2009) 143. In De Witte’s view it is hard to conclude, as some authors have done, that the Kadi judgment conveys a consistent dualistic approach, Bruno de Witte, ‘European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ (2010) 65 ZÖR 141, 154.

  253. 253.

    Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: Economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order’ (2009) 46 CMLR 13, 43.

  254. 254.

    Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law’ (2008) 6 I.J.C.L. 397, 400.

  255. 255.

    For a recent contribution see Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘EU international agreements through a US lens: different methods of interpretation, tests and the issue of “rights”’ (2014) 39 ELRev. 601–625.

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Zipperle, N. (2017). The Court’s Case Law on Direct Effect of International Agreements (Free Trade Associations, Accession Associations, Development Associations and EEA) and Status of WTO Law. In: EU International Agreements. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64078-5_2

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