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Intervention

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Abstract

Nicaragua’s cases brought a great contribution to the law on intervention. They clarified some of its characteristics, the most important of which relating to the statutory nature of intervention: thus, the admissibility of these proceedings is not dependent upon the consent of the Parties, but on the fulfilment of the conditions established by the Statute. Though the Court took many years to acknowledge this fundamental aspect, its case-law seems now stabilized—at least as a matter of principle. The same cannot be said about the substantive conditions for admissibility of intervention: absent any real attempt from the Court to define the concept of ‘interest of a legal nature which may be affected’, the admission of intervention under Article 62 is still highly circumstantial. These ambiguities also durably impacted the consequences of intervention. The Court firmly maintains a peremptory distinction between intervention as a party and intervention as a non-party, but it also deprives it of any prospect of clarification, since it has never admitted intervention as a party. This emphatic insistence does not help clarifying the status of the intervener, nor does it stimulate the reflection upon its procedural rights and obligations.

Keywords

  • Nature Which
  • Legal Nature
  • Nicaragua
  • Supra Note
  • Maritime Frontier Dispute

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Alina Miron was part of the legal team representing the Republic of Nicaragua in the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia). The views and opinions expressed in this Chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Republic of Nicaragua.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1990, p. 92 (hereinafter ‘El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene)’).

  2. 2.

    See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Declaration of Intervention, Order of 4 October 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 215 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua v. United States of America (Declaration of Intervention by El Salvador)’).

  3. 3.

    See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Costa Rica for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 348 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene)’) and Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Application by Honduras for Permission to Intervene of Honduras, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2011, p. 420 (hereinafter ‘Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene)’).

  4. 4.

    Nicaragua’s position was to call the Court’s attention to some deficiencies in the applications for permission to intervene, leaving it to the Court to appreciate whether the statutory conditions for admissibility were met (Written Observations on the Declaration of Intervention (Nicaragua) in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 10 September 1984, para 1; Written Observations of the Republic of Nicaragua on the Application for Permission to Intervene by the government of Costa Rica, 26 May 2010, para 41 and Written Observations of the Republic of Nicaragua on the Application for Permission to Intervene Filed by the Republic of Honduras, 26 May 2010, para 41).

  5. 5.

    See also Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Donoghue, p. 485, paras 37–38.

  6. 6.

    Article 84, paragraph 2 of the Rules provides for a right to oral hearings on the admissibility of intervention in case of an objection of one of the parties. In this case, the Court decides by a judgment. Absent any objection, the Court decides of the admissibility of intervention by an order.

  7. 7.

    In 1990, the acceptance of Nicaragua’s intervention in El Salvador/Honduras was preceded by two judgements rejecting Malta’s Application for permission to intervene in Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Judgment of 14 April 1981) (hereinafter ‘Tunisia/Libya (Application by Malta to Intervene)’) and Italy’s Application in Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment of 21 March 1984) (hereinafter ‘Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene)’). In 1994, the Court accepted Equatorial Guinea’s application for permission to intervene in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria). However, Costa Rica’s and Honduras applications were denied in 2011, while, the same year, Greece’s request was admitted in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) (Order of 4 July 2011, ICJ Reports 2011, p. (hereinafter ‘Jurisdictional Immunities (Application by Greece to Intervene)’)). In 2013, the Court acceded to New Zealand’s request to intervene in Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) (Order of 6 February 2013, ICJ Reports 2013, p. 3 (hereinafter ‘Whaling (Declaration of Intervention by New Zealand)’)), but, to the difference of the previous cases, this one was based on Article 63 of the Statute.

  8. 8.

    This distinction appears in Sir Ian’s pleadings in the El Salvador/Honduras case: ‘In the submission of Nicaragua, the protective function is not to be equated with the informative or prescriptive function of intervention characterized […] as being concerned with ensuring ‘the sound administration of justice’. The protective function complements the informative function but provides the intervening State with the opportunity to explain the legitimate interests of the intervener which are placed in issue by the litigation between the Parties. The function of protection involves a consideration of the objectives of the litigants and the precise modes in which those objectives may affect the legal entitlements of the intervening State.’ (Verbatim, 7 June 1991, C 4/CR 91/43 p. 46 (Ian Brownlie)). The terminology ‘protective/ informative function’ was taken up by the doctrine (e.g.: Forlati 2014, p. 190).

  9. 9.

    Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2013, p. 70, para 48 quoting Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 270–271, para 55; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 476, para 58.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    See Sect. 3.2.1 below.

  12. 12.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 237, para 18.

  13. 13.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 130, para 90.

  14. 14.

    ‘[I]n accordance with the terms of Article 63 of the Statute, the limited object of the intervention is to allow a third State not party to the proceedings, but party to a convention whose construction is in question in those proceedings, to present to the Court its observations on the construction of that convention’ (Whaling (Declaration of Intervention by New Zealand), supra note 7, p. 5, para 8).

  15. 15.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 359, para 27—italics added.

  16. 16.

    The phrase ‘request for intervention’ is used to encompass both the ‘application for permission to intervene’ under Article 62 of the Statute and ‘the declaration of intervention’ under Article 63.

  17. 17.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 130, para 90—italics added.

  18. 18.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 360, para 33—italics added.

  19. 19.

    Nicaragua v. United States of America (Declaration of Intervention by El Salvador), supra note 2, p. 216. Here the Court clarified and confirmed a stance already announced in Haya de la Tore case (‘every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case’—ICJ Reports 1951, p. 76) and in ‘the Nuclear Tests case, where […] the ICJ deferred consideration of Fiji’s request to intervene until it had pronounced on France’s objections to jurisdiction and admissibility’ (Miron and Chinkin 2018, p. 1344). Ultimately the Court found that ‘the claim of New Zealand no longer has any object and that the Court is therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon; […] in consequence there will no longer be any proceedings before the Court to which the Application for permission to intervene could relate’ (Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Application by Fiji for Permission to Intervene, Orders of 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 535).

  20. 20.

    See Sect. 2.3 below.

  21. 21.

    Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Application to Intervene, Order of 28 February 1990, ICJ Reports 1990, p. 4, quoting Haya de la Torre, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 76.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 134, para 98—italics added.

  24. 24.

    Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1998, p. 324, para 116, quoting East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 101, para 26.

  25. 25.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 99; see also Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 22, para 35.

  26. 26.

    Miron and Chinkin (2018), p. 1370.

  27. 27.

    This does not mean that intervention under Article 63 is not disruptive of the equality of the Parties (see Sect. 4 below).

  28. 28.

    The general interest in the interpretation of treaties is not enough for the purposes of Article 62 (see Sect. 3.1.1 below).

  29. 29.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 117, para 61.

  30. 30.

    This revision seems to have been prompted by Fiji’s request for intervention in the Nuclear Tests case. As H. Thirlway reminds, ‘[t]he cases came to a premature end before the Court was called upon to decide the point, but some of the judges felt strongly enough to indicate, in declarations attached to an Order of the Court, that they would have dismissed the intervention for lack of jurisdiction’ (2016, p. 181).

  31. 31.

    Among the most vigorous and well documented critics is that by Judge Oda (Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oda, pp. 93–99, paras 8–19). For other references, see Miron and Chinkin (2018), pp. 1356–1357).

  32. 32.

    See references in Miron and Chinkin (2018), p. 1357, footnotes 163–165.

  33. 33.

    Rosenne (2005), p. 1468.

  34. 34.

    Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 24; see also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, p. 25, para 51.

  35. 35.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 94. The phrase ‘valid jurisdictional link’ is a particularity of intervention proceedings. The phrase as such was cornered in Tunisia/Libya (Application by Malta to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 20, para 36.

  36. 36.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 90; see also ibid., para 96.

  37. 37.

    Ibid. In the same vein: ‘the competence of the Court or of the Tribunal in these matters does not derive from the consent of the parties to the case to hear and determine the dispute, but from the consent given by them, in becoming parties to the Statute, to the exercise by the Court, or by the Tribunal, the powers conferred upon it by the Statute’ (Torres Bernárdez (2006), p. 37).

  38. 38.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, pp. 134–135, para 99.

  39. 39.

    See also Sect. 4 below.

  40. 40.

    Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 17 march 2016, para 48, quoting Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 456, para 120; in the same sense, see Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 177, para 29.

  41. 41.

    Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2008, p. 200, para 48.

  42. 42.

    See references in footnote 37 above.

  43. 43.

    Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2013, pp. 295–304, paras 31–57.

  44. 44.

    Even if Article 84 of the Rules uses a distinct terminology—‘whether an application for permission to intervene under Article 62 of the Statute should be granted, and whether an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute is admissible’, there is no difference in the nature of the exam made by the Court.

  45. 45.

    See Sect. 2.2 above.

  46. 46.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 367, para 65.

  47. 47.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 434, para 36.

  48. 48.

    This distinction is maintained in all the relevant articles of the Rules (see Articles 82–85).

  49. 49.

    Whaling (Declaration of Intervention by New Zealand), supra note 7, p. 5, para 8.

  50. 50.

    See Sect. 2.2 above.

  51. 51.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 90, quoting Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 28, para 46.

  52. 52.

    See Article 84, paragraph 2 of the Rules; see also note 6 above.

  53. 53.

    The interventions admitted under Article 62 were: Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon und Nigeria, Application by Equatorial Guinea to Intervene, Order of 21 October 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, pp. 1033–1034, paras 9–10; Jurisdictional Immunities (Application by Greece to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 496, para 6. New Zealand’s intervention under Article 63 in the Whaling case was not objected to either by Australia or Japan (Whaling (Declaration of Intervention by New Zealand), supra note 7, p. 8, paras 16–17 and p. 9, para 19).

  54. 54.

    Criticizing the influence upon the Court of the attitude of the parties, see Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Donoghue, pp. 490–491, para 56.

  55. 55.

    In the same vein, see also Palchetti (2002), p. 152.

  56. 56.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 434, para 36, quoting Tunisia/Libya (Application by Malta to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 12, para 17. See also Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 358, para 25.

  57. 57.

    See Kolb (2013), pp. 1169–1180; see also Miron (2016), p. 374.

  58. 58.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Abraham, p. 450, para 12. See also Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 12, paras 17–18.

  59. 59.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 363, paras 49–51.

  60. 60.

    This difficult distinction goes beyond the question of intervention in contentious proceedings. It was for instance one of the touchstones of codification of the law of responsibility (see Nolte 2002).

  61. 61.

    See Sect. 3.2 below.

  62. 62.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 129, para 87.

  63. 63.

    This is particularly the case in relation to standing (in French: intérêt à agir): see South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1966, pp. 18–19, paras 4–8 and p. 22, para 14. Later, the Court abandoned this restrictive approach, and no longer requires from States to prove the existence of a subjective right in order to be recognize their standing: ‘All the other States parties have a common interest in compliance with these obligations by the State in whose territory the alleged offender is present. That common interest implies that the obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties to the Convention. All the States parties ‘have a legal interest’ in the protection of the rights involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 32, para 33). These obligations may be defined as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case’ (Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 68, para 449—italics added).

  64. 64.

    De Visscher (1966), p. 63.

  65. 65.

    In the same vein, Palchetti explains that ‘[a] state seeking to intervene under Article 62 has to specify the content of its legal interest with reference to a given claim. In the cases so far submitted to the Court the interest has been mainly identified with specific rights or titles that the states seeking to intervene claimed to possess against the parties to the dispute’ (2002, p. 144).

  66. 66.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, pp. 358–359, para 26 (italics added). See also Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 434, para 37. Judge Donoghue did not entirely subscribe to this understanding: ‘The Court today appears to suggest that an “interest of a legal nature” must be framed as a “claim” of a legal right. The focus on claims may flow from a body of jurisprudence derived from maritime claims. Nonetheless, although a generalized interest in the content of international law has been found to be insufficient to comprise an “interest of a legal nature”, I do not rule out the possibility of a third State demonstrating an “interest of a legal nature” without framing it as a “claim” of a legal right’ (ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Donoghue, p. 476, fn 1).

  67. 67.

    See also Queneudec (1995), pp. 419–420. This distinguishes the legal interest for the purposes of intervention from standing based on the common interest for the enforcement of erga omnes obligations (see note 63 above).

  68. 68.

    Tunisia/Libya (Application by Malta to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 11, para 16 and p. 17, para 29.

  69. 69.

    See Greece’s intervention: ‘[I]n its written observations, Greece also expresses its wish to inform the Court “on Greece’s approach to the issue of State immunity, and to developments in that regard in recent years”; and whereas Greece does not present this element as indicating the existence of an interest of a legal nature, but rather as providing context to its Application for intervention’ (Jurisdictional Immunities (Application by Greece to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 499, para 18). However, most of Greece’s observation as an intervenor related to ascertaining the existence of some rules of customary law (like the existence of a private right to compensation for human rights violations and the exception to State immunity in case of violations of norms of jus cogens: see Written Statement of the Hellenic Republic, 3 August 2011).

  70. 70.

    Forlati (2014), p. 200.

  71. 71.

    Palchetti (2002), p. 162. See also Wolfrum (1998), p. 428.

  72. 72.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 444, paras 72–73.

  73. 73.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 358, para 26.

  74. 74.

    A preliminary question would be to assess whether the Monetary Gold principle can be applied outside the situations where the subject-matter of the dispute is a question of responsibility of a State absent from proceedings ‘as a precondition for ruling on the responsibility of the Respondent’ (Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom), Judgment of 5 October 2016, Separate opinion of Judge Tomka, para 38). In El Salvador/Honduras, no question of responsibility arose and the reference to the Monetary Gold principle was not obvious. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, where questions of responsibility arose, Germany refrained from questioning the legality of the Greek judicial decisions and the Court considered that different sets of rules applied to their enforcement (Jurisdictional Immunities (Application by Greece to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 147, para 114).

  75. 75.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 116, paras 54 and 56.

  76. 76.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 434, para 38, quoting Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application by the Philippines for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, p. 596, para 47 (hereinafter ‘Indonesia/Malaysia (Application by the Philippines to Intervene)’). See also Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 359, para 26.

  77. 77.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Donoghue, p. 476, para 16.

  78. 78.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 372, para 87—italics added.

  79. 79.

    Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 421, para 238.

  80. 80.

    See the critics by Judge Donoghue in its Dissenting Opinion in Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, pp. 480–481, para 22–23.

  81. 81.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 124, para 77 quoted in Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 371, para 85.

  82. 82.

    Miron and Chinkin (2018), pp. 1345–1346.

  83. 83.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 136, para 103. See also p. 125, para 79.

  84. 84.

    See above, Introduction.

  85. 85.

    As for instance: ‘the precise object of the request to intervene certainly consists in informing the Court of the interest of a legal nature’ (Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 360, para 33; see also p. 363, para 49).

  86. 86.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 134, para 98.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., pp. 132–133, para 97 quoting Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 23, para 37.

  88. 88.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, pp. 113–114, para 51.

  89. 89.

    Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, Merits, ICJ Reports 1992, p. 114, para 51 (hereinafter ‘El Salvador/Honduras (Merits)’) quoting Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 20, para 31.

  90. 90.

    See Palchetti (2002), pp. 148–149.

  91. 91.

    See Sect. 3.1.1 above.

  92. 92.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra n. 3, p. 432, para 29.

  93. 93.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra n. 1, p. 134, para 98, emphasis added.

  94. 94.

    See Lagrange (2005), pp. 65–70.

  95. 95.

    Some indications could however be found in the travaux préparatoires. Indeed, as R. Wolfrum underlined: ‘Comparing article 62 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the equivalent provision of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), one major difference becomes evident. Whereas, under the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the intervening State intervenes ‘as a third party’, it does not do so under the Statute of the International Court of Justice. These words were deleted from the provision when, in 1945, a committee of jurists prepared a draft statute for the International Court of Justice. In assessing such a change, it should be noted that the 1920 French version of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice did not contain these words and that, accordingly, the present version of article 62 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice reflects the French version of Article 62 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The report on the draft statute of the ICJ to the San Francisco Conference stated that the deletion of the words ‘as a third party’ were not intended to change the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute.’ (Wolfrum 1998, p. 434, footnotes omitted).

  96. 96.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, pp. 134–135, para 99.

  97. 97.

    See Sect. 2.2 above.

  98. 98.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 95.

  99. 99.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 432, para 28 and Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Costa Rica to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 361, para 38. See also Indonesia/Malaysia (Application by the Philippines to Intervene), supra note 76, pp. 588–589, paras 31–36.

  100. 100.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, p. 429, para 18.

  101. 101.

    Nicaragua v. Colombia (Application by Honduras to Intervene), supra note 3, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Abraham, p. 452, para 18.

  102. 102.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Merits), supra note 89, p. 629, para 421. See quote ibid., para 424.

  103. 103.

    See the critics by Judge Oda in its Declaration in El Salvador/Honduras (Merits), supra note 89, pp. 619–620 and by Judge ad hoc Torres-Bernárdez in its Separate Opinion in ibid., pp. 730–731, para 208.

  104. 104.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Merits), supra note 89, p. 616, para 432. See also the conclusions of the Court in relation to the enforcement by Italy of the decisions of the Greek courts (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2012, p. 155, para 139, point 3).

  105. 105.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Merits), supra note 89, p. 616, para 432.

  106. 106.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Merits), supra note 89, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres-Bernárdez, pp. 730–731, para 208.

  107. 107.

    LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, pp. 501–506, paras 98–109.

  108. 108.

    El Salvador/Honduras (Application by Nicaragua to Intervene), supra note 1, p. 133, para 99, Libya/Malta (Application by Italy to Intervene), supra note 7, p. 22, para 35. In El Salvador/Honduras, the Chamber made clear that the intervener had no right to appoint an ad hoc judge (ibid., pp. 135–136, para 102).

  109. 109.

    Such as the right to file pleadings and the right to be heard (both on issues of admissibility and on merits) (see Articles 84, 85 and 86 of the Statute).

  110. 110.

    On these aspects, see Miron (2016), pp. 390–391.

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Miron, A. (2018). Intervention. In: Sobenes Obregon, E., Samson, B. (eds) Nicaragua Before the International Court of Justice. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62962-9_16

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