Abstract
Going forward after the reforms and adjustments of the 1990s, it was a reasonable expectation that humanitarian concerns would feature prominently across all UN sanctions regimes. Yet again, superpower prerogatives asserted themselves over UN sanctions when the attacks of 11 September 2001 threatened hard US national security interests. The attacks served as the impetus for a multi-pronged counter offensive with full-spectrum militarization as the centerpiece of national and international counterterrorism responses. UN counterterrorism sanctions were used to delegitimize radicalized Islam and its adherents, and to establish target lists of hard security threat actors to be disposed of with military force, or soft security targets for legal prosecution. With the wholesale abandonment of minimal standards of fair and clear procedures, the backlash against UN counterterrorism sanctions was inevitable. The new round of reforms exposed European P5 member states to the quandary of how to promoteĀ counterterrorism measures while at the same time championing due process standards vigorously defended by the EU High Courts. Effectively, the fight for due process against unlawful counterterrorism sanctions practices spearheaded by the P5 was the first time elected member states of the Security Council and their allies in the General Assembly issued a resounding rebuke of big power overreach.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the Washington Post the Obama administration directed US Defense Department personnel to refrain from use of the term āWar on Terrorismā and use instead the term āOverseas Contingency Operationā; see āGlobal War On Terrorā Is Given New Name; Washington Post by Scott Wilson and Al Kamen; March 25, 2009.
- 2.
Two and a half months later, the alliance obtained a Security Council resolution authorizing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide security support to the newly installed Afghan Interim Authority.
- 3.
David Frum continued years later to defend his analogy, see, for example, his article Why āAxis of Evilā is still right, in the Daily Beast online issue of 29 January 2012; see http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/29/axis-of-evil-ten-years-later.html. But neither he nor President Bush has ever explained how the comparatively weak military powers Iraq , Iran , and the DPRK could stand in realistic comparison to the military alliance of the historic Axisāarguably the most powerful military alliance of that period, that triggered WW2.
- 4.
The US government maintained, however, that military action was authorized based on previous resolutions.
- 5.
Enrico Carischās interview with a senior official of a regulatory agency of a European country in charge of implementing targeted financial sanctions, conducted on 22 May 2002 under a confidentiality agreement.
- 6.
See also Rico Carisch ; Institutional Responses to 9/11 , Chapter 10 of Terrornomics, edited by Sean S. Costigan and David Gould; Ashgate Publishing, 2007; pp. 173.
- 7.
See also the CTC ās implementation manual for Resolution 1373 at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/technical_guide_2009.pdf.
- 8.
For a particularly insightful critic of the financial war on terrorism, see Ibrahim Warde ; The price of fearāthe truth behind the financial war on terror; University of California Press; 2007.
- 9.
See, for example, the 23 March 2013 announcement of a hunger strike of Guantanamo detainees at: http://shahamat-english.com/index.php/paighamoona/29832-strike-of-destitute-inmates-in-guantanamo-prison-reaches-forty-days(accessed 2 February 2015); or War Crimes of Foreign and Internal forces (December 2014) at http://shahamat-english.com/index.php/interviwe/51925-war-crimes-of-foreign-and-internal-forces-december-2014.
- 10.
The Washington Post reported on 6 June 2005: āThis has become the greatest propaganda tool that exists for recruiting of terrorists around the world. And it is unnecessary to be in that position,ā Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) said on ABCās āThis Week.ā
- 11.
NBC News; Meet the Press of 21 February 2010; for a transcript, see http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35493976/ns/meet_the_press/t/meet-press-transcript-february/.
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Carisch, E., Rickard-Martin, L., Meister, S.R. (2017). Backlash Against the Backlash. In: The Evolution of UN Sanctions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5_6
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