Abstract
The chapter analyses the issues of advanced weapons on earth and in space and their implications for arms control. Such technological developments are seen as extremely dangerous and capable of opening the way to very threatening security scenarios with high levels of instability and uncertainty. The technical and political dimensions of a possible arms control regime for space are thoroughly discussed and solid arguments are advanced that a ban on actual space weapons and on anti-satellite weapons is both essential and feasible.
Originally presented to the Third ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Global Security in New International Situation, Arms Control in Outer Space, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Test and Verification Techniques, Beijing, 21–26 October 1992.
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This limitation on potential brightness would correspond to illumination of about 1 W/cm2 at 300 km distance. It would be reached with 1 kW of laser light at 1 micron wavelength, into a mirror of 1 m2 area.
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Garwin, R.L. (2018). Weapons on Earth and in Space: Global Security in the New International Situation. In: Foradori, P., Giacomello, G., Pascolini, A. (eds) Arms Control and Disarmament. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62259-0_15
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