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Security Privatization pp 275–299Cite as

Regulation of Data Breaches in the European Union: Private Companies in the Driver’s Seat of Cybersecurity?

Abstract

This chapter illustrates how EU law on data breaches has come to put private companies that are not PMSCs in the driver’s seat of cybersecurity, due to their pivotal role for network and information security and the prevention of cybercrime, which are two of the three pillars of the Union cybersecurity strategy. The applicable law divides into a double regime, depending on whether the breach of security concerns personal or impersonal data. However, the differences between the two regimes are trumped by a number of important commonalities. The analysis of the bridging role played by ENISA unveils that commonalities between the two regimes are not casual, but rather relate to the applicable law’s common pursuit of network and information security. The instruments are informed by the logics of risk management and assessment, as well as the prevention of security incidents. These logics frame the norms on data breaches notification and mitigation, which appear part of a wider infrastructure of security aimed at the prevention of cybercrime. This is the case irrespective of whether the breach concerns personal or impersonal data, as demonstrated by means of an analysis of the notion of information security, and of the ‘risks’ entailed by personal data breaches. It is in this light that private companies managing data breaches implicitly become cybersecurity agents, or drivers of cybersecurity. To continue along the lines of the car metaphor, it is as if EU law tries to supply private company with a specific route—the implementation of risk-based network and information security measures—and fit the car with emergency breaks—the notification of data breaches. Whether private companies are ready—or sufficiently incentivized—to ‘start the engine’ of cybersecurity, drive along the designated route, and break when needed is, however, a different question. In fact, data breaches obligations may appear as the (only?) ‘stick’ available to the state to ensure that private companies do not take all the gains of the information society at the risk for critical (information) infrastructure, begging the question of the effectiveness of the stick.

Keywords

  • Personal Data Breach
  • European Network And Information Security Agency (ENISA)
  • Cybercrime
  • Impersonal Data
  • Digital Service Providers

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Know-how is excluded from the notion of personal data. Deceased individuals do not enjoy the protection of the GDPR (recital 27).

  2. 2.

    For instance, “identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller” (recital 57 of the GDPR).

  3. 3.

    The GDPR was accompanied by the adoption of Directive 2016/680, which substitutes the much-criticized Council Framework Decision 977/2008/JHA, and addresses what has long been a legal grey area. It will apply to the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, but not to national security, which is the sole responsibility of Member States (article 72 TFEU). Since it concerns public bodies, which are beyond the scope of this discussion, I will not perform an analysis of the provisions on data breaches contained therein.

  4. 4.

    Adopted pursuant to article 5(5) and 14a(2) of the e-Privacy Directive, the Commission Regulation lays down “technical implementing measures concerning the circumstances, format and procedures applicable to the information and notification requirements referred to” (recital 3) in Directive 2002/58/EC.

  5. 5.

    For the purposes of this definition: (1) ‘at a distance’ means that the service is provided without the parties being simultaneously present; (2) ‘by electronic means’ means that the service is sent initially and received at its destination by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data, and entirely transmitted, conveyed and received by wire, by radio, by optical means or by other electromagnetic means; (3) ‘at the individual request of a recipient of services’ means that the service is provided through the transmission of data on individual request.

  6. 6.

    A closer reading of the relevant provisions seems to favour an understanding of ‘high’ risks as very likely ones, whereas ‘significant’ risks seems to relate to the intensity of the potential damage suffered by individuals.

  7. 7.

    The Regulation does not explicitly qualify the nature of the services as information society services (ISSs). It can be argued that eIDAS would not fall under the definition of ISS because they do not operate entirely by electronic means, in that they need a physical support (i.e. hardware) to work.

  8. 8.

    Defined in article 4 as follows: (13) ‘internet exchange point (IXP)’ means a network facility which enables the interconnection of more than two independent autonomous systems, primarily for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of internet traffic; an IXP provides interconnection only for autonomous systems; an IXP does not require the internet traffic passing between any pair of participating autonomous systems to pass through any third autonomous system, nor does it alter or otherwise interfere with such traffic; (14) ‘domain name system (DNS)’ means a hierarchical distributed naming system in a network which refers queries for domain names; (15) ‘DNS service provider’ means an entity which provides DNS services on the internet.

  9. 9.

    Measures must be ‘appropriate’ in the case of essential services; the obligation concerns digital services referred to in Annex III that are offered within the Union.

  10. 10.

    Digital service providers must identify measures; the obligation concerns operators in the Union; moreover, “having regard to the state of the art, those measures shall ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risk posed, and shall take into account the following elements: (a) the security of systems and facilities; (b) incident handling; (c) business continuity management; (d) monitoring, auditing and testing; (e) compliance with international standards.” (article 16 (1)).

  11. 11.

    It is not possible to predict whether ‘continuity’ of the service will be given more weight than ‘security’ in the national rules transposing the articles on the notification of breaches, but shoud this happen, it would represent a betrayal of the spirit of the NIS Directive.

  12. 12.

    Codified Directive 2015/1535/EU on Information Society Services.

  13. 13.

    The differences between the definitions concern the following: the scope of threats to security, which may include natural disasters (ENISA’s definition); the scope of data which can include further operations on top of transmission and storage (NIS and Framework Directive); and the explicit ambit of application.

  14. 14.

    As discussed in Sect. 12.3.1, in the implementation phase integrity has been interpreted as availability of the service (European Network and Information Security Agency 2017). However, this betrays the intention of maintaining security. A more authentic interpretation would require taking into account both meanings, i.e. available and secure.

  15. 15.

    Statistics are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ICT_security_in_enterprises (last accessed 12 June 2017).

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Acknowledgment

The completion of this chapter has been supported by the EPSRC-funded project CRITiCaL—Combatting cRiminals In The CLoud.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, The Liberty Building, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK

    Maria Grazia Porcedda

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  1. Maria Grazia Porcedda
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Correspondence to Maria Grazia Porcedda .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Security Studies, Metropolitan University Prague, Prague, Czech Republic

    Dr. Oldrich Bures

  2. Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Languages and Social Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom

    Dr. Helena Carrapico

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Porcedda, M.G. (2018). Regulation of Data Breaches in the European Union: Private Companies in the Driver’s Seat of Cybersecurity?. In: Bures, O., Carrapico, H. (eds) Security Privatization. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63010-6_12

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