Advertisement

Methodology in the New Key: The Methodology Cycle

Chapter
  • 915 Downloads
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Psychology book series (BRIEFSPSYCHOL)

Abstract

Educated intuition is at the very core of all science. The first question for a researcher is—what research questions are worthwhile to ask in the first place. Intuition here comes first—yet it is educated, not naïve and not “pure.” There are many layers of personal-cultural needs that turn an ordinary person into a scientist. Here the scientist and artist function similarly—the emergence of an idea is hidden somewhere in the internal infinity of our mind.

Methodology is at the center of our knowledge creation. Yet it is an ambiguous term—often considered to be a synonym of “method.” This reduction is not allowable. Here we insist upon strict but inclusive separation of the two—“method” is part of Methodology Cycle and has no existence outside of that cycle. The chapter includes exposition of the whole Methodology Cycle and its various transformations.

References

  1. Abbey, E., & Diriwächter, R. (Eds.). (2008). Innovating genesis: Microgenesis and the constructive mind in action. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishers.Google Scholar
  2. Baumann, S. L. (2010). The limitations of evidence-based practice. Nursing Science Quarterly, 23(3), 226–230.CrossRefPubMedGoogle Scholar
  3. Beckstead, Z. (2012). Crossing thresholds: Movement as a means of transformation. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), Oxford handbook of culture and psychology (pp. 710–729). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General systems theory. New York: Beorge Braziller.Google Scholar
  5. Chelnokova, O. (2009). Functional magnetic resonance: Constructing the data? Psychology & Society, 2(2), 168–175.Google Scholar
  6. Günther, I. (2008). Contacting subjects: The untold story. Culture & Psychology, 4(1), 65–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Hadamard, J. (1954). An essay on the psychology of invention in the mathematical field. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
  8. Holton, G. (1988). Thematic origins of scientific thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Holton, G. (1998). The advancement of science, and its burdens. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Cultures of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  11. Lorino, P. (2013). Charles Sanders Peirce. In Oxford handbook of process philosophy and organizational studies. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Marková, I. (1982). Paradigms, thought and language. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
  13. McCabe, D. P., & Castel, A. (2008). Seeing is believing: The effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning. Cognition, 107, 343–352.CrossRefPubMedGoogle Scholar
  14. Miller, G. (2008). Growing pains for fMRI. Science, 320, 1412–1414.CrossRefPubMedGoogle Scholar
  15. Nishida, K. (1979). Affective feeling. In Y. Nitta & H. Tatematsu (Eds.), Japanese phenomenology (Vol. 8, pp. 223–247). Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Porter, T. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Rescher, N. (1968). Can there be random individuals? In N. Rescher (Ed.), Topics in philosophical logic (pp. 134–137). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Smedslund, J. (1978). Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 19, 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Smedslund, J. (1980). Analyzing the primary code: From empiricism to apriorism. In D. R. Olson (Ed.), The social foundations of language and thought (pp. 47–73). New York: Norton.Google Scholar
  20. Smedslund, J. (1997). The structure of psychological common sense. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.Google Scholar
  21. Smedslund, J. (2009). The mismatch between current research methods and the nature of psychological phenomena. What researchers must learn from practitioners. Theory & Psychology, 19, 778–794.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Smedslund, J. (2012). What follows from what we all know about human beings. Theory & Psychology, 22(5), 658–668.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Toomela, A. (2009). How methodology became a toolbox—And how it escapes from that box. In J. Valsiner, P. Molenaar, M. Lyra, & N. Chaudhary (Eds.), Dynamic process methodology in the social and developmental sciences (pp. 45–66). New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Toomela, A. (2012). Guesses on the future of cultural psychology: Past, present, and past. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), Oxford handbook of culture and psychology (pp. 998–1033). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  25. Valsiner, J. (2000). Culture and human development. London: Sage.Google Scholar
  26. Valsiner, J. (2009). Between fiction and reality: Transforming the semiotic object. Sign System Studies, 37(1), 99–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Vignaux, G., & Moscovici, S. (2000). The concept of themata. In S. Moscovici & G. Duveen (Eds.), Social Representation (pp. 156–183). Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  28. Yurevich, A. V. (2009). Cognitive frames in psychology: Demarcations and ruptures. IPBS: Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science, 43, 89–103.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Communication and PsychologyAalborg UniversityAalborgDenmark

Personalised recommendations