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The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance pp 183–205Cite as

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Understanding Governance and Corruption Using Survey Data: A Novel Approach and Its Applications in Policy and Research

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Abstract

Cross-country evidence has shown the negative impact of poor governance and corruption on citizens and business people. Researchers and practitioners, however, need more disaggregated data for policy design, implementation, and monitoring. This chapter introduces an alternative methodology that allows institutions to be measured in a more disaggregated way using survey data to create indicators at the agency and sub-national levels. The experiential data used also allows the evaluation of the degree of implementation of regulations within public agencies rather than their quality. The chapter discusses two research applications that have shed light on the links between the quality of institutions, service delivery, and corruption. It also provides an overview of selected cases where these indicators have supported policy-makers in the design of governance reforms.

Prepared for the Workshop on Global Governance by Indicators: Measuring Governance and Stateness, Florence, 13–14 November 2014. This work would not have been possible without the cooperation of thousands of survey respondents who selflessly shared their experiences. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its executive board, or its management.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the purposes of this chapter, governance is defined as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufmann et al. 1999a, b, p. 1) and corruption is defined as the use of the power of public office for personal gain. Corruption is taken to include all (and only) activities in which “public officials, bureaucrats, legislators and politicians use powers delegated to them by the public to further their own economic interests at the expense of the public good” (Jain 2001, p. 73). This definition embraces many different forms of corruption—from administrative corruption to “state capture”—when powerful groups buy influence and shape laws to their benefit.

  2. 2.

    This is in line with the “resistance to reforms” argument first highlighted by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).

  3. 3.

    See Kaufmann et al. (1998) for a description of the original approach and its implementation in Latvia, Georgia, and Albania.

  4. 4.

    Recanatini (2012) offers a detailed discussion of these tools and their applicability for policy reform.

  5. 5.

    To test the robustness of our approach, we also calculate agency indices of governance as mean values of the individual responses.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

    Francesca Recanatini

Authors
  1. Francesca Recanatini
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

    Debora Valentina Malito

  2. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

    Gaby Umbach

  3. Law Department, European University Institute, Firenze, Italy

    Nehal Bhuta

Annex 8.1

Annex 8.1

Table 8.4 Survey questions used to construct governance variables
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Table 8.5 Governance and corruption indicators by the province, Zambia
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Table 8.6 Governance and corruption indicators by institution, Sierra Leone
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Recanatini, F. (2018). Understanding Governance and Corruption Using Survey Data: A Novel Approach and Its Applications in Policy and Research. In: Malito, D., Umbach, G., Bhuta, N. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62707-6_8

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