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Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

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Energy Politics and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Abstract

Underpinning this chapter is an in-depth examination of rural electrification efforts under a tenuous trajectory of democratization and decentralization. The chapter argues that successful outcomes of electrification initiatives are the cumulative result of sequenced efforts and transformation of access via a public goods lens. The chapter suggests a need to revisit notions of success and inherent paradox between decentralization objectives, central government and electricity delivery.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Unless otherwise cited, all quotations in this chapter are taken from my confidential interviews and personal communications with government officials in 2009. In “The Measurement of Decentralization: The Ghanaian Experience, 1988–92,” African Affairs 95, no. 378 (January 1996): 31–50, Joseph Ayee notes that deconcentration was taken to mean the “authority for the discharge of specified functions to the staff of a central government ministry or department at the local level to make administrative decisions on behalf of the central government or authority” (37).

  2. 2.

    Diana Conyers, “Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration?” Public Administration & Development (Pre-1986) 3, no. 2 (1983): 97.

  3. 3.

    Alison J. Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation: The Global Constitution of (Neo)Liberal Polities in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2006): 329.

  4. 4.

    See James Tyler Dickovick and James S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated, 2014), exploration of a rich account of over 10 states.

  5. 5.

    Harriet B. Schiffer, “Local Administration and National Development: Fragmentation and Centralization in Ghana,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 4, no. 1 (1970): 74–75.

  6. 6.

    Leslie E. Grayson, “Decentralisation in Planning and Economic Decision-Making in Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 13, no. 1 (March 1975): 126–33.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., 127.

  8. 8.

    Kwamena Ahwoi, Local Government and Decentralisation in Ghana (Accra: Unimax Macmillan, 2010), 19.

  9. 9.

    J. Naustdalslid, Decentralisation Policies in Ghana (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 1992); Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation; Stein Sundsøl Eriksen, Jon Naustdalslid, and Arild Schou, Decentralisation from Above: A Study of Local Government in Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 1999); George Owusu, “Small Towns and Decentralised Development in Ghana: Theory and Practice,” Africa Spectrum 39, no. 2 (2004): 167.

  10. 10.

    Ayee, “Measurement of Decentralization,” 38.

  11. 11.

    See Daniel Green and E. Gyimah-Boadi, “Review of Ghana under PNDC Rule,” Africa Today 43, no. 4 (October–December 1996): 431–34.

  12. 12.

    Gyimah-Boadi, Ghana under PNDC Rule.

  13. 13.

    Eboe Hutchful, “Why Regimes Adjust: The World Bank Ponders Its ‘Star Pupil’,” Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines 29, no. 2 (1995): 306.

  14. 14.

    See Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation,” 322–23.

  15. 15.

    See Jean Grugel, Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 176, 180.

  16. 16.

    Peter Fuseini Haruna, “Reforming Ghana’s Public Service: Issues and Experiences in Comparative Perspective,” Public Administration Review 63, no. 3 (May 2003): 343–54.

  17. 17.

    See Michael Ross, “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 4 (October 2006): 860; See Peter Boone, “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” European Economic Review 40, no. 2 (1996): 289–329; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, R. M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, “Logic of Political Survival Cambridge, Mass” (2003); Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution (Oxford University Press on Demand, 1995); Álvaro Franco, Carlos Álvarez-Dardet, and Maria Teresa Ruiz, “Effect of Democracy on Health: Ecological Study,” BMJ 329, no. 7480 (2004): 1421–23; David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 6 (2001): 587–621; David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services,” Comparative Political Studies 34, no. 6 (2001): 587–621; James W. McGuire, “Social policy and mortality decline in East Asia and Latin America,” World Development 29, no. 10 (2001): 1673–97; Bruce E. Moon and William J. Dixon, “Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-National Study,” American Journal of Political Science (1985): 661–94; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990,” (2001): 236; Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford University Press, 1981); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph T. Siegle, Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin, “Why Democracies Excel,” Foreign Affairs 83 (2004): 57; Thomas D. Zweifel, and Patricio Navia, “Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 2 (2000): 99–114.

  18. 18.

    Most recently Brian Min, in Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2015) addresses this question in compelling fashion. Also see George Avelino, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter. “The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 625–41; David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter, “Democracy and Human Capital Formation: Education Spending in Latin America, 1980 to 1997,” Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 7 (2004): 842–64.; John Gerring, Strom C. Thacker, and Rodrigo Alfaro. “Democracy and Human Development,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (2012): 1–17; Robert R. Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, “Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973–97,” World Politics 53, no. 4 (2001): 553–87; James W. McGuire, “Social Policy and Mortality Decline in East Asia and Latin America,” World Development 29, no. 10 (2001): 1673–97; Stasavage, David, “The Role of Democracy in Uganda’s Move to Universal Primary Education,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 1 (2005): 53–73; Jose Tavares and Romain Wacziarg, “How Democracy Affects Growth,” European Economic Review 45, no. 8 (2001): 1341–78.

  19. 19.

    Ross, “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” 860.

  20. 20.

    Brian Min, Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 8–9.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., 27. Min offers fascinating perspective on the notion that rural poor vote on higher levels in developing countries, with India as an example, than in the developed world.

  22. 22.

    Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

  23. 23.

    See Dennis A. Rondinelli, G. Shabbir Cheema, and John R. Nellis, Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1983); James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu, eds., The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); Richard Crook and James Manor, Enhancing Participation and Institutional Performance: Democratic Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Report to ESCOR, the Overseas Development Administration, on Phase Two of a Two Phase Research Project (London: Economic and Social Committee on Overseas Research, 1994).

  24. 24.

    Dickovick and Wunsch, Decentralization in Africa, 92.

  25. 25.

    Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982–1991 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

  26. 26.

    See Jennifer A. Widner, ed., Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

  27. 27.

    Richard C. Crook and James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability, and Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 222.

  28. 28.

    Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton University Press, 1996).

  29. 29.

    See Ayee, “Measurement of Decentralization”; Joseph R. A. Ayee, Towards Effective and Accountable Local Government in Ghana (Legon-Accra: Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2003); Kwame Ninsin, Ghana’s Political Transition (Accra: Ghana Freedom, 1996).

  30. 30.

    These responses came from a questionnaire that I administered in 2009. For details on the questionnaire, see the appendix to this chapter.

  31. 31.

    See Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation,” 329.

  32. 32.

    J. Tyler Dickovick and James S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2014).

  33. 33.

    Ibid., 91.

  34. 34.

    Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation,” 329.

  35. 35.

    Samuel, P. “Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968).” argues that the slow development of political institutions coupled with rapid social change could lead to political decay, instability, and even violence in developing societies because of the incongruence between resources and infrastructure and the mobilization of new societal groups. This argument is instructive here because the process of decentralization attempted to localize development initiatives and create political structures directly accountable to the people, thereby heightening rural residents’ expectations.

  36. 36.

    See World Bank, Somalia: Country Re-Engagement Note (Washington, DC: World Bank, April 2003), 1. Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/830051468781503521/Somalia-Country-re-engagement-note.

  37. 37.

    G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli, eds., Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices (Cambridge, MA: Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 2–4.

  38. 38.

    See Dennis Rondinelli, “What Is Decentralization?” in Decentralization Briefing Notes, ed. Jennie Litvack and Jessica Seddon (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 1999), 2–5. See also Andrew N. Parker, Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development? (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995).

  39. 39.

    Jennie Litvack, Ahmad Junaid, and Richard Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), 4. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/Rethinking%20Decentralization.pdf; Sylvia Bergh, “Democratic Decentralisation and Local Participation: A Review of Recent Research,” Development in Practice 14, no. 6 (November 2004): 780–90.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., 781.

  41. 41.

    Kwamena Ahwoi, Enhancing the Decentralization Programme: District Assemblies and Sub-Structures as Partners in Governance (Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2000), 2.

  42. 42.

    Mike Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 1982–1992: Rawlings, Revolution, and Populist Democracy (Accra: Tornado 2004), 265.

  43. 43.

    Kodwo Ewusi, Trends in the Economy of Ghana, 1986–1988 (Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research, University of Ghana, 1988), 46.

  44. 44.

    World Bank, 1987, 4.

  45. 45.

    Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 265.

  46. 46.

    For more on historical and ideological rivalries between political parties in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections, see Minion K. C. Morrison , “Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics: A Path to Democratic Consolidation,” Comparative Politics (2004): 421–42.

  47. 47.

    Green, “Ghana’s Adjusted Democracy”; M. Bawumia, “Understanding Rural–Urban Voting Patterns in the 1992 Ghanaian Election,” Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 (1997): 47–70; Michael Bratton, Philip Alderfer, and Neo R. Simutanyi, Political Participation in Zambia, 1991–1996: Trends, Determinants, and USAID Program Implications (Zambia Democratic Governance Project, 1997).

  48. 48.

    See Lindsay Whitfield, “Trustees of Development from Conditionality to Governance: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in Ghana,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 4 (December 2005): 641–64; Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation.”

  49. 49.

    Whitfield, “Trustees of Development,” 653.

  50. 50.

    Irving Leonard Markovitz, “Uncivil Society, Capitalism and the State in Africa,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (1998): 21–53.

  51. 51.

    These regions have high percentages of agriculture, low percentages of industry, and lower median incomes and electrification rates than the country’s other seven regions. According to the Ministry of Energy, only about 30% of the nearly two million residents of the Upper East have access to electricity.

  52. 52.

    See Richard C. Crook and Alan Sturla Sverrisson. “IDS Working paper 130.” Brighton: Institute of (2001); Richard C. Crook, “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Local–Central Relations,” Public Administration and Development 23, no. 1 (2003): 77–88; Paul Smoke, “Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges,” Public Administration and Development 23, no. 1 (2003): 7–16; Gordon Crawford, “Decentralization and the Limits to Poverty Reduction: Findings from Ghana,” Oxford Development Studies 36, no. 2 (2008): 235–258; Crawford (2008).

  53. 53.

    Gordon Crawford, “Decentralisation and Struggles for Basic Rights in Ghana: Opportunities and Constraints,” The International Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 1 (2010): 134, 135.

  54. 54.

    Oquaye, Mike. Politics in Ghana, 1982–1992: Rawlings, Revolution, and Populist Democracy (Tornado Publications, 2004).

  55. 55.

    Konings, Piet. The State and Rural Class Formation in Ghana: A Comparative Analysis (KPI, 1986), 2.

  56. 56.

    Hutchful, “Fall and Rise.”

  57. 57.

    Ghana Statistical Service, (GSS) 1995 cited from Owusu, George, “Small Towns and Decentralised Development in Ghana: Theory and Practice,” Africa Spectrum (2004): 165–95. L.

  58. 58.

    Post-independence political and economic upheavals contributed to the limited attention to domestic energy provision.

  59. 59.

    James Tyler Dickovick and James S. Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Incorporated, 2014), 105.

  60. 60.

    See Oquaye, Politics in Ghana, 265.

  61. 61.

    Ayee, “Measurement of Decentralization.”

  62. 62.

    Ninsin, Ghana’s Political Transition.

  63. 63.

    See Amos Anyimadu, “Some Institutional Aspects of Agricultural Development Policy under the PDNC,” in Ghana under PNDC Rule, ed. E. Gyimah-Boadi (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1993).

  64. 64.

    Ayee, “Measurement of Decentralization.”

  65. 65.

    The substantial increase reflected in the current number of districts reflects few changes or the circumstances noted above.

  66. 66.

    See David Simon, Duncan McGregor, Kwasi Nsiah-Gyabaah, and Donald A. Thompson, “Poverty Elimination, North-South Research Collaboration, and the Politics of Participatory Development,” Development in Practice 13, no. 1 (February 2003): 46.

  67. 67.

    Cited in Anne M. Larson and Jesse C. Ribot, “Democratic Decentralisation through a Natural Resource Lens: An Introduction,” European Journal of Development Research 16, no. 1 (2004): 1–25.

  68. 68.

    Dubash, Navroz K. “Revisiting Electricity Reform: The Case for a Sustainable Development Approach,” Utilities Policy 11, no. 3 (2003): 143–54.

  69. 69.

    Gary, Ian. “Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-optation: NGOs and the Ghanaian State during Structural Adjustment,” Review of African Political Economy 23, no. 68 (1996): 163.

  70. 70.

    On the difficulties of delineating the differences between local/indigenous and foreign/international NGOs and their activities, see Joel D. Barkan , “I. Elections in Agrarian Societies,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 4 (1995): 106–16. Ian Gary , “Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-optation: NGOs and the Ghanaian State during Structural Adjustment,” Review of African Political Economy 23, no. 68 (1996). For discussions of the typology of NGOs, which include community-based organizations, service or intermediary NGOs, and international and relief organizations (which tend to be foreign), see Michael Bratton , “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,” World Politics 41, no. 3 (1989): 407–30; Alan Fowler , “Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market,” Review of African Political Economy 19, no. 55 (1992): 9–29.

  71. 71.

    A. Bebbington and J. Farrington, “Governments, NGOs, and Agricultural Development: Perspectives on Changing Inter-Organisational Relationships,” Journal of Development Studies 29, no. 2 (1993): 25.

  72. 72.

    Xiao Ye and Sudharshan Canagarajah, Efficiency of Public Expenditure Distribution and Beyond: A Report on Ghana’s 2000 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in the Sectors of Primary Health and Education (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002). Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711501468774879785/Efficiency-of-public-expenditure-distribution-and-beyond-a-report-on-Ghanas-2000-public-expenditure-tracking-survey-in-the-sectors-of-primary-health-and-education.

  73. 73.

    World Bank, Ghana: Sector Reform and the Pattern of the Poor—Energy Use and Supply (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006). Available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/421071468252576846/Ghana-sector-reform-and-the-pattern-of-the-poor-energy-use-and-supply.

  74. 74.

    See Gerald Foley, Electricity for Rural People (London: Panos, 1990).

  75. 75.

    Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana (2002) Monograph series, No. 3.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., 4.

  77. 77.

    Bartholomew Armah, “Public Sector Corruption and Macro-Stability: Evidence from the Auditor-General’s Reports: from A Review of the Auditor General’s Reports 1993–1999 The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2003.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Parliamentary Debates, (Ghana) Fourth Series, Official Report (2003), 730.

  80. 80.

    IEA Report Number 3, 2002.

  81. 81.

    See, for example, Ayee, “Measurement of Decentralization.”

  82. 82.

    Bartholomew K. Armah, William Inaidoo, and Mawuli Feglo, The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy and Its Link to the 2003 Budget (Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2003).

  83. 83.

    Ibid.

  84. 84.

    Ministry of Energy document, 2006.

  85. 85.

    Ministry of Energy document, 2008.

  86. 86.

    Ministry of Energy document, 2008.

  87. 87.

    Information provided by two engineers who noted extensive lobbying by chiefs and opinion leaders.

  88. 88.

    Foley, Electricity for Rural People, 9.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., 11.

  90. 90.

    See Lindsay Whitfield, The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

  91. 91.

    Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), Round 6: “Poverty Profile in Ghana.

  92. 92.

    National Electrification Scheme, Ministry of Energy, 2008.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    These figures come from Ministry of Energy report, 2016.

  95. 95.

    John-Mary Kauzya, Local Governance Capacity-Building for Full Range Participation: Concepts, Frameworks, and Experience in African Countries (New York: United Nations, 2003).

  96. 96.

    Whitfield, “Trustees of Development,” 660.

  97. 97.

    See ibid.; Ayers, “Demystifying Democratisation.”

  98. 98.

    USAID Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Final Report and Summary of Findings, September 2010, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADX211.pdf.

  99. 99.

    Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Political Decentralization: Achievements and Challenges in “Reflections on Ghana’s Decentralization Program: Progress, Stagnation or Retrogression,” Decentralization Symposium, Center for Democracy and Development, (CDD-Ghana) 2009: 7.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., 6–7.

  101. 101.

    Dickovick and Wunsch, Decentralization in Africa, 92.

  102. 102.

    Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 20, 2005, www.afrobarometer.org.

  103. 103.

    http://afrobarometer.org/countries/ghana-1.

  104. 104.

    Reflections on Ghana’s Decentralization Program: Progress, Stagnation or Retrogression,” Decentralization Symposium, Center for Democracy and Development, (CDD-Ghana) 2009.

  105. 105.

    Caterina Clerici, Marisa Schwartz Taylor, and Kevin Taylor, “Dumsor: The Electricity Outages Leaving Ghana in the Dark,” Al-Jazeera, 2016. Available at http://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/ghana-electricity-outage-dumsor/.

  106. 106.

    See Owusu, “Small Towns and Decentralised Development,” 165–95.

  107. 107.

    See Kwame Akonor, Africa and IMF Conditionality: The Unevenness of Compliance (New York: Routledge, 2012).

  108. 108.

    Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game,” Journal of Politics 48, no. 2 (May 1986): 370–89.

  109. 109.

    Brian Min, Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 15.

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Appendix: Research Methodology

Appendix: Research Methodology

In the summer of 2009, I conducted fifteen interviews with members of Ghana’s parliament. A year later, I distributed a questionnaire to 19 officials with the Ghanaian Ministry of Energy and the Electricity Company of Ghana, asking about their perceptions regarding the capacity of the Akosombo Dam , a primary source of hydropower; the Self-Help Electrification Program; and the capacity of DAs to promote rural electrification. Respondents were asked to answer questions 1–5, 7, and 10 with a number between 1 and 10, with 1–3 indicating “poor,” 4–5 indicating “fair,” 6–7 indicating “good,” 8 indicating “very good,” and 9–10 indicating “excellent.” For questions 6, 8, and 9, they were asked to select one of three responses: high, moderate, or low. Table 2.1 shows the questions asked and the responses received.

Table 2.1 Rural electrification questionnaire results

Three of the eight respondents from the Ministry of Energy evaluated SHEP ’s success (question 3) as “poor”; four chose “fair,” while one did not answer the question. These responses indicate that, despite the Ministry of Energy’s official statements touting the program’s effectiveness, administrators do not personally share that assessment. However, 68% of the respondents had relatively high assessments of the DAs ’ performance regarding SHEP , a finding that supports the view that DAs do a good job in the face of numerous financial constraints that affect their ability to meet their administrative, fiscal, and development responsibilities.

For question 6, regarding the effectiveness of the devolution of authority to the DAs , 13 respondents selected “moderate,” four chose “low,” and two selected “high.” When asked to assess the DAs ’ capacity to meet their communities’ financial and material needs (question 9), nine respondents answered “moderate,” nine said “low,” and one chose “high,” indicating a split in perceptions that contradicts widespread observations both in interviews and in the literature. This finding suggests a gap between expectations and standards of operation and may reflect the ambiguous results of ongoing decentralization efforts and the nature of capacity-building.

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Sackeyfio, N. (2018). Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. In: Energy Politics and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60122-9_2

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