Skip to main content

Processing and Analysing Experimental Data Using a Tensor-Based Method: Evidence from an Ultimatum Game Study

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Decision Economics: In the Tradition of Herbert A. Simon's Heritage (DCAI 2017)

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 618))

Abstract

This work investigates how newer economic behavioural research can be applied to human group behaviour and how it can be enriched using a relatively novel knowledge discovery approach. Based on an ultimatum game study conducted in the context of an extra-lab experiment, the authors propose a tensor-based method to analyse their experimental results and, therefore, to address a multi-dimensional approach. The authors prove that subjects do not behave as game theory would predict, but rather they basically prefer fair divisions of gains. This evidence confirms significant implications for theories addressing the evolution of, and the mechanisms underpinning, human group behaviour in economics, cognitive, and organizational studies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This is a one-shot two-stage sequential bargaining game methodologically based on studies concerning game approaches to interactions between individuals [13,14,15]. Although the ultimatum game is frequently used to describe the backward induction method of solving for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for monetary payoffs maximising individuals, this bargaining game provides evidence for fairness concerns on individuals’ preferences. Indeed, there are multiple reported results of equal-split or close to equal-split outcomes from several experiments. Results from these experiments contradict the standard economic theory and have been used to argue that pro-social preferences are important in a wide range of real-world contexts (e.g., [16, 17]).

References

  1. Camerer, C.F.: Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2003)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Camerer, C.F., Malmendier, U.: Behavioral economics of organizations. In: Diamond, P., Vartiainen, H. (eds.) Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, pp. 235–290. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Priddat, B.P.: Communication and Economic Theory. How to Deal with Rationality in a Communicational Environment. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Keynes, J.M.: Alfred Marshall - 1842-1924. Econ. J. 34(135), 311–372 (1924)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Dow, S.: The methodology of macroeconomic thought. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Sen, A.K.: Rational fools: a critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philos. Public Aff. 6(4), 317–344 (1977)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Simon, H.A.: An Empirically Based Microeconomics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Axtell, R.: The complexity of exchange. Econ. J. 115(504), F193–F210 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Axerold, R., Tesfatsion, L.: Appendix AA guide for newcomers to agent-based modeling in the social sciences. Handb. Comput. Econ. 2, 1647–1659 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Gray, M.L., Suri, S.: The humans working behind the AI curtain, Harvard Business Review (2017). https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-humans-working-behind-the-ai-curtain

  11. Boden, M.: How artificial is artificial intelligence? Br. J. Philos. Sci. 24(1), 61–72 (1973)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Levitt, S.D., List, J.A.: What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? J. Econ. Perspect. 21(2), 153–174 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., Schwarze, B.: An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 3(4), 367–388 (1982)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Güth, W.: On ultimatum bargaining experiments – a personal review. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 27, 329–344 (1995)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Sanfey, A.G.: The neural basis of economic decision–making in the ultimatum game. Science 300, 1755–1758 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Fehr, E., Gächter, S.: Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. J. Econ. Perspect. 14(3), 159–181 (2000)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Camerer, C.F., Fehr, E.: Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: a guide for social scientists. In: Henrich, J., et al. (eds.) Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence From Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, pp. 55–95. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Bucciarelli, E., Persico, T.E.: How does fairness relate to economic decision-making? An experimental investigation of pro-social behavior. In: Rodríguez González, S., et al. (eds.) Decision Economics, In Commemoration of the Birth Centennial of Herbert A. Simon 1916–2016, pp. 49–56. Springer, Cham (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Uhlaner, C.J.: Relational goods and participation: incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action. Public Choice 62(3), 253–285 (1989)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. Valence, A.: Demand dynamics in a psycho-socio-economic evolving network of consumers. Math. Popul. Stud. 12(3), 159–179 (2005)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Kriss, P., Nagel, R., Weber, R.A.: Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 93, 337–346 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Simon, H.A.: The architecture of complexity. Proc. Am. Philos. Soc. 106(6), 467–482 (1962)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Simon, H.A.: Near decomposability and the speed of evolution. Ind. Corp. Change 11(3), 587–599 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Chen, S.-H.: The missing legacy of Herbert Simon in agent-based computational economics. In: Rodríguez González, S., et al. (eds.), Decision Economics, in Commemoration of the Birth Centennial of Herbert A. Simon 1916-2016 (Nobel Prize in Economics 1978), pp. 1–7. Springer International Publishing, Cham (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  25. Wilber, C.K., Harrison, R.S.: The methodological basis of institutional economics: pattern model, storytelling, and holism. J. Econ. Issues 12(1), 61–89 (1978)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Hodgson, G.M.: Reconstitutive downward causation. Social structure and the development of individual agency. In: Fullbrook, E. (ed.) Intersubjectivity in Economics: Agents and Structures, pp. 159–180. Routledge, London (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  27. Sen, A.K.: Behavior and the concept of preference. Economica 40(159), 241–259 (1973)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Sen, A.K.: Goals, commitment, and identity. J. Law Econ. Organ. 1(2), 206–224 (1985)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Charness, G., Rabin, M.: Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q. J. Econ. 117(3), 817–869 (2002)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  30. Meier, S.: A survey of economic theories and field evidence on pro-social behavior. In: Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A. (eds.) Economics and Psychology, pp. 51–88. MIT Press, Cambridge (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  31. Simon, H.A.: Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, vol. 3. MIT press, Cambridge (1982)

    Google Scholar 

  32. Piateski-Shapiro, G., Frawley, W.: Knowledge Discovery in Databases. MIT Press, Cambridge (1991)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Fayyad, U.M., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Smyth, P.: From data mining to knowledge discovery: an overview. In: Fayyad, U.M., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Uthurusamy, R. (eds.) Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 1–34. American Association for Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Fehr, E., Schmidt, M.K.: A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Q. J. Econ. 114(3), 817–868 (1999)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  35. Carlsson, F., Daruvala, D., Johansson-Stenman, O.: Are people inequality-averse, or just risk-averse? Economica 72(287), 375–396 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  36. McFadden, D.: Econometric models of probabilistic choice. In: Manski, C., McFadden, D. (eds.) Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications, pp. 198–272. MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) (1981)

    Google Scholar 

  37. Acar, E.: (Some) Challenges in tensor mining. In: Van Loan, C. (ed.) Future Directions in Tensor-Based Computation and Modeling, National Science Foundation, Arlington (VA), 20–21 February (2009). https://www.cs.cornell.edu/cv/TenWork/Home.htm

  38. Falk, A., Fehr, E., Firschbacher, U.: On the nature of fair behavior. Econ. Inq. 41(1), 20–26 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  39. Kolda, G.T., Bader, B.W.: Tensor decompositions and applications. SIAM Rev. 51(3), 455–500 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the 314 students who took part in the experimental study conducted in 2015 for their time and valuable input. Furthermore, the authors wish to thank Nicola Mattoscio, Shu-Heng Chen, Herrade Igersheim, Carmen Pagliari, Assia Liberatore, and two anonymous reviewers for their advice and constructive criticism on earlier drafts. Finally, the authors thank the conference participants at the 13th DECON-DCAI 2016 for useful suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Edgardo Bucciarelli .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG

About this paper

Cite this paper

Bucciarelli, E., Persico, T.E. (2018). Processing and Analysing Experimental Data Using a Tensor-Based Method: Evidence from an Ultimatum Game Study. In: Bucciarelli, E., Chen, SH., Corchado, J. (eds) Decision Economics: In the Tradition of Herbert A. Simon's Heritage. DCAI 2017. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 618. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60882-2_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60882-2_15

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-60881-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-60882-2

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics