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Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Evolved... but Our Security Models Didn’t

  • Hugo JonkerEmail author
  • Sjouke Mauw
  • Rolando Trujillo-Rasua
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10368)

Abstract

The security community seems to be thoroughly familiar with man-in-the-middle attacks. However, the common perception of this type of attack is outdated. It originates from when network connections were fixed, not mobile, before 24/7 connectivity became ubiquitous. The common perception of this attack stems from an era before the vulnerability of the protocol’s context was realised. Thanks to revelations by Snowden and by currently available man-in-the-middle tools focused on protocol meta-data (such as so-called “Stingrays” for cellphones), this view is no longer tenable. Security protocols that only protect the contents of their messages are insufficient. Contemporary security protocols must also take steps to protect their context: who is talking to whom, where is the sender located, etc.

In short: the attacker has evolved. It’s high time for our security models and requirements to catch up.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hugo Jonker
    • 1
    Email author
  • Sjouke Mauw
    • 2
  • Rolando Trujillo-Rasua
    • 2
  1. 1.Open University of the NetherlandsHeerlenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg CityLuxembourg

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