Incentive Ratios of a Proportional Sharing Mechanism in Resource Sharing
In a resource sharing system, resources are shared among multiple interconnected peers. Peers act as both suppliers and customers of resources by making a certain amount of their resource directly available to others. In this paper we focus on a proportional sharing mechanism, which is fair, efficient and guarantees a market equilibrium in the resource sharing system. We study the incentives an agent may manipulate such a mechanism, by the vertex splitting strategy, for personal gains and adopt a concept called incentive ratio to quantify the amount of gains. For the resource sharing system where the underlying network ia a cycle, we prove that the incentive ratio on this kind of network is bounded by \(2\le \zeta \le 4\). Furthermore, the incentive ratio on an even cycle, a cycle with even number of vertices, is proved to be exactly 2.
KeywordsMechanism design Market equilibrium Combinatorial optimization Incentive ratio Resource sharing
This research was partially supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (No. 11301475, 11426026, 61632017, 61173011), by a Project 985 grant of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and by the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong (ECS Project No. 26200314, GRF Project No. 16213115 and GRF Project No.16243516).
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