Abstract
UN sanctions implementation practices have advanced as a result of various reforms, but but are currently applied mostly on failed or failing states and asymmetric opponents. Once targeted on well-organized, sophisticated governments or very affluent groups and entities, UN sanctions culture is insufficiently resilient to prevail against far more formidable violators of international norms. The required escalating sophistication of the sanctions regimes on Iran , North Korea, or Qaddafi ’s Libya stretch the technical capacities of many states and frustrate policy-makers around the world. They also require political will and unity of purpose whereas time and again, disunity among the powerful states undermines their effectiveness. Our research and analysis for each of the following case studies show that at their inception sanctions were thwarted and turned into wedge issues by self-interested big power politics. With the international community barely able to muster a semblance of political of cooperation on sanctions and often divided on other options including mediation - the Iran case being the notable exception - neither the Libya nor DPRK regime offers any reason for optimism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Samuel Ramani of the Washington Post explained the term as follows: “In 1962, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK ) committed itself to “all-fortressization ,” hyper-militarization and nuclear weapons development that would enable the country to defend itself from any U.S. and South Korean aggression without help from the Soviets or Chinese.”; Washington Post, 18 February 2016.
- 2.
UNSC S/1Res/1718/2006, Preamble.
- 3.
UNSC S/RES/1718, para. 8.
- 4.
UNSC S/RES/1718, para 6.
- 5.
UNSC S/RES/1718, para. 8 (a) iii.
- 6.
Lopez , pp. 6–7.
- 7.
Lopez , p. 7.
- 8.
UNSC S/RES/1874 (12 Jun. 2009), para. 9.
- 9.
UNSC S/RES/1874, para. 10.
- 10.
UNSC S/RES/1874, paras. 11–12.
- 11.
UNSC S/RES/1874, paras. 14–15.
- 12.
UNSC S/RES/1874, para. 17.
- 13.
UNSC S/RES/1874, paras. 19–20.
- 14.
UNSC S/RES/1874, para. 32.
- 15.
UNSC S/RES/2087, para. 19.
- 16.
Resolution 1718 , para. 8 (a) ii offers the first definition of what would eventually be known as the “Catch-All Provision.”
- 17.
Paragraph 9 of Resolution 2087 (2013) is the definitive definition for the “Catch-All Provision.”
- 18.
UNSC S/RES/2094 paras. 7, 20, and 22.
- 19.
UNSC S/RES/2094, paras. 11 and 14.
- 20.
UNSC S/RES/2094, para. 10.
- 21.
UNSC S/RES/2094, para. 18.
- 22.
UNSC S/RES/2094, para. 24.
- 23.
This announcement is no longer accessible in the archive of the multilanguage website of KCNA. See: http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf.
- 24.
Bajoria and Xu (2013).
- 25.
Squassoni (2006), p. 3.
- 26.
For a fuller discussion of the meaning of “Spirit of Vienna,” see a speech by IAEA Deputy Director General David Waller, Atoms for Peace: A perspective from the IAEA ; https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/atoms-peace-perspective-iaea (Accessed 2016, September 25).
- 27.
For the US perspective, see the account by its UN Permanent Representative John Bolton in Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations. July 1, 2008 Simon and Schuster, 140 ff.
- 28.
The IAEA has signed “Additional Protocols” with well over 120 states. The Islamic Republic of Iran that signed it on 18 December 2003, but it was never put into force.
- 29.
UNSC S/RES/1696, paras. 7–8.
- 30.
As a sign of Russia’s connections to Iran, during the drafting of the first sanctions resolution Russia removed reference to the Bushehr reactor. Katz, p. 5.
- 31.
UNSC S/RES/1737, para. 3.
- 32.
Identical to the DPRK sanctions, the same non-proliferation instruments were applied as the basis to define restrictions on proliferation items, equipment, and technology, the Security Council referenced existing definitional non-proliferation instruments:
-
Restricted Nuclear Goods, Commodities, and Technologies, published by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG ).
-
Nuclear-Related Dual Use Equipment, Material, Software, and Related Technologies, published by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG ).
-
List of Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods, and Technology Related to Ballistic Missile Programs, issued by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ).
-
List of Chemical and Biological Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods, and Technologies Related to Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, issued by the Australia Group.
-
- 33.
End use or end user refers to the final person who will receive and/or use an item, good, service, funds, etc. UNSC S/RES/1737, para. 5.
- 34.
UNSC S/RES/1737, para. 12.
- 35.
UNSC S/RES/1737, paras. 10 and 17.
- 36.
IAEA Report GOV/2007/8 paras. 14, 26-29.
- 37.
For instance, Qatar and South Africa were two member states that had expressed strong concerns about using sanctions. UNSC S/PV.5647 (24 Mar. 2007), p. 134.
- 38.
UNSC S/RES/1747 Annex. II.
- 39.
UNSC S/RES/1747, para. 7.
- 40.
See IAEA GOV/2007/22 (23 May 2007); IAEA GOV/2007/48 (30 Aug. 2007).
- 41.
IAEA Report GOV/2007/48.
- 42.
Meier, pp. 10-11.
- 43.
IAEA GOV/2007/58 paras. 39–43.
- 44.
Indonesia, which cited Iran ’s cooperation with the IAEA as a positive move, did not agree to additional sanctions and abstained from voting. UNSC SC/9268 (3 Mar. 2008); UNSC S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008).
- 45.
UNSC S/RES/1803, paras. 10–11.
- 46.
Meier, pp. 12–13.
- 47.
UNSC S/RES/1929 paras. 8 and 10.
- 48.
UNSC S/RES/1929, para. 9.
- 49.
UNSC S/RES/1929, paras. 7, 11–13.
- 50.
UNSC S/RES/1929, paras. 11–13.
- 51.
UNSC S/RES/1929, para. 21.
- 52.
UNSC S/RES/1929, para. 22.
- 53.
UNSC S/RES/1929, paras. 23–24.
- 54.
The website is separated from all other sanctions regime websites and can be found here: http://www.un.org/en/sc/2231/ (Accessed 2017, February 10).
- 55.
Previously adopted Resolution 1975 on Côte d’Ivoire had already reminded the government of President Gbagbo, after its
electoral defeat, of the “primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians.”
- 56.
The Responsibility to Protect , sometimes abbreviated as R2P or RtoP, is a principle that emerged from the 2005 World Summit as a commitment by the international community to act preventively against potential genocide , war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. After its first use in the context of Libya , its application as part of UN sanctions practices is uncertain however, as, for example, the conflict in Syria , South Sudan, or Yemen seems to demonstrate.
- 57.
Because Qaddafi’s threatened assault on the resistance in Benghazi was averted by the NATO military intervention, the question can only be evaluated on circumstantial evidence. For a brief discussion of this question, see, for example, Foreign Policy, David Bosco; Was there going to be a Benghazi massacre? 7 April 2011.
- 58.
UNSC SC/10180, AFR/2120 (22 February 2011).
- 59.
UNSC S/Res/1970/2011, paras. 4–8.
- 60.
UNSC S/Res/1970/2011, paras. 9–25.
- 61.
UNSC S/Res/1970/2011, paras. 12–13.
- 62.
Vira and Cordesman, p. 10.
- 63.
UNSC S/Res/1973/2011, para. 8.
- 64.
UNSC S/RES/1973, paras. 1 and 4.
- 65.
UNSC S/RES/1973, paras. 13 and 16.
- 66.
UNSC S/RES/1973, paras. 17 and 18.
- 67.
UNSC S/RES/1973, paras. 19, 22, and 23.
- 68.
UNSC S/RES/1973, para. 24.
- 69.
Vira and Cordesman, p. 47.
- 70.
Vira and Cordesman, pp. 63–64.
- 71.
UNSC S/RES/2009, para. 12.
- 72.
UNSC S/RES/2009, para. 13.
- 73.
UNSC S/RES/2009, paras. 14–16
- 74.
UNSC S/RES/2009, paras. 20–21.
- 75.
UNSC S/RES/2016, paras. 5–6.
- 76.
UNSC S/RES/2017, para. 3.
- 77.
PoE Report S/2012/163 Sub-Chapter E. Impact of proliferation of arms in the region.
- 78.
UNSC S/2012/163, Section VI. C and VII. A.
- 79.
UNSC S/RES/2040, para. 8.
- 80.
See, for example, Security Council Report: Interactive Dialogue with the ICC Prosecutor. 2013; or The Guardian: International Criminal Court backs Libyan trial of spy chief Al Senussi. 24 July 2014 (Accessed 2017, January 5).
- 81.
PoE S/2013/99, paras. 30–35.
- 82.
UNSC S/RES/2095, paras. 9–12.
- 83.
UNSC S/RES/2095, para. 13.
- 84.
UNSC S/RES/2144, paras. 7–9.
- 85.
For instance, see “Libya warns will destroy tankers illegally exporting oil,” <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/uk-libya-oil-tanker-idUKBRE97P0VV20130826> or “UN authorizes return of illegal Libyan oil exports” < http://bigstory.ap.org/article/un-authorizes-return-illegAl libyan-oil-exports>.
- 86.
UNSC S/RES/2146, paras. 5–9.
- 87.
UNSC S/RES/2146, para. 10.
- 88.
UNSC S/Res/2146/2014, para. 15.
- 89.
UNSC S/Res/2214/2015, para. 2.
References
Introduction
Barnaby, F. (1982). The Falklands fallout. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 38(7), 34.
HCoC. (2001). The Hague code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. http://www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_hcoc&page=hcoc_chronology
MTCR. (1987). The missile technology control regime. http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MTCR_Annex_Handbook_ENG.pdf
NATO. (1954, October 23). Modified Brussels Treaty. WEU Secretariat General. http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/11/26/7d182408-0ff6-432e-b793-0d1065ebe695/publishable_en.pdf
UNODA. (1970). Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/. Accessed 10 August 2016.
UNODA. (1975). The biological weapons convention. http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc/text. Accessed 10 August 2016.
UNODA. (1992). The chemical weapons convention. https://www.opcw.org/chemicAl weapons-convention/. Accessed 10 August 2016.
General Assembly. (1946, January 24). Resolution A/RES/1/1946. New York: United Nations.
DPRK
Jazeera, A. (2009, Mary 27). North Korea defies global outcry: Reports say North has restarted nuclear plant and fired more missiles as UN response stalls. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2009/05/20095270458302529.html. Accessed 15 September 2016.
Bajoria, J., & Xu, B. (2013, September 30). The Six Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program. Council on Foreign Relations: CFR Backgrounders.
BBC. (2007, March 16). Seoul to resume North Korea aid.
BBC. (2016, May 8). North Korea ‘will not use nuclear weapons’ unless threatened.
Bush, G. W. (2004, February 11). President announces new measures to counter the threat of WMD. Fort Lesley J. McNair: National Defense University.
CNN. (2006, October 4). North Korea pledges to test nuclear bomb. http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/03/nkorea.nuclear/index.html?PHPSESSID=e00207818747c2c959b7677da032e02c. Accessed 10 September 2016.
Crail, P. (2009, January 16). Six-party talks stall over sampling. Washington, D.C. Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/sixpartytalksstall. Accessed 15 November 2016.
Demick, B., & Damiannova, J. (2008, September 25). North Korea says it will restart nuclear processing. The Baltimore Sun, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-09-25/news/0809240131_1_north-korea-restart-nuclear-reprocessing-plant. Accessed 15 June 2014.
General Assembly. (1947, November 14). Resolution A/RES/112/1947. New York: United Nations.
Kim, J., & Charbonneau, L. (2013, March 7). North Korea threatens nuclear strike, U.N. expands sanctions. Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/us-korea-north-attack-idUSBRE9260BR20130307. Accessed 13 September 2016.
Kim, H., & Shi, T. (2017, February 19). China message to Trump with North Korea coal ban: Let’s deal. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-19/china-s-message-to-trump-with-north-korea-coAlban-let-s-deal. Accessed 17 February 2017.
Lankov, A. (2006, November 29). Why North Korea’s neighbors soft-pedal sanctions. Asia Times.
Lopez, G. A. (2012). Evaluating the impacts and effectiveness of targeted sanctions: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (p. 17). Geneva: Targeted Sanctions Consortium.
News Corp Australia Network. (2017, April 23). North Korea threatens Australia with nuclear strike over US allegiance.
PoE. (2013a, June 11). Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) (Report S/2013/337) (para. 142). New York: United Nations.
Reuters. (2015, December 10). North Korean leader Kim’s H-bomb claim draws skepticism. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-bomb-idUSKBN0TT0R020151210. Accessed 13 September 2016.
Security Council. (2006a, October 14). Resolution S/Res/1718/2006. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2009a, June 12). Resolution S/Res/1874/2009. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2013a, January 22). Resolution S/Res/2087/2013. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2013b, March 7). Resolution S/Res/2094/2013. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2016a, March 2). Resolution S/Res/2270/2016. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2016b, November 30). Resolution S/Res/2321/2016. New York: United Nations.
Security Council Press Release. (2017, February 13). Security Council press statement on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ballistic missile launch–SC/12716-DC/3684. New York: United Nations.
Sigal, L. V. (2002, Decemeber 1). North Korea is no Iraq: Pyongyang’s negotiating strategy. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_12/sigal_dec02. Accessed 10 September 2016.
State Department. (2007, February 13). Initial actions to implement six-party joint statement. Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesman US. Department of State.
United Nations Peacemaker. (1953, July 27). Agreement concerning a military armistice in Korea. New York: Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Peacemaker.
Toloraya, G. (2016, August 17). Post-THAAD, don’t expect much North Korea cooperation from Russia. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2016/08/post-thaad-dont-expect-much-n-korea-cooperation-from-russia/. Accessed 15 December 2016.
United Nations Peacemaker. (1994, October 21). Agreed framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. New York: Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Peacemaker.
United Nations Peacemaker. (2007, October 10). Declaration on the advancement of South-North Korean relations peace and prosperity. New York: Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Peacemaker.
Yonhap News Agency. (2014, July 10). North Korea newsletter 321. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/07/09/83/0401000000AEN20140709009100325F.html. Accessed 14 September 2016.
Iran
Ahmadinejad, M. (2007). Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Sixty Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly. p. 8. New York: United Nations. Video record at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/. Accessed 15 September 2017.
IAEA. (2007a, February 22). Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Report IAEA GOV/2007/8). IAEA: Board of Governors.
IAEA. (2007b, August 30). Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Report IAEA GOV/2007/48). IAEA: Board of Governors.
IAEA. (2007c, November 15). Report by the Director General on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Report GOV/2007/58). IAEA: Board of Governors.
JCPOA. (2015, July 20). Resolution S/Res/2231/2015. New York: United Nations. Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, 2015, July 14.
Katz, M. N. 2007. Putin, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian nuclear crisis (p. 4). George Mason University.
Landler, M., & Levy, C. J. (2009, October 13). Russia resists U.S. position on sanctions for Iran. New York Times. pp. 12–13.
Lew, J. (2015, April 29). Remarks of Secretary Jacob J. Lew at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 30th Anniversary Gala. Washington DC: US Department of the Treasury.
Lewis, J. (2008, October 28). NCRI did not discover Natanz. Arms Control Wonk blog. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/201274/ncri-did-not-discover-natanz/. Accessed 25 September 2016.
Meier, O. (2013, February). European efforts to solve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme: How has the european union performed? (Vol. 27, pp. 8–9). Stockholm: SIPRI, Non-Proliferation Papers.
Neuger, J. G. (2007, June 8). G-8 leaders press Iran to halt uranium enrichment (update2). Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aug.ol0xGIq0&refer=home. Accessed 18 October 2016.
New York Times. (2005, January 27). Military rumblings on Iran. The Opinion Pages. Editorial.
Sanger, D. (2013, April). Confront and conceal: Obama’s secret wars and surprising use of American power (p. 207). Broadway Books.
Security Council. (2006b, July 31). Resolution S/Res/1969/2006. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2006c, December 27). Resolution S/Res/1737/2006. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2007, September 24). Resolution S/Res/1747/2007. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2009b, June 9). Resolution S/Res/1929/2009. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2015a, July 20). Resolution S/Res/2231/2015. New York: United Nations.
Security Council Note. (2016, January 16). Note by the President of the Security Council—Security. Council tasks under Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)–Note S/ /2016/44. New York: United Nations.
Squassoni, S. (2006, July 20). Iran’s nuclear program: Recent developments (p. 2). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Libya
African Court. (2011, March 25). In the Matter of African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights vs. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Application No. 004/2011–Order for Provisional Measures. Arusha: African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
African Union. (2011, March 19). Press release: Meeting of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee On Libya. All Africa, http://allafrica.com/stories/201103200011.html
Ad Hoc Committee on Libya. (2011, March 19). Communique of the Meeting of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya. Nouakchott: African Union.
Albayaty, A. I., et al. (2011, April 16). Using Libya to abort the Arab Spring. Al Ahram: 2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/10114.aspx. Accessed 20 December 2016.
Ashton, C. (2011, February 21). 3069th Council Meeting—Press Release 6773/11. Brussels: Council of the European Union.
BBC. (2011, August 22). Libya crisis: Profile of NTC Chair Mustafa Abdul Jalil. London: BBC.
Chrisafis, A. (2009, June 22). Nicolas Sarkozy says Islamic veils are not welcome in France. The Guardian.
Erlanger, S. (2011, March 18). France and Britain lead military push on Libya. New York Times.
European Affairs. (2011). EU haunted by fear of refugees, not reality. The European Institute, https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/127-european-affairs/ea-june-2011/1330-eu-haunted-by-fear-of-refugees-not-reality. Accessed 5 January 2017.
General Assembly. (2011, March 3). Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council–Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya–Resolution A /HRC/RES/S-15/1. New York: United Nations.
ICC. (2011, June). Situation in Libya–ICC-01/11. The Hague: International Criminal Court–https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya. Accessed 5 January 2017. | Pre-Trial Chamber I | Warrant of Arrest.
ICG. (2011, March 10). A ceasefire and negotiations: The right way to resolve the Libya crisis. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
Kristof, N. (2011, February 23). On the line with Libya. New York Times.
Peterson, S. (2011, May 5). 686,000 Libya refugees flee to Egypt, Tunisia. The Christian Science Monitor.
LAS. (2011, March 12). The outcome of the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at the Ministerial level in its extraordinary session—On the implications of the current events in Libya and the Arab position. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement%2012%20march%202011%20-%20english(1).pdf. Accessed 5 January 2017.
Lewis, A. (2016, August 19). Libya’s jihadist challenge to last beyond Sirte defeat. Reuters.
Mackey, R. (2011, March 18). Updates on Libya and Arab uprisings. New York Times, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/latest-updates-on-libya-and-arabuprisings/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. Accessed 5 January 2017.
NTC Libya. (2011). Key individuals behind the NTC Libya. National Transitional Council—Libya, http://ntclibya.org/key-individuals-behind-the-ntc/. Accessed 5 January 2017.
Obama, B. (2011, March 18). Remarks by the President on the situation in Libya. Washington DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya. Accessed 5 January 2017.
PoE. (2012, March 20). Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya (Report S/2012/163). New York: United Nations.
PoE. (2013b, February 15). Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya (Report S/2013/99). New York: United Nations.
RT. (2014, February 14). Libyan economy hit by civil war. Russian TV. http://rt.com/business/libya-war-economy-losses-295. Accessed 5 January 2017.
Security Council. (2011a, February 26). Resolution S/Res/1970/2011. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2011b, March 17). Resolution S/Res/1973/2011. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2011c, September 16). Resolution S/Res/2009/2011. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2011d, October 27). Resolution S/Res/2016/2011. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2011e, October 27). Resolution S/Res/2017/2011. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2012, March 12). Resolution S/Res/2040/2012. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2013c, March 14). Resolution S/Res/2095/2013. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2014a, March 14). Resolution S/Res/2144/2014. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2014b, March 19). Resolution S/Res/2146/2014. New York: United Nations.
Security Council. (2015b, March 27). Resolution S/Res/2214/2015. New York: United Nations.
Slackman, M. (2009, March 19). A leader beyond reproach limits the possibilities for political change. New York Times.
Spencer, R. (2011, June 29). France supplying weapons to Libyan rebels. The Telegraph.
Vira, V., & Cordesman, A. H. (2011, June 20). The Libyan uprising: An uncertain trajectory (p. 26). Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Carisch, E., Rickard-Martin, L., Meister, S.R. (2017). Back to the Future: The Non-Proliferation Cases of Iran, North Korea and R2P Sanctions on Libya. In: The Evolution of UN Sanctions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-60004-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-60005-5
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)