Placing Joint Orders When Holding Costs Are Negligible and Shortages Are Not Allowed
In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs.
KeywordsAirport game Core allocation Cost game Inventory problem Order coalition
Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2014-53395-C3-1-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P and of Xunta de Galicia through the ERDF (Grupos de Referencia Competitiva ED431C-2016-015 and ED431C-2016-040, and Centro Singular de Investigación de Galicia ED431G/01).
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