Abstract
Ontologically, the problem of prediction connects with the reality of the phenomena. This feature leads to the specific characteristics that phenomena of different realms of the reality (natural, social, or artificial) might have. From this perspective, the attention goes first to the repercussions (above all, epistemological and methodological) of the reality of phenomena on scientific prediction. Secondly, the problem of the characterization of future phenomena is considered, which is connected with the time horizon of prediction and the possibility of control over phenomena. Thirdly, the ontological limits to scientific prediction are analyzed, because there are obstacles to predictability that are rooted in the reality of phenomena. Finally, the ontology of scientific prediction is analyzed from the angle of complexity (structural and dynamic), which means emphasizing the notion of historicity. Thus, the reflection on complexity is developed from the perspective of historicity, which is especially important for the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The research on the ontological limits of predictability from the perspective of complexity is in Guillán (2016b).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 15.7.2014.
- 6.
Rescher, Personal communication , 15.7.2014.
- 7.
This issue is developed from a methodological point of view in Sect. 5.3.1.
- 8.
Cf. Rescher, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 106–110. On the inference from laws as a method for predicting, see Sect. 6.3.2 herein.
- 9.
On the epistemological and ontological limits to predictability, see Rescher (2009b, pp. 91–122).
- 10.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 29.7.2014.
- 11.
Rescher, Personal Communication , 29.7.2014. Here the concept of “evolution ” that Rescher uses is the current idea of evolution as change over time that follows a certain line towards the future, instead of being the ramified idea of Darwinian evolution (as can be seen in the graph that Darwin made in chapter IV of On the Origin of Species, in the first edition of 1859).
- 12.
The possibility of “new facts ” in the realm of the social sciences (for example, in economics) is comparatively higher than in the case of the natural sciences . There are a series of contextual elements that have repercussions on economics (“Economics as activity ”) together with the components of variability of the economic activity itself (“economic activity ”), Cf. Gonzalez (1994).
- 13.
This feature has been highlighted by Wenceslao J. Gonzalez with regard to the sciences of design . Cf. Gonzalez (2012b).
- 14.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 10.6.2014.
- 15.
The roles of complexity and historicity in social sciences are further developed in Sect. 7.4.3 of this chapter.
- 16.
- 17.
On the role of creativity in the sciences of design , see Guillán (2013).
- 18.
Rescher does not defend an ontological determinism . Rather, he makes it clear that there is a reality of the future as something that will show up.
- 19.
Although Dummett considers this possibility, he actually does not support it.
- 20.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 8.7.2014.
- 21.
On the topic of determinism both in social sciences and in the sciences of nature, see the set of papers published in Gonzalez (2012d).
- 22.
In this volume, Rescher offers renewed approaches in favor of human freedom.
- 23.
“A weather forecast is long range if it looks ahead for more than a month, an economic forecast is long range if it looks ahead for more than a year, a population forecast would have to look several generations ahead to qualify as long run,” Rescher (1998a, p. 78).
- 24.
It should be noted that the concept “intervention ” and its differences with “representation ” received especial attention after the publication of the book by Hacking (1983).
- 25.
- 26.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 10.6.2014.
- 27.
- 28.
The analysis of these limits to predictability is also in Guillán (2016b).
- 29.
On the preconditions for rational prediction , see Sect. 5.4.
- 30.
For further details on this distinction, see Sect. 2.5.
- 31.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 17.6.2014.
- 32.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 1.7.2014.
- 33.
Note that in Rescher’s terminology, “unpredictability” is used instead of “not-predictability.” See Sect. 2.5 of this monograph.
- 34.
“The future of American poetry is impredictable: we simply have no grip on any laws or regularities that provide for rational prediction ,” Rescher (2009b, p. 103).
- 35.
Rescher suggests this issue with regard to humanistic realms, like literature , so he does not consider how it can affect the scientific disciplines related to designs.
- 36.
On the notion of creativity, see Gonzalez (2013a).
- 37.
On conceptual change , see Gonzalez (2011a).
- 38.
From this point of view, it is a mistake to think of the experiments as prior to the concepts related to them or the technological doing as prior to the conceptual support for its use in the research.
- 39.
On the constitutive elements of science, see Gonzalez (2005, pp. 3–49; especially, pp. 10–11).
- 40.
Cf. Rescher (1998b, pp. 159–161). What Rescher means by “self-insight” problems is in fact a kind of “meta-prediction” about the limits (e.g., of a universal problem-solver ).
- 41.
These limitations have received attention in Sect. 6.1.1 of this monograph.
- 42.
This analysis of complexity is also in Guillán 2016b.
- 43.
It has been noted that complexity sets limits to science: “the study of the characteristics of complex dynamic systems are showing us exactly why limited knowledge is unavoidable—or, to be more precise, why knowledge has to be limited,” Cilliers (2007, p. 82).
- 44.
A recent study of both aspects is in Gonzalez (2015b).
- 45.
“Complexity depends on the number of elements of the system, the number of its properties and the number of relationships between these elements or properties.” Betz (2006, p. 81). This characterization can be valid with regard to the complex structure of a system, but it does not encompass, in my judgment, the whole realm of complexity, since it does not take into account the dynamics of a system.
- 46.
It should be pointed out that there is not a definition of “complexity” or “complex system ” that is generally accepted. Cf. Chu et al (2003, p. 19).
- 47.
- 48.
Certainly, the dynamic trait is also present in Simon ’s analysis of the sciences of design as sciences of complexity , but he is more interested in the structure of the complex systems than in the dynamic complexity . Cf. Simon (1996).
- 49.
He points out just two possible options within the three ontological modes, but they can be enlarged if we take into account dynamic aspects.
- 50.
This is relevant not only for the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial, but also for natural sciences such as biology. See Gonzalez (2015b).
- 51.
This functional complexity involves some kind of openness to a teleological component insofar as the operations are oriented to ends. But this aspect, as well as its dynamic consequences, is not the focus of attention of Rescher’s approach to complexity.
- 52.
On the notion of “process” in Rescher, see Gonzalez (2012b), pp. 79–80.
- 53.
Cf. Rescher, Personal communication , 10.6.2014.
References
Arrojo, M. J. 2012. La sobriedad de factores en el análisis de la complejidad en las Ciencias de la Comunicación. El estudio de la Televisión Digital Terrestre. In Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 337–358. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
Betz, G. 2006. Prediction or prophecy? The boundaries of economic foreknowledge and their socio-political consequences. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag.
Boden, M.A. 2004. The creative mind. Myths and mechanisms, 2nd ed. London: Routledge (1st ed., 1990).
Chu, D., R. Strand, and R. Fjelland. 2003. Theories of complexity. Common denominators of complex systems. Complexity 8 (3): 19–30.
Cilliers, P. 2007. Why we cannot know complex things completely. In Reframing complexity. Perspectives from the North and South. Exploring complexity, ed. F. Capra, A. Juarrero, P. Sotolongo, and J. van Uden, vol. I, 81–89. Mansfield: ISCE.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1996. Creativity. Flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. New York: Harper/Collins (reprinted in 1997).
Dasgupta, S. 1994. Creativity in invention and design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dummett, M. 1954. Can an effect precede its cause? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28: 27–44.
———. 1964. Bringing about the past. Philosophical Review 73: 338–359.
Firth, M. 1977. Forecasting methods in business and management. London: E. Arnold.
Gonzalez, W.J. 1986. La Teoría de la Referencia. Strawson y la Filosofía Analítica. Salamanca/Murcia: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia.
———. 1993. El realismo y sus variedades: El debate actual sobre las bases filosóficas de la Ciencia. In Conocimiento, Ciencia y Realidad, ed. A. Carreras, 11–58. Zaragoza: Seminario Interdisciplinar de la Universidad de Zaragoza-Ediciones Mira.
———. 1994. Economic prediction and human activity. An analysis of prediction in economics from action theory. Epistemologia 17 (2): 253–294.
———. 2003. Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes económicos. In Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 65–96. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2005. The philosophical approach to science, technology and society. In Science, technology and society: A philosophical perspective, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 3–49. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2008a. Rationality and prediction in the sciences of the artificial. In Reasoning, rationality, and probability, ed. M.C. Galavotti, R. Scazzieri, and P. Suppes, 165–186. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
———. 2008b. El enfoque cognitivo en la Ciencia y el problema de la historicidad: Caracterización desde los conceptos. Letras 114 (79): 51–80.
———. 2010. La predicción científica. Concepciones filosófico-metodológicas desde H. Reichenbach a N. Rescher. Montesinos: Barcelona.
———. 2011a. Conceptual changes and scientific diversity: The role of historicity. In Conceptual revolutions: From cognitive science to medicine, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 39–62. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2011b. Complexity in economics and prediction: The role of parsimonious factors. In Explanation, prediction, and confirmation, ed. D. Dieks, W.J. Gonzalez, S. Hartman, Th. Uebel, and M. Weber, 319–330. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2012a. Las Ciencias de Diseño en cuanto Ciencias de la Complejidad: Análisis de la Economía, Documentación y Comunicación. In Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 7–30. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2012b. La vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de la Complejidad. Repercusión de la historicidad para la predicción científica en las Ciencias Diseño. In Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, ed. W. J. Gonzalez, 73–106. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2012c. Complejidad estructural en Ciencias de Diseño y su incidencia en la predicción científica: El papel de la sobriedad de factores (parsimonious factors). In Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, ed. W. J. Gonzalez, 143–167. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. (ed.). 2012d. Freedom and determinism: Social sciences and natural sciences. Monographic issue of Peruvian Journal of Epistemology, vol. 1. Cambre : Imprenta Mundo.
———. 2013a. The roles of scientific creativity and technological innovation in the context of complexity of science. In Creativity, innovation, and complexity in science, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 11–40. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2013b. The sciences of design as sciences of complexity: The dynamic trait. In New Challenges to Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Andersen, D. Dieks, W.J. Gonzalez, Th. Uebel, and G. Wheeler, 299–311. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2014. The evolution of Lakatos’s repercussion on the methodology of economics. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 1–25.
———. 2015a. Philosophico-methodological analysis of prediction and its role in economics. Dordrecht: Springer.
———. 2015b. Prediction and prescription in biological systems: The role of technology for measurement and transformation. In The future of scientific practice: “Bio-techno-logos”, ed. M. Bertolaso, 133–146 and 209–213. London: Pickering and Chatto.
———. 2016. Rethinking the limits of science: From the difficulties for the frontiers to the concern on the confines. In The limits of science: An analysis from “barriers” to “confines,” Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 3–30. Leiden: Brill.
Granger, C. W. J. 1989. Forecasting in business and economics, 2nd ed.. San Diego: Academic (1st ed., 1980).
Guillán, A. 2013. Analysis of creativity in the sciences of design. In Creativity, innovation, and complexity in science, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 125–139. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
———. 2016a. The limits of future knowledge: An analysis of Nicholas Rescher’s epistemological approach. In The limits of science: An analysis from “barriers” to “confines”, Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and the humanities, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 134–149. Leiden: Brill.
———. 2016b. The obstacles to scientific prediction: An analysis of the limits of predictability from the ontology of science. In The limits of science: An analysis from “barriers” to “confines”, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, ed. W.J. Gonzalez. Leiden: Brill.
Hacking, I. 1983. Representing and intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, M. 2009. Complexity: A guided tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neira, P. 2012. Complejidad en Ciencias de la Comunicación debido a la racionalidad: Papel de la racionalidad limitada ante la creatividad e innovación en Internet. In Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, ed. W.J. Gonzalez, 205–230. A Coruña: Netbiblo.
Niiniluoto, I. 1984. Is science progressive? Dordrecht: Reidel.
———. 1993. The aim and structure of applied research. Erkenntnis 38 (1): 1–21.
———. 1995. Approximation in applied science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and the Humanities 42: 127–139.
Rescher, N. 1978. Scientific progress. In A philosophical essay on the economics of the natural science. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1987. Scientific realism. Dordrecht: Reidel.
———. 1990. Our science as o-u-r science. In A useful inheritance. Evolutionary aspects of the theory of knowledge, N. Rescher, 77–104. Savage: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 1992a. A system of pragmatic idealism. Vol. I: Human knowledge in idealistic perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 1992b. Realism and idealism. In A system of pragmatic idealism. Vol. I: Human knowledge in idealistic perspective, N. Rescher, 304–327. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 1995. Predictive incapacity and rational decision. European Review 3 (4): 327–332.
———. 1997. Objectivity. The obligations of impersonal reason. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 1998a. Predicting the future. An introduction to the theory of forecasting. New York: State University of New York Press.
———. 1998b. Complexity: A philosophical overview. N. Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
———. 1998c. Objectivity and communication. How ordinary discourse is committed to objectivity. In Communicative pragmatism and other philosophical essays on language, N. Rescher, 85–97. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 1999a. Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica. Barcelona: Paidós.
———. 1999b. The limits of science, revised edition. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
———. 2005a. Realism and pragmatic epistemology. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
———. 2005b. Reason and reality. Realism and idealism in pragmatic perspective. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
———. 2009a. Free will: A philosophical reappraisal. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
———. 2009b. Ignorance. On the wider implications of deficient knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
———. 2009c. Unknowability. An inquiry into the limits of knowledge. Lanham: Lexington Books.
———. 2010. Reality and its appearance. London: Continuum.
———. 2012a. The problem of future knowledge. Mind and Society 11 (2): 149–163.
———. 2012b. Political pragmatism. In Pragmatism. The restoration of its scientific roots, N. Rescher, 205–215. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Sen, A. 1986. Prediction and economic theory. In Predictability in science and society, ed. J. Mason, P. Mathias, and J.H. Westcott, 103–125. London: The Royal Society and The British Academy.
Simon, H.A. 1990. Prediction and prescription in systems modeling. Operations Research 38: 7–14. Compiled Simon, H.A. 1997. Models of bounded rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, 115–128. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
———. 1991. Models of my life. New York: Basic Books (reprinted in Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996a).
———. 1995. Problem forming, problem finding, and problem solving in design. In Design and systems: General applications of methodology, ed. A. Collen and W.W. Gasparski, vol. 3, 245–257. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
———. 1996. The sciences of the artificial, 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1st ed., 1969; 2nd ed., 1981).
———. 2001. Science seeks parsimony, not simplicity: Searching for pattern in phenomena. In Simplicity, inference and modeling. Keeping it sophisticatedly simple, ed. A. Zellner, H.A. Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer, 32–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2002. Forecasting the future or shaping it? Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (3): 601–605.
Sprott, J. C. 2006. Complex behavior of simple systems. In Unifying themes in complex systems, Vol. IIIB, New research, ed. A.A. Minai and Y. Bar- Yam, 2–11. Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Complex Systems. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Guillán, A. (2017). Ontology of Scientific Prediction. In: Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63043-4_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63043-4_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-63042-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-63043-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)