Abstract
China’s embrace of globalization can be traced back to the 1980s. For the post-Mao leadership, reform was a necessity whose aim was upholding the Communist regime through “self-perfection of socialism.” This gave rise to Deng Xiaoping’s approach of “perestroika without glasnost.” The political balance of power between Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun confined the market-oriented reform within the “birdcage” of state socialism. The reform achieved only limited success and came to a stalemate by the late 1980s, which drove Zhao Ziyang, the de facto chief architect of China’s reform, to neoliberal solutions. He managed to undermine central planning through fiscal decentralization and parochial external integration, both of which served to erode national economic reintegration, thereby inclining the Chinese economy toward greater “external orientation.”
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Notes
- 1.
Yang Jisheng (2004), The Political Struggle in the Era of Reform, Hong Kong: Excellent Cultural Press, p. 17; Yang Jisheng (2015), “How China Dealt with Mao’s Legacies after the Cultural Revolution?”—Speech at the seminar on “Maoism: Perspectives half a Century later” at Keio University (Tokyo, Japan), 27/12/2015. http://yangjs001.jigsy.com/entries/general/%E6%9D%A8%E7%BB%A7%E7%BB%B3%EF%BC%9A%E6%96%87%E9%9D%A9%E5%90%8E%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%80%8E%E6%A0%B7%E5%AF%B9%E5%BE%85%E6%AF%9B%E6%B3%BD%E4%B8%9C%E7%9A%84%E2%80%9C%E9%81%97%E4%BA%A7%E2%80%9D
- 2.
This dwarfed Gorbachev’s inappropriate “acceleration (uskoreniie) strategy” that eroded the credibility of perestroika. Marshall I. Goldman (1992), What Went Wrong with Perestroika (updated), NY: Norton, pp. 88, 94.
- 3.
Mao’s opening remarks at the First Session of the First NPC on 15/09/1954. People’s Daily, 16/09/1954.
- 4.
Vladimir. I. Lenin (1920), “Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks,” speech delivered to the Moscow Gubernia conference of the R.C.P.(B.), 21/11/1920. Lenin’s Collected Works (4th English Edition), Moscow: Progress Publishers, V. 31, pp. 408–426.
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Shen Zhihua (2009), “From Xibaipo to Moscow: Mao Declared ‘Leaning to One Side,’” Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies, No. 4. http://military.china.com/history4/62/20100805/16063530.html
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“Inside Story: US 5-billion-$ Aid to China in Case of No ‘Leaning to One Side,’” renminwang, 21/06/2010. http://news.ifeng.com/history/special/chubingjiazhi/detail_2010_06/21/1648724_0.shtml; also http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguojindaishi/detail_2011_02/05/4564965_0.shtml
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Li Hua-yu (2001), “The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948–54,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 3:2, pp. 28–47. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-yu Li (ed.) (2010), “Instilling Stalinism in Chinese Party Members: Absorbing Stalin’s Short Course,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
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Xu Zerong (2000), “China’s Role in the Korean War,” Modern China Studies, No. 1.
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Bernstein, T and Li, H (ed.) (2010), China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present, p. 29.
- 10.
According to Li Hua-Yu, Stalin acquiesced to Mao’s radical economic Stalinization in exchange for his political obedience. Li, H (2006), Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 134.
- 11.
Amlan Datta (1973), Perspectives of Economic Development, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 104.
- 12.
Slava Gerovitch (2008), “InterNyet: Why the Soviet Union did not Build a Nationwide Computer Network,” History and Technology, 24:4, pp. 335–350.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Allin Cottrell and W. Paul Cockshott (1993), “Socialist Planning after the Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Prepared for conference on The Socialist Calculation Debate after the Upheavals in Eastern Europe, Centre d’´etudes interdisciplinaires Walras–Pareto, Universit’e de Lausanne, December 11–12, 1992. Published in Revue europ’eene des sciences sociales, tome XXXI, no. 96, 1993, 167–185. Martin Cave (1980), Computers and Economic Planning: The Soviet Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 178.
- 15.
Liu Yia-ling (1999), “The Segmentation of China’s Domestic Market—The Institutional Legacy of the Planning Economy,” Journal of Sociology of NCCU, No. 29, October, pp. 1–32.
- 16.
Susan L. Shirk (1993), The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 160.
- 17.
Richard F. Bensel (2000), The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.
- 18.
Neil Fligstein (2008), Euroclash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 87.
- 19.
Marshall Goldman (1992), What Went Wrong with Perestroika, p. 57.
- 20.
Salaries for urban dwellers did not increase for 20 years following 1957. The average wage per annum declined from 624 yuan in 1957 to 575 yuan in 1976. Rationing was rampant due to severe shortages of consumer goods, and housing conditions were rather difficult for many of the urban families especially in big cities like Shanghai. Cao Pu, “The Historic Origins of China’s Reform and Opening,” xuexi shibao, 18/10/2008.
- 21.
Kent Deng (2012), China’s Political Economy in Modern Times: Changes and Economic Consequences, 1800–2000, Oxon: Routledge, p. 123.
- 22.
Li Lanqing (2008), Breaking the Siege, p. 17.
- 23.
“In 1820, the Qing dynasty had about 33 percent of the world’s total GDP, a share that had never been achieved in China’s history … Within a period of 50 years, from 1820 to 1870. China’s GDP share to the world total dropped sharply from 33 percent to about 17 percent.” Rongxing Guo (2017), An Economic Inquiry into the Nonlinear Behaviors of Nations: Dynamic Developments and the Origins of Civilizations, London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 194.
- 24.
In 1978, the CCP admitted that there are as many as 250 million people living in extreme poverty. The World Bank estimated the figure (on $1/day) at 490 million in 1981, more than half of the population. http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CHINA_-4.PDF
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Cao Pu, “The Historic Origins of China’s Reform and Opening,” Study Times (xuexi shibao), 18/10/2008. http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200810/12/t20081012_17038696.shtml
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Marshall I. Goldman (1983), USSR in Crisis—The Failure of an Economic System, NY: Norton, p. 21.
- 27.
Cited from Chen Yan (2006), China’s Awakening: An Evolution of Chinese Thoughts after the Cultural Revolution (1976–2002), HK: Tianyuan Publishing House, pp. 101. Original source: Wang Xiaoqiang (1980), “A Critique of Agrarian Socialism,” Problems of Rural Economy, No. 2.
- 28.
Yang Jisheng (2003), “In Remembrance of Li Shenzhi,” http://www.cssm.gov.cn/view.php?id=29924; Mao’s written instructions, 9/05/1963. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66671/4493614.html
- 29.
“The Chinese People must Oppose Slavish Comprador Philosophy,” editorial of Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 4, 1976. http://www.360doc.cn/article/94763_7164027.html
- 30.
Yan Changgui (2005), The Inside Story about the Use and Annulment of the Appellation of “Shanghai Commune,” Beijing: bainianchao, No. 8, p. 44. http://www.hprc.org.cn/pdf/BNCH200508008.pdf
- 31.
Hu Ping (2017), “A Review of Yang Jisheng’s New Book on the History of the Cultural Revolution,” China Human Rights Bi-weekly, No. 201. http://www.hrichina.org/chs/zhong-guo-ren-quan-shuang-zhou-kan/hu-ping-da-li-tui-jian-yang-ji-sheng-xian-sheng-xin-zhu-tian-di
- 32.
Jin Chongji (2011), The Biography of Mao Zedong (Vol. 6), Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, p. 2750. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/historic/0615/1957.html
- 33.
Zhang Chunqiao’s warnings after his imprisonment were deeply embarrassing to Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun in jail. Gao Wenqian (2003), Zhou Enlai in His Late Years, NY: Mirrorbooks, p. 550.
- 34.
Song Yongyi and Sun Dajin (ed.) (1999), The Cultural Revolution and Its Heresies (online) (part 4). http://tttan.com/HT/xanc/groups/GROUP_4/history/M1123881232/M1150763546/M.1136511915.A.html
- 35.
Kornai Janos (1992), The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 383–386.
- 36.
- 37.
V. I. Lenin, “The Collapse of the Second International,” Collected Works, V. 21: August 1914–December 1915 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), pp. 213–214.
- 38.
Debate on “New Democracy”: Zhang Musheng’s view, a panel discussion chaired by Lu Yuegang, released by ChinaSunTV (yangguang weishi) on 18/08/2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGzQi4rGSjw&list=PL064A9B9FF2FAFA85
- 39.
Cao Pu, “The Historic Origins of China’s Reform and Opening,” xuexi shibao, 18/10/2008. http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/200810/12/t20081012_17038696.shtml
- 40.
Zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu bangongshi: “zhongguo jingji fazhan wushinian dashiji,” Beijing 1999.
- 41.
Chen Donglin (1997), “A Realistic Critique of the Economic Construction during the Cultural Revolution,” Studies on Chinese Economic History, No. 4.
- 42.
Han Gang article on Hua Guofeng. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/qsp/2011/212/KH15.html; http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/yehuazhongnanhai/gx-02252014123900.html
- 43.
Hua Guofeng then held three key positions: party chairman, premier and chairman of the central military commission.
- 44.
Fang Mao (2016), “Hua Guofeng and China’s Open-Door,” yanhuang chunqiu, No. 5. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/qsp/2016/513/16513213014J3AC10163J58J1514E70A59I.html
- 45.
Still there were political prisoners, like Li Jiulian, Zhong Haiyuan, and Wang Xinyou, being executed at least until 1980 by the Hua Guofeng administration even after the fall of the Gang of Four.
- 46.
Wu Yong (2004): “The Ideological Battle between 1978 and 1988,” Modern China Studies, No. 3. http://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/85-mcs-2004-issue-3/875-19781988.html
- 47.
Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals (2006), Mao’s Last Revolution, Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, Mao’s Last Revolution, p. 457.
- 48.
Gao Wenqian (2016), “Mao’s Cultural Revolution Legacy and Xi Jinping’s Statecraft,” an essay delivered to the academic seminar on the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution, VOA, 6/05/2016. https://www.voachinese.com/a/gao-wenqian-cultural-revolution-part1-20160505/3317245.html
- 49.
Chen Yan (2006), “The Democracy Wall Movement and Its Historical Status,” Modern China Studies, No. 2. http://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/92-mcs-2006-issue-2/956-2012-01-05-15-35-10.html
- 50.
Chen Yan (2006), China Awakening, p. 25.
- 51.
“Chen Yun, Who Slowed China’s Shift to Market, Dies at 89,” The New York Times, 12/04/1995. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/12/obituaries/chen-yun-who-slowed-china-s-shift-to-market-dies-at-89.html?pagewanted=all
- 52.
On December 26, 1977, Deng told a visiting foreign communist delegation, “How to embody the superiority of socialism? Is the decline rather than improvement of people’s standard of living the proof of the superiority of socialism? If that kind of thing can be called ‘superiority,’ we prefer rejecting this sort of socialism.” On another occasion, when inspecting Northeastern provinces in September 1978, Deng said, “We are too impoverished, too backward. Honestly speaking, we feel sorry for our people … If socialism is demonstrated by persistent poverty after more than twenty years. What’s the use of socialism?” See Xie Minggan (2010), “Before and after ‘the Decision to Reform’ was Made,” September. http://www.reformdata.org/index.do?m=wap&a=show&catid=301&typeid=&id=5014
- 53.
Chen Yan (2006), “The Democracy Wall Movement and its Historical Status,” Modern China Studies, No. 2.
- 54.
During Mao’s reign, the Complete Book of Six Codes (六法全书) promulgated in the Republican era was completely abolished. Only two legal codes, namely, the PRC’s Constitution and the Marriage Law, were allowed to exist. Mao’s socialist state building was anti-modern. Pei Yiran (2015), The Disillusion of Utopia, Taipei: Independent & Unique, p. 161.
- 55.
He Weilin (2015), Unfinished Manuscripts, HK: Strong Wind Press, p. 14.
- 56.
Hu Sheng (ed.) (1991), Seventy Years of the CCP, Beijing: zhongyang dangshi chubanshe, p. 566.
- 57.
Zubok’s lecture at London School of Economics on CPSU’s history, 28/02/2017.
- 58.
Marshal Ye is one of the balao. He was the key figure that allied with Hua and Wang Dongxing (internal security chief) in the coup that overthrew the Gang of Four in October 1976.
- 59.
Conversation with Cheng Xiaonong, 14/10/2016.
- 60.
Interview with Cheng Xiaonong, 16/10/2010.
- 61.
The author agrees with He Weilin in rejecting the inaccurate and simplistic dichotomy of reformist-conservative divide. He Weilin (2015), Unfinished Manuscripts, p. 88.
- 62.
“(If some people) says the market economy only existed in capitalist societies, (this) is definitely incorrect. Why can’t socialism have market economy? This (market economy) cannot be labeled as capitalism.” Li Lanqing (2008), Break the Siege, pp. 173–174.
- 63.
Wei Xinghua (2010), “Chen Yun’s Thought on Planning vs. Market is the Forerunner of China’s Economic Reform,” Social Sciences Journal of Universities in Shanxi, 22:9, September, pp. 1–5. http://www.nssd.org/articles/article_detail.aspx?id=35324464; Deng’s original remarks (26/11/1979), “Ours is Planned Economy Supplemented by Market Economy,” http://zg.people.com.cn/BIG5/33839/34943/34944/34946/2617351.html; Given the term’s extreme sensitivity ideologically then for being synonymous with capitalism, Deng’s speech was kept confidential until after 1992, the year “market economy” was eventually legalized.
- 64.
Deng’s Works, vol. 2 (1983), Beijing: renmin chubanshe, p. 315.
- 65.
Mao had two incisive comments on Deng, the once designated successor after State President Liu Shaoqi. One comment was made in the 1950s when Deng followed closely Mao’s line: “an iron fist in a velvet glove” (mianli cangzhen). The other was made in the 1970s when Deng was suspended his post and ousted the second time by Mao for his stubborn adherence to revisionism: “(he) rhetorically vows not to reverse the verdict (of being a capitalist-roader) against him… (His promise) was untenable; in fact (he) always clings to his ‘Cat Theory.’”
- 66.
A Chronicle of Chen Yun (Chen Yun nianpu) (2000), vol. 3. Beijing: zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, p. 262.
- 67.
Selected Works of Chen Yun (1995), vol. 3, Beijing: renmin chubanshe, p. 320.
- 68.
Cheng Chen (2007), The Prospects for Liberal Nationalism in Post-Leninist States, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 114.
- 69.
Donald C. Hodges (1981), The Bureaucratization of Socialism, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, p. 84.
- 70.
- 71.
Zong Fengming (2007), p. 74.
- 72.
- 73.
“Classical socialism was a movement to replace the unplanned and exploitative institutions of capitalism with national planning, public ownership, and distribution according to human need rather than by the arbitrary capriciousness of the market.” T.A. Burczak (2006), Socialism after Hayek, Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, p. 2.
- 74.
For understandable reasons, these sensitive words were not included in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Du Daozheng, “How to Look on Deng Xiaoping Today?” Caijing, 05/12/2008.
- 75.
“The CPSU’s General Secretary: Communism is a ‘Deceptive Nonsense,’” http://history.dwnews.com/news/2015-10-03/59685843.html
- 76.
Li Jingxian (2008), Deng Xiaoping’s Meeting with Gorbachev Remembered, Beijing: bainianchao, No. 3. Deng told Gorbachev outspokenly on May 16, 1989, that both sides had uttered “many empty words” and that “[now] we do not believe that our side was absolutely correct then after more than twenty years of practice.” http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85038/7407132.html
- 77.
“Ezra Vogel: Six Key Figures in the Deng Xiaoping Era,” The Paper (pengpai xinwen), 13/08/2014. http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1261111
- 78.
Deng’s Works, vol. 3, p. 63; Zong (2007), p. 125.
- 79.
In 1986, when China started to experiment stock market trading, it was immediately under the attack from the conservatives who accused it of being “capitalist.” Deng was in support of the stock market development, especially its financing function to China’s capital-devoid economy. Deng rebuffed the opponents’ view simply by stating, “just close it down [in case of big problems].” This example vividly describes Deng’s flexible but opportunistic political character. The negative side of Deng’s opportunism was later reflected in his attitudinal change toward the price reform in 1988. Deng threw out Premier Zhao Ziyang as his scapegoat to moderate backlashes of the planning faction bureaucrats headed by Chen Yun so as to keep himself intact (see Cheng Xiaonong’s article on the price reform in 1988).
- 80.
According to Yang Jisheng (2004), p. 18, Chinese veteran economist Yu Guangyuan concluded as early as the late 1970s, “Hoping the CCP to undertake political reform (which is meant to end its monopoly of power) is like ‘asking a tiger for its skin’ (yu hu mopi).”
- 81.
Zhao Ziyang (2009), The Secret Journal, Hong Kong: New Century Press, p. 278; Wu Wei, “Two Different Roadmaps of Political Reform between Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang,” The New York Times (Chinese online), 15/12/2014. https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20141215/cc15wuwei41/
- 82.
Zhao had a candid talk with Deng in the year of 1988, briefing him on the new notion of “neo-authoritarianism.” Deng replied: “This is what I have been for. But better not use this term.” Yang Jisheng (2004), p. 565.
- 83.
Zhao’s perception of democracy at the time was rather vague, which included no more than greater political participation of the “democratic parties”—sneered as the “vase parties” (huapingdang)—under the CCP’s tight control, greater intra-party democracy, and the rule of law. Zhao (2009), pp. 294–295.
- 84.
Zong (2007), pp. 84, 121, 286.
- 85.
He Weilin (2015), pp. 370–371.
- 86.
“The History of the ‘Stone Theory,’” Guangming Daily, 9/04/2014. http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2014-04/09/nw.D110000gmrb_20140409_3-14.htm; Han Zhenfeng, “Who First Raised the ‘Stone Theory’ as a Reform Method?” Guangming Daily, 6/01/2015. It is Chen Yun rather than Deng Xiaoping that first raised the “stone theory.” http://history.people.com.cn/n/2015/0106/c372327-26335792.html
- 87.
Su Shaozhi (1999), “Theory and Practice of Political System Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era,” Modern China Studies, No. 3. http://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/66-mcs-1999-issue-3/503-2012-01-01-10-06-23.html
- 88.
For instance, in the policy-making process, Deng, more often than not, intentionally prevented Chen Yun’s involvement in the Politburo Standing Committee discussions on reform policies; Chen retaliated by blocking Deng’s policies through his protégés in the powerful central planning bureaucracy. This irregular authoritarian politics put Zhao Ziyang in an awkward position. Yang (2004), pp. 24–25; Zong (2007), p. 153.
- 89.
The opening of Yangpu Development Zone in Hainan, with Deng’s backing notwithstanding, was dubbed as a traitorous behavior in the year of 1988 when the province of Hainan was just created. The decision to open up Yangpu was made by the State Council only on March 9, 1992, in the aftermath of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour early in the year.
- 90.
Conversation with Cheng Xiaonong, 14/10/2016.
- 91.
Zhao (2009), p. 126.
- 92.
“Cheng Xiaonong: The Economic Reform without Zhao Ziyang was Led Astray,” Epoch Times, 27/01/2005. http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/5/1/27/n795482.htm
- 93.
In this sense, Zhao remained a “Traditional Communist” even until quite late during his captivity, as Zhang Boshu portrayed him. Zhang Boshu (ed.) (2011), Zhao Ziyang’s Road, HK: Morningbell Press, p. 5.
- 94.
Excerpts from Actual Talks by Deng Xiaoping in Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai (18/1–21/2, 1992). http://zg.people.com.cn/GB/33839/34943/34944/34947/2617452.html
- 95.
This initial reform scenario was agreed by both Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, as well as the SPC and the Ministry of Finance, which was “not an easy matter at the time.” http://www.reformdata.org/content/20080305/20835.html
- 96.
“China’s Reform and Opening Meets No End—An Interview with Xu Jing’an,” China Economic Herald, 12/12/2008.
- 97.
“The Price-Fiscal-Taxation Comprehensive Reform Scenario Approved (in August 1986),” which was, nonetheless, abandoned in October. http://www.reformdata.org/special/270/about.html; Also, Jia Kang’s article on Caijing, 30/08/2010. http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-08-30/110508381.html
- 98.
Marshall Goldman (1992), What Went Wrong with Perestroika? pp. 117; 162–169.
- 99.
“The Most Influential Foreign Experts in the 60-year History of New China,” People’s Daily, 23/10/2009. http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/171502/10248026.html
- 100.
During the initial seven years of reform, FDI in China was just US $6.06 billion (1979–1985) in all, in which the year 1985 saw FDI inflow at US $1.96 billion. FDI rose from US $2.24 billion to US $11 billion in 1991 in another six years.
- 101.
The reform experiment began in 1981.
- 102.
He Weilin (2015), p. 337.
- 103.
Wu Jingling’s lecture at CEIBS, November 1999; “SOEs’ Reform: 30 Years in Retrospect,” 2/12/2011. http://www.chinareform.org.cn/economy/Enterprise/practice/201112/t20111202_129053.htm
- 104.
Andrew G. Walder (1983), “Organized Dependency and Cultures of. Authority in Chinese Industry,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 43:1, pp. 51–76.
- 105.
János Kornai (1979), “Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems,” Econometrica, 47:4, pp. 801–819.
- 106.
Zhao (2009), p. 135.
- 107.
Ibid: Epilogue by Roderick MacFarquhar, pp. 301–310.
- 108.
Girsh I. Khanin (2003), “The 1950s: The Triumph of the Soviet Economy,” Europe-Asia Studies, 55:8, pp. 1187–1211.
- 109.
In September 1978, Deng openly repented the party’s former wrongdoing for having kept the people persistently poor over the past decades. “Deng Xiaoping Say Sorry to the People,” Study Times, 25/12/2012. http://history.people.com.cn/n/2012/1225/c198865-20005852.html
- 110.
China’s fiscal revenue as a percentage of GDP dropped from 33.8% in 1978 to only 10.8% in 1995.
- 111.
Y.Y. Kueh (2008), China’s New Industrialization Strategy: Was Chairman Mao Really Necessary? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, vii.
- 112.
This is clearly reflected in Deng Liqun (2006), Twelve Springs and Autumns, HK: Strong Wind Press.
- 113.
Immanuel Wallerstein (1992), “The Concept of National Development,” The American Behavioral Scientist, 35:4, pp. 517–529.
- 114.
“Knocking the Door at Fuqiang Lane No. 6 to Interview Zhao Ziyang in Summer 2004,” HK: Qianshao, No. 3, 2005; Wang Xiaodong, “China’s Nationalism under the Shadow of Globalization,” public lecture delivered at the London School of Economics, 7/02/2005.
- 115.
A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 1975–1997) Part One (2004), Beijing: zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, p. 616.
- 116.
“China’s Reform and Opening Meets No End—An Interview with Xu Jing’an,” China Economic Times, 12/12/2008.
- 117.
Marshall Goldman (1992), What Went Wrong with Perestroika? p. 88.
- 118.
Liu Liqun (1992), “The Transformation of China’s Economic Development Strategy and Its Problems,” The State Council’s Development and Research Centre (DRC) internal report: No. 43, 25/09/1992.
- 119.
Liu Liqun, for instance. Interview with Liu in Beijing, 26/08/2005.
- 120.
Li Shenzhi (2002), “The PRC’s Foreign Policy,” March. http://paper.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Details.aspx?id=2200; Yuan Ming (2005), “The U.S. Factor in the Process of China’s Modernization,” Diplomatic Review, No. 3. http://www.aisixiang.com/data/12185.html
- 121.
Kenneth Pyle (2008), Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, NY: PublicAffairs
- 122.
Deng’s Works (1993), vol. 3, p. 3.
- 123.
On August 20, 1983, liberal economist Zhang Weiying, then an MSc student in economics, published a hugely controversial article titled “To Make Money is not Wrong” (weiqian zhengming) on the China Youth Daily, a liberal-oriented newspaper affiliated with the Communist Youth League (CYL). Guangzhou: nanfang renwu zhoukan, 6/07/2007. http://news.qq.com/a/20070706/003155.htm; http://www.xzbu.com/5/view-1203578.htm; During the mid-1980s, the China Youth Daily initiated discussions on “what is modern life style?,” pointing to the thriving consumerism in China. http://women.sohu.com/g-xinzhoukan/consume.html; other newspapers and periodicals, such as Chinese Women, Pursuit, and so on, also organized open discussions on modern life style. See Youth Digest: first half-month (1985), No. 4. http://www.ifreetxt.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=195273&extra=page%3D1
- 124.
Deng Xiaoping had never made such utterances in any abstract way. Rather, the vague mention he made was accompanied by the commitment of pursuing common wealth as the end goal and of disallowing income inequality, or in his own words, “never will we allow a new bourgeoisie to emerge.” See “Answering Michael Wallace (60 Minutes),” 2/09/1986. http://zg.people.com.cn/BIG5/33839/34943/34944/34947/2617792.html
- 125.
Ronald P. Dore (1987), Taking Japan Seriously: A Confucian Perspective on Leading Economic Issues, Redwood: Stanford University Press; Douglass Smith (1991), The Confucian Continuum: Educational Modernization in Taiwan, NY: Praeger; Ruth Hayhoe (1992), “Book Review: The Confucian Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” Curriculum Inquiry, 22:4, pp. 425–431.
- 126.
The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang (2009), Epilogue by MacFarquhar, p. 304.
- 127.
Cheng Xiaonong (1995), “Decision and Miscarriage: Radical Price Reform in the Summer of 1988,” in Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders, ed. Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 189–206.
- 128.
Recent research indicated that Zhao’s “creative” fiscal decentralization could be traced back to 1971 when similar measures had been adopted, though under experiment.
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“Wu Jinglian Talks about Industrial Policy,” Dameisha Forum (Shenzhen), 04/11/2016. http://economy.caijing.com.cn/20161104/4195056.shtml
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Interview with Cheng Xiaonong, 12/11/2009.
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Yao Jianfu, “Li Xiannian Masterminded the Coup against Zhao Ziyang,” http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=10026
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Zhao (2009), p. 264.
- 133.
Deng Liqun (2006), “Twelve Springs and Autumns,” p. 529.
- 134.
Yang Jisheng (2004), p. 27.
- 135.
Zhao Ziyang (2009), p. 241.
- 136.
According to Hao Yufan, the notion of “export orientation” in lieu of ISI had dominated Chinese leaders (he did not mention concrete names) in the years 1985 and 1986, who were convinced of the necessity of making Chinese economy part of the global economy through joining so-called international economic cycling (guoji jingji da xunhuan). Hao Yufan (2007), “China’s Foreign Economic Policy in the Past Fifty Years,” Review of Foreign Affairs (Beijing: waijiao pinglun), No. 5, pp. 57–63. http://www.xueshu.com/wjpl/200705/24020684.html
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Zhao (2009), pp. 163–164.
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Tian Jiyun (2015), “The Formation and Implementation of the Coastal Development Strategy,” yanhuang chunqiu, No. 3. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/cqb/2015/39/15391919259H8E597782DI69GEE3384DKC.html
- 139.
Zhao (2009), p. 173; also Ibid. Zhao hidden reform agenda was illustrated in the People’s Daily editorial dated 19/05/1988, titled “An Event of Historical Significance—On the Coastal Economic Development Strategy.”
- 140.
Li Xianglu (2016), “A Forerunner of Reform Remembered (huiyi yiwei zhanzai gaige qianyan de zhangzhe),” yanhuang chunqiu, No. 2. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/hyp/2016/29/1629152821DIF7810084A898K0F55BJ8G4A.html
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Wang Jian’s report was first printed in dongtai qingyang, an internal publication of the Xinhua Agency on November 1, 1987. It was openly published on Economic Daily on January 5, 1988.
- 142.
Zhao clarified later that the coastal development strategy was completely his making, Zhao (2009), p. 168.
- 143.
General trade refers to import of foreign goods and export of Chinese-made products with overwhelmingly local contents. General-trade exportation, given its external demand-pull mechanism, has a direct impact on the domestic economy and serves as the engine of economic growth.
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Li Changli (1989), “An Externally-Oriented Strategy Should Not Be The General Development Strategy of China as a Big Country,” jingji lilun yu jingji guanli (Economic Theory and Economic Management), No. 5.
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http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/supplem/essay/0409009.htm (this hyperlink no longer exists)
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Cheng, X (1995), “Decision and Miscarriage: Radical Price Reform in the Summer of 1988,” pp. 189–206.
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Wu Wei (2015), “Decision Making behind the 1988 Price Reform,” yanhuang chunqiu, No. 12. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/cqb/2015/129/15129181313AIJ1410032B9DBK8329E88IGJ.html
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Before and After the Rash Price Reform in 1988, yanhuang chunqiu, No. 10, 2005. http://www.yhcqw.com/html/psz/2008/417/084171020487KHIH14944D7BE6BFJJAE3A8.html; Wu Wei (2015), “Decision Making behind the 1988 Price Reform,” yanhuang chunqiu, No. 12.
- 149.
Cheng, X (1995), “Decision and Miscarriage: Radical Price Reform in the Summer of 1988,” pp. 189–206.
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Ibid.
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Zhao (2009), pp. 145–146.
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Zong (2007), p. 88.
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Luo Yu (2015), Farewell to the General Staff, HK: Open Press, pp. 120, 241–244. Yu Jie’s commentary article, 3/12/2015. http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/wenyitiandi-cite/yj1-12032015162442.html; about corruption scandal implicating Hu Yaobang’s family: an informed source referred to Liu Hu, Hu’s second son (October 2016).
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“Let Part of the People, Part of the Country to Get Rich First,” 17/02/2009. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/82819/143371/8818525.html
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Yu Meisun (2007), “In Memory of Milton Friedman and Zhao Ziyang,” http://www.open.com.hk/old_version/0702p27.html; Regarding Luo Xiaopeng’s accounts, see Hu Ping’s article, “Reinterpreting ‘China Model,’” China Human-Rights Biweekly, 8–21/02/2013. http://biweeklyarchive.hrichina.org/article/4883.html
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Guo Shuqing (1992), “Three-Year Rectification and Improvement and China’s Economic Reform (sannian zhili zhengdun yu zhongguo jingji gaige),” shengchanli yanjiu (Productivity Research), No. 5, pp. 18–32.
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The CCP’s decision to further zhili zhengdun, 9/11/1989. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5105/5188/20010429/455917.html
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Dr. Chen Kuide at Princeton was among the first few people to discern the rightward transformation of Chinese communist dictatorship in early 1992. http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/pinglun/125754-20040114.html
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Yue, J. (2018). Chinese Reform and Development in the 1980s. In: China's Rise in the Age of Globalization. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_3
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