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The Judicial Function of the WTO

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Environmental Policy, Non-Product Related Process and Production Methods and the Law of the World Trade Organization

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 1))

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Abstract

In simple terms, the WTO’s sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism makes it a distinctive organization.

This quotation from Pascal Lamy, former Director-General of the WTO, clearly recognises the importance of the WTO DSS in the particular and distinctive position of the WTO. Indeed, as quoted above, the WTO DSS is ‘in all probability, the most effective area of adjudication in the entire area of public international law’. Thus, the WTO DSS operates in such a manner that is almost unique in effectiveness in the realm of public international law. This section aims to elaborate on some of the previous points raised as to why this is and incorporate other facets of the DSS that have not yet been mentioned that also contribute to the effectiveness of the system.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Pascal Lamy, The Place and Role of the WTO in the International Legal Order: Address before the European Society of International Law (May 2006), available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl26_e.htm (last accessed on 05/03/2017).

  2. 2.

    Pascal Lamy was Director-General of the WTO from 2005–2013. See: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/pl_e.htm (last accessed on 05/03/2017).

  3. 3.

    David Palmeter/Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure (Cambridge, 2nd edn. 2004), 234.

  4. 4.

    Art. 5 DSU.

  5. 5.

    Furthermore, ‘The DSU expresses a clear preference for solutions mutually acceptable to the parties reached through negotiations, rather than solutions resulting from adjudication’. See Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge, 2nd edn. 2008), 173 and 171–178 generally.

  6. 6.

    Appellate Body Report Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, para. 352.

  7. 7.

    It should be noted, however, that there is no provision comparable to Art. 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which lays out the jurisdiction of the DSS in DSU or any other of the covered agreements. See Palmeter/Mavroidis (note 3), 17. The jurisdiction of the DSS, though not laid out explicitly, can be found in Arts. 1, 2, 3.1, 6, 7, 17.6 and 17.13 DSU: ibid.

  8. 8.

    Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948–1996: An Introduction, in: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.), Studies in Transnational Economic Law: International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (Neuwied, 1997), 55.

  9. 9.

    Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, Wisconsin Law Review (1982), 975, 986.

  10. 10.

    Exclusive jurisdiction is possessed by many human rights bodies, but is often coupled with an obligation to first exhaust any possible national remedies. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is a specialist tribunal, but without exclusive jurisdiction and parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (of 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3), are only subject to compulsory jurisdiction in certain instances and not specifically at the ITLOS (See Part. XV UNCLOS). The ICJ has general jurisdiction but not compulsory.

  11. 11.

    Palmeter/Mavroidis (note 3), 234.

  12. 12.

    Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford, 2009), 5.

  13. 13.

    In the 2004 Sutherland Report, the creation of the right to appeal was described as ‘[t]he balancing element in the DSU’: WTO, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (2004), 50 (para. 219).

  14. 14.

    Art. 16.4 DSU.

  15. 15.

    Art. 17.1 DSU.

  16. 16.

    Art 17.3 DSU.

  17. 17.

    With the possibility of one re-appointment: Art. 17.2 DSU.

  18. 18.

    Art. 17.3 DSU.

  19. 19.

    Art. 17.3 DSU.

  20. 20.

    See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last accessed on 05/03/2017).

  21. 21.

    States have, furthermore, ‘refrain[ed] from making their own binding unilateral judgments on whether other parties have acted inconsistently’, further neutralising influence in a similar manner, as well as substantially strengthening the system: see 2004 Sutherland Report (note 13), 50 (para. 220).

  22. 22.

    Emphasis added.

  23. 23.

    Art. 3 DSU. What constitutes a reasonable period of time clearly varies on a case-by-case basis, but Art. 3 (a)-(c) DSU lay out some guidance. Members can propose a time period which will constitute a reasonable period of time if approved by the DSB, the parties to the dispute can mutually agree a period of time, or a period of time will be determined through binding arbitration. Furthermore, it was laid out in the arbitration award in the EC – Hormones dispute that a ‘reasonable period of time for implementation’ should be considered as ‘the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations of and rulings of the DSB’, see Award of the Arbitrator, EC – Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 26. This is now considered to be the ‘core rule in establishing a reasonable period of time’, Van den Bossche (note 5), 221.

  24. 24.

    Caroline E. Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge, 2011), 282.

  25. 25.

    Art. 22.1 DSU.

  26. 26.

    Art. 22.1 DSU states: ‘Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.’

  27. 27.

    John Errrico, The WTO in the EU: Unwinding the Knot, Cornell International Law Journal 44 (2011), 179, 195.

  28. 28.

    John H. Jackson, International law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’?, AJIL 98 (2004), 109, 123.

  29. 29.

    There is no scope in this work for any address or analysis of the question of whether it is really possible to compare WTO obligations with other obligations under public international law. It suffices here to say that Jackson’s summation of the status of WTO obligations, alongside the real consequences produced for their breach gives sufficient evidence to the position that both the academic and State position regard them as binding, if not 100% analogous with other internationally binding obligations.

  30. 30.

    Van den Bossche (note 5), 218.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., 219.

  32. 32.

    The request for consultations in the EC – Hormones dispute between the United States and the European Communities was received on 26th of January 1996, the Panel Report was issued on 18th August 1997, the Appellate Body report on the 16th January 1998 and a mutually acceptable solution for implementation was notified on 25th September 2009. See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm (last accessed on 05/03/2017).

  33. 33.

    ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res. 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Annex (ASR).

  34. 34.

    Panel Report Korea-Measures – Affecting Government Procurement, para. 7.96.

  35. 35.

    Arts. 34–37, 42 ASR.

  36. 36.

    Except in limited consequences. Article XXI (c) GATT 1947 provides an exception in terms of economic sanctions used as countermeasures, provided that they are taken ‘to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security’. This has the consequence that States will not be held in breach of their obligations under the WTO and covered agreements if they implement trade restrictive measures in pursuance of fulfilling a UN Security Council Resolution obligation. This particular exception clearly does not allow for any degree of unilateralism in terms of the application of trade related economic countermeasures, and is therefore also in line with other purposes of removing unilateralism from the trading system, see infra, 6.5.6.

  37. 37.

    Appellate Body Report Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 31.

  38. 38.

    Panel Report United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yard from Pakistan, pg. 97 (para. 7.35, footnote 93).

  39. 39.

    This position is not shared by all. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution (Oxford, 2003), 7–8, talks of the irrelevance of domestic standard of review concepts in the analysis of the standard of review in the WTO. This work will not assess the application of these various standards in the domestic context, though the benefit of comparison with fixed standards of review is not ruled out.

  40. 40.

    Oesch (note 39), 13.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., 14.

  42. 42.

    Ross Becroft, The Standard of Review in WTO Dispute Settlement: Critique and Development (Cheltenham, 2012), 1.

  43. 43.

    Art. 17.6 DSU.

  44. 44.

    E.g. The European Communities, except perhaps in Anti-dumping matters, see Oesch (note 39), 76.

  45. 45.

    E.g. The United States, see ibid., 73.

  46. 46.

    John H. Jackson, WTO and the New Sovereignty, ASIL Proceedings 88 (1994), 139.

  47. 47.

    Oesch (note 39), 7.

  48. 48.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), pg. 43 (para. 119).

  49. 49.

    Palmeter/Mavroidis (note 3), 152.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, pg. 46 (para. 133).

  52. 52.

    Jackson identifies two separate standards of review operating within the WTO system. The first applies to the standard applied by panels in their review of members’ decisions/decision making processes and the second applies to the Appellate Body in its review of Panel decisions. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, The WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge, 2006), 169. In this section the main focus is clearly on the first standard, though as can be seen here in its interpretation of the application of Art. 11 DSU the Appellate Body does have some, albeit indirect, interaction with the first standard.

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    Oesch (note 39), 15.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Though this is politically unlikely, if not unfeasible.

  58. 58.

    Becroft (note 42), 51.

  59. 59.

    Formal realisability is condition by which treaty obligations, or any legal duties, can provide a clear and concise standard by which states can assess whether, when facing litigation, they have fulfilled their duty or not. Unclear, imprecise obligations which do not provide surety lack formal realisability.

  60. 60.

    Indeed, the first decision which touched on standard of review in the GATT showed a highly deferential approach. See: GATT Panel Report United States – Fur Felt Hats, pg. 30; Becroft (note 42), 40.

  61. 61.

    Oesch (note 39), 60.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    See Becroft (note 42), 40–42.

  64. 64.

    The blueprint for what would become the DSU.

  65. 65.

    Jackson 2006 (note 52), 171.

  66. 66.

    Becroft (note 42), 52.

  67. 67.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), pg. 43 (para. 117).

  68. 68.

    Appellate Body Report Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, pg. 78 (para. 266).

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Becroft (note 42), 52.

  72. 72.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., pg. 45 (para. 148).

  74. 74.

    Ibid., pg. 9 (para. 24).

  75. 75.

    Ibid., pg. 46 (para. 151).

  76. 76.

    For a thorough treatment of the categorical difference in terms of errors of law and errors of fact made by Panels, see: Oesch (note 39), Ch. 6–11.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., pg. 50 (para. 161).

  78. 78.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS; Appellate Body Report United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology.

  79. 79.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., para. 598.

  81. 81.

    Ibid.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Panel Report Australia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New Zealand.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., para 7.222.

  85. 85.

    Becroft (note 42), 55–56; Australia – Apples, first written submission, 180–183.

  86. 86.

    Becroft (note 42), 52.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., 56.

  88. 88.

    Ibid.

  89. 89.

    Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, JIEL 6 (2003), 635, 650.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., 651 (emphasis added).

  91. 91.

    Art. 5.2 SPS states: ‘In the assessment of risks. Members shall take into account available scientific evidence, relevant process and production methods […]’.

  92. 92.

    Palmeter/Mavroidis (note 3), 154.

  93. 93.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia.

  94. 94.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan.

  95. 95.

    Palmeter/Mavroidis (note 3), 154.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., 155.

  97. 97.

    For a full treatment of the benefits of the introduction of a general standard of review and how this may be modified, using a precise legal test in Agreement-specific cases where a general standard may not be appropriate, see Becroft (note 42), 100–154.

  98. 98.

    Van Damme (note 12), 110.

  99. 99.

    Ibid.

  100. 100.

    Armin von Bogdandy/Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, in: Armin Von Bogdandy/Ingo Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking (Heidelberg, 2012), 3.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., 4.

  102. 102.

    Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, in: Bogdandy/Venzke (note 279), 179, 180.

  103. 103.

    See supra, note 59. For more on the position of the rule of law in international law, see: Simon Chesterman, The Rule of Law, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. VIII (Oxford, 2012), 1014–1022.

  104. 104.

    See infra, 4.4.7.

  105. 105.

    Van Damme (note 12), 7.

  106. 106.

    See comments of former Appellate Body Member James Bacchus, who denies that the Body has overreached, but agrees that perhaps the criticism of overreaching could be levelled at the system as a whole, James Bacchus, WTO Appellate Body Roundtable, ASIL Proceedings (2005), 175, 178, stating: ‘it could be argued that the system is overreaching’.

  107. 107.

    See, for example, Appellate Body Report United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, pg. 16–17; Appellate Body Report Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, pg. 104.

  108. 108.

    Makane Moïse Mbengue, Preamble, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. VIII (Oxford, 2012), 397 (para. 4).

  109. 109.

    Furthermore, if you compare this provision (Art. 3.2 DSU) with what is contained in the WTO Agreement (binding the whole organization including the DSS) then it raises further doubt that it was so intended to create an obligation on the DSS then without doing so expressly – Art. XVI:1 WTO Agreement reads: ‘Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of the GATT 1947.’

  110. 110.

    See, for example, Alexander M. Feldman, Evolving Treaty Obligations: A Proposal for Analyzing Subsequent Practice Derived from WTO Dispute Settlement, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 41 (2008–2009), 655, 677.

  111. 111.

    ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion of 20 November 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), 73, 89–90 (para. 37).

  112. 112.

    Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. II (Oxford, 2012), 937, 955 (para. 87). See further Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Amoco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 ILM 1316 (1998), para. 112, stating: ‘As a lex specialis in the relations between the two countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law. This does not mean, however, that the latter is irrelevant. On the contrary, the rules of customary law may be useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and application of its provisions.’

  113. 113.

    Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Implied Powers of International Organizations, in: Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (Leiden, 1989) 855 et seq. See also Niels M. Blokker, International Organizations or Institutions, Implied Powers, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. VI (Oxford, 2012), 18–26.

  114. 114.

    Skubizewski (note 113), 860.

  115. 115.

    Formal realisability is condition by which treaty obligations, or any legal duties, can provide a clear and concise standard by which states can assess whether, when facing litigation, they have fulfilled their duty or not. Unclear, imprecise obligations which do not provide surety lack formal realisability.

  116. 116.

    Van Damme (note 12), 189–191, also explores the idea of inherent powers of the WTO DSS, but in a slightly different context.

  117. 117.

    Ibid., 56.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., 57.

  119. 119.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, para. 84.

  120. 120.

    See Van Damme (note 12), 57.

  121. 121.

    Art. 31 (1) VCLT.

  122. 122.

    Art. 31 (2) (a) VCLT.

  123. 123.

    Art. 31 (2) (b) VCLT.

  124. 124.

    Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, JIEL 5 (2002), 17, 24.

  125. 125.

    Art. 31 (3) (a) VCLT; see infra, 4.4.7 for detail on the Art IX:2 WTO Agreement procedure on authoritative interpretation and how this unutilised tool may constitute an opportunity for such ‘agreements’ to be concluded in relation to the WTO.

  126. 126.

    Art. 31 (3) (b) VCLT.

  127. 127.

    Art. 31 (3) (c) VCLT.

  128. 128.

    Though it has also been argued that these interpretations would be legally binding on the DSS. Article IX:2 WTO Agreement is discussed in greater detail below, or see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann/Lothar Ehring, The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, JIEL 8 (2005), 803 et seq.

  129. 129.

    Van Damme (note 12), 305.

  130. 130.

    Ibid., 310.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., 313.

  132. 132.

    Ibid. Furthermore, Van Damme makes particular reference to the fact that it is very difficult in the case of the WTO and covered agreements to find ‘accessible, trustworthy, and representative preparatory work having probative value’, ibid., 316; see also Bacchus, WTO Roundtable (note 106), 179, stating: ‘[W]e all know there is no negotiating history. There certainly is nothing that rises to the level of what would be considered preparatory work under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention’.

  133. 133.

    Malgosia Fitzmaurice/Panos Merkouris, Canons of Treaty Interpretation, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice/Olufemi Elian/Panos Merkouris (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Leiden, 2010), 153, 183.

  134. 134.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, para. 268. See also: Appellate Body Report Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 478–9; Appellate Body Report United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para. 152; and Van Damme (note 12), 310–327.

  135. 135.

    Mitsuo Matsushita, WTO Roundtable (note 106), 180.

  136. 136.

    Ibid.

  137. 137.

    Oliver Dörr, Article 31, in: Oliver Dörr/Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Heidelberg, 2012), 521, 560.

  138. 138.

    Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, Loyola International Law Review 6 (2008), 173–207.

  139. 139.

    Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79.

  140. 140.

    Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208.

  141. 141.

    Panel Report European Communities – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.68.

  142. 142.

    Ibid.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., footnote 242.

  144. 144.

    Ibid., para. 7.69.

  145. 145.

    Center for International Environmental Law, EC-Biotech: Overview and Analysis of the Panel’s Interim Report (2006), 49.

  146. 146.

    Ibid., 49–50.

  147. 147.

    Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Third Parties and the Law of Treaties, MPYBUNL 6 (2002), 37, 38.

  148. 148.

    See Ch. 6.6.

  149. 149.

    See also EC – Biotech and the attempted invocation of inter alia The Biosafety Protocol: Panel Report European Communities – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.78.

  150. 150.

    Appellate Body Report China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products.

  151. 151.

    Dörr (note 137), 538–539.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., 538.

  153. 153.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), para. 165 (footnote 154, quoting R. Jennings/A. Watts (eds.) Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed. Vol. I (1992), 1278).

  154. 154.

    Van Damme (note 12), 63.

  155. 155.

    Ibid., 62.

  156. 156.

    In cases such as: PCIJ, Competence of the International Labour Organization in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, PCIJ (1922) Ser. B, No. 2; PCIJ, The S.S. Wimbledon, PCIJ (1923) Ser. A, No. 1, 35. See further Van Damme (note 12), 60–64.

  157. 157.

    Van Damme (note 12), 60–65.

  158. 158.

    Lennard (note 124), 63.

  159. 159.

    Arnold D. McNair, The Law Treaties (1961), 765, quoted in Lennard (note 124), 63.

  160. 160.

    Lennard (note 124), 25.

  161. 161.

    WTO, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium (2004), 53–54.

  162. 162.

    Dörr (note 137), 538.

  163. 163.

    Ibid.

  164. 164.

    Van Damme (note 12), 58 (footnote 124); George Lestas, Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer, EJIL 21 (2010), 509–541.

  165. 165.

    Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, EJIL 21 (2010), 543–583.

  166. 166.

    Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Interpretation of Treaties – A Re-examination: Preface, EJIL 21 (2010), 507.

  167. 167.

    ILC, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission – Fragmentation in International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (2006).

  168. 168.

    Ibid., para. 18.

  169. 169.

    Joost Pauwelyn/Manfred Elsig, The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across International Tribunals, in: Jeffrey L. Dunoff/Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (Cambridge, 2012), 445.

  170. 170.

    Ibid., 446.

  171. 171.

    See further Panos Merkouris, Interpretation is an Art, is a Science, is an Art, in: Malgosia Fitzmaurice/Olufemi Elian/Panos Merkouris (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Leiden, 2010), 1–14, who finally concludes: ‘Interpretation is a science, that is artful, an art that is scientific; a science that has characteristics that transform it into art, which art in turn partakes of such scientific elements that make it a science, and so on and so forth’.

  172. 172.

    See, for example, Appellate Body Report China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, paras. 338–413.

  173. 173.

    Douglas A. Irwin/Joseph Weiler, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285), World Trade Review 7 (2008), 71, 90.

  174. 174.

    Ehlermann/Ehring (note 128), 812.

  175. 175.

    Ibid., 804.

  176. 176.

    Ibid., 807–812.

  177. 177.

    Ibid., 818.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., 806.

  179. 179.

    Ibid., 818.

  180. 180.

    Won-Mog Choi, Like Products in International Trade Law: Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence (Oxford, 2003), ix.

  181. 181.

    Appellate Body Report Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 21.

  182. 182.

    Robert E. Hudec, ‘Like Product’: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in: Thomas Cottier/Petros Mavroidis (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law (Ann Arbor, 2000), 101.

  183. 183.

    Ibid., 101–102.

  184. 184.

    Including Arts. 2.1, 5.1.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.5 of the TBT Agreement.

  185. 185.

    Hudec (note 182), 108.

  186. 186.

    Choi (note 180), 107; UN ECOSOC, Draft Report of the Technical Subcommittee of Committee II, UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 (1946), 4–5.

  187. 187.

    Choi (note 180), 13.

  188. 188.

    Van den Bossche (note 5), 330.

  189. 189.

    GATT Panel Report Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, para. 4.6.

  190. 190.

    Ibid.

  191. 191.

    Hudec (note 182), 116.

  192. 192.

    Van den Bossche (note 5), 331.

  193. 193.

    GATT Panel Report United States — Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages. See Van den Bossche (note 5), 354–355.

  194. 194.

    GATT Panel Report United States – Taxes on Automobiles, para. 5.10.

  195. 195.

    Hudec (note 182), 103.

  196. 196.

    Appellate Body Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 19–20.

  197. 197.

    Panel Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para 6.16.

  198. 198.

    Appellate Body Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 23.

  199. 199.

    Van den Bossche (note 5), 352.

  200. 200.

    Panel Report Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para 6.17. For further analysis of Art. XX exceptions, see Ch. 6.5.

  201. 201.

    Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (1970), para. 18; Appellate Body Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 23.

  202. 202.

    Appellate Body Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 23.

  203. 203.

    See, for example, GATT Working Party Report Australia – Ammonium Sulphate, para. 8; GATT Panel Report EEC – Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.22.

  204. 204.

    Art. III:1 GATT.

  205. 205.

    Appellate Body Report Japan –Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 18.

  206. 206.

    Hudec (note 182), 106.

  207. 207.

    Ibid.

  208. 208.

    The second sentence of Art. III:4 relates specifically to transport charges, and is not of relevance in the assessment of like products.

  209. 209.

    Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder/Daniel Magraw/Maria Julia Olivia/Morcos Orellana/Elizabeth Tuerk, Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence (London, 2006), 10.

  210. 210.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 93.

  211. 211.

    Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (note 209), 12.

  212. 212.

    Ibid.

  213. 213.

    Appellate Body Report European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 99.

  214. 214.

    Choi (note 180), ix.

  215. 215.

    Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (note 209), 14.

  216. 216.

    Hudec (note 182), 107.

  217. 217.

    Ibid.

  218. 218.

    Ibid., 107–108.

  219. 219.

    Ibid., 108. Hudec also concedes here that this would mean that there was disparity in the application of the national treatment obligation, with broader protection for foreign products against tax discrimination than other types of regulatory discrimination. He outlines that this could be justified, however, by arguing: ‘(a) Differences in tax rates are inherently arbitrary, and thus should be harder to justify than regulatory distinctions. (b) It is easier to trace the competitive effects on tax differences (money charges) on dissimilar but competitively related products than it is to trace the effects of regulatory distinctions on such products.’

  220. 220.

    Ibid., 109.

  221. 221.

    Ibid., 108–9.

  222. 222.

    Ibid., 109.

  223. 223.

    Ibid., 109. In support of his argument Hudec cites the distinctions made in: GATT Panel Report Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee; GATT Panel Report Germany – Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines. It should be noted, however, that this tacit agreement is not considered by Hudec to be far reaching and can only be utilised in limited circumstances. See ibid., 109–112.

  224. 224.

    Ibid., 120.

  225. 225.

    Ibid., 121.

  226. 226.

    Choi (note 180), 154.

  227. 227.

    Ibid.

  228. 228.

    Appellate Body Report Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pg. 32 (para. 111).

  229. 229.

    Choi (note 180), 30.

  230. 230.

    Ibid., 1.

  231. 231.

    Choi (note 180), xxi.

  232. 232.

    Ibid., 171–172.

  233. 233.

    See, e.g., ibid., 94–95.

  234. 234.

    Panel Report United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes; Appellate Body Report United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes.

  235. 235.

    Panel Report United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.119; Peter Van den Bossche/Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge, 3rd ed. 2013), 866.

  236. 236.

    Appellate Body Report United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, para. 120.

  237. 237.

    GATT Panel Report United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna Restrictions on the Import of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin I), para. 5.15.

  238. 238.

    Van den Bossche (note 5), 381.

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    Amber Rose Maggio

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Maggio, A.R. (2017). The Judicial Function of the WTO. In: Environmental Policy, Non-Product Related Process and Production Methods and the Law of the World Trade Organization. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61155-6_4

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