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The Evolution of UN Sanctions pp 183–223Cite as

Humanitarian Collateral Costs: From Iraq to Yugoslavia to Haiti

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Abstract

After the end of the Cold War , Western nations had a unique historic opportunity to remake the UN sanctions system and to prove that whatever policies had not worked so far, were due to the Soviet Union’s intransigence and obstruction of Security Council decisions. It was their chance to demonstrate that the human welfare pillars of the UN were not mere rhetoric but a political aspiration that these victorious Western states were now going to turn into a political reality with their new sanctions regimes. Our research shows, however, that no such considerations dominated the thinking of the post-Cold War sanctions politicians. If any change took place in conflict zones that leading member states perceived to be hard security threats—meaning Iraq , Yugoslavia, and to a lesser degree in Haiti —it was by moving backwards, towards harsher economic warfare rather than towards more calibrated and temporary sanctions measures. Sanctions decision makers were so convinced of their righteous intentions that unlike the poorly implemented early sanctions regime against South Africa and Southern Rhodesia , they now inflicted inadvertently mass collateral fatalities.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See for example George Bush ’s Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict on March 6, 1991 celebrating the success of Operation Desert Storm.

  2. 2.

    The true extent of Iraq ’s aggression against Kuwait was questioned contemporaneously as the New York Times and many other international media outlets reported. See for example: Special to The New York Times by Jason DeParle on 3 September 1990 in The Media Business: Gulf Crisis Starts a Costly Fight for Good Press; or Special to The New York Times of 16 December 1990 by Judith Miller; Standoff in the Gulf; Atrocities by Iraqis in Kuwait : Numbers Are Hard to Verify.

  3. 3.

    Among the publicly proclaimed rationale for instigating the war, shared by the US and Gulf States, was Saddam Hussein ’s fear that Ayatollah Khomeini ’s Shia -Islamic revolution would spread to Iraq . Ironically, the second US-instigated invasion and occupation of Iraq, led after 9/11 to the establishment of a Shia-dominated Iraqi government in 2004, that is closely aligned with Iran ’s Shia government.

  4. 4.

    Ample evidence for Western and particularly US support to Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the war against Iran has been published by most major media around the world. The Washington-based not-for-profit organization The National Security Archive maintains an online library of many original government documents that detail US support to Iraq. For more see: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm.

  5. 5.

    UNSCS/RES/661, (6 Aug. 1990), paras. 3–4.

  6. 6.

    UNSC /RES/661, para. 9.

  7. 7.

    UNSC S/RES/661, para. 6.

  8. 8.

    S/RES/678, (29 Nov. 1990), paras. 1–2.

  9. 9.

    Among the numerous contemporaneous news reports was the New York Times Alan Cowell on 3 April 1990: Iraq Chief, Boasting of Poison Gas, Warns of Disaster if Israelis Strike; on the same day the Washington Post ’s Jackson Diehl: New Arab arsenals challenge Israel ’s long regional dominance; and Patrick Tyler, “Iraqi warns of using poison gas,” also of the Washington Post).

  10. 10.

    See the United States General Accounting Office reporting from 15 May 1991 on the Cost of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Allied Contributions.

  11. 11.

    UNSC S/RES/687, paras. 8 and 9.

  12. 12.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 9(b)(i).

  13. 13.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 9.

  14. 14.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 10.

  15. 15.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 12.

  16. 16.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 24.

  17. 17.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 20.

  18. 18.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 32.

  19. 19.

    UNSC S/RES/687, para. 9(b)(i).

  20. 20.

    UNSC S/RES/687, paras. 15, 30–31.

  21. 21.

    UNSC S/RES/687, paras. 16–18.

  22. 22.

    UNSC S/1995/1017, paras. 9, 19, and 29

  23. 23.

    “U.S. inspector dismisses spy allegations.” World News. CNN <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9712/21/iraq.inspector/>. 21 Dec. 1997; Robert H. Reid. “Next U.N. inspection will test Iraq .” Associated Press <http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/Next-U-N-Inspection-Will-Test-Iraq/id-ccca45062cc0ec92d56d3429110ebcb6>. 2 Dec. 1997. Web. 28 Jun. 2014.

  24. 24.

    UNSCS/RES/1137, paras. 1–2 and 4–5.

  25. 25.

    For instance, see UNSC S/1998/920, (6 October 1998), para. 67; UNSC S/1998/312, (9 April 1998), paras. 33–35; UNSC , S/1998/694 (27 July 1998).

  26. 26.

    See for example UNSC Report S/1998/920, Section VI or Cortright and Lopez , The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, p. 53.

  27. 27.

    UNSC S/RES/1194 para. 3.

  28. 28.

    O’Sullivan, p. 117.

  29. 29.

    O’Sullivan, p. 120; Cortright and Lopez , pp. 56–57.

  30. 30.

    Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, had made it clear in 1997 that the US would not back down from Iraq until Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. In 1998, President Clinton established the Iraq Liberation Act to remove Saddam from power and initiate democratic processes in Iraq. Madeleine K. Albright, “Preserving Principle and Safeguarding Stability: United States Policy Towards Iraq,” Georgetown University; Cortright and Lopez , The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s, pp. 56–57.

  31. 31.

    Cortright and Lopez , pp. 57–58.

  32. 32.

    UNSC S/RES/1284, para. 1.

  33. 33.

    UNSC, S/RES/1284, para. 15.

  34. 34.

    UNSC S/RES/1409, paras. 2–4.

  35. 35.

    UNSC S/RES/1441, paras. 1 and 3.

  36. 36.

    UNSC S/RES/1441, para. 13.

  37. 37.

    As quoted in “Threats and Responses; Transcript of Bush ’s remarks on the Security Council’s Iraq resolution.” The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/09/world/threats-responses-transcript-bush-s-remarks-security-council-s-iraq-Resolution.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%222%22%3A%22RI%3A16%22}>. 9 Nov. 2002. Web. 28 Jun. 2014; Smith , p. 61.

  38. 38.

    See for example in Trevor Findlay. 2004. The lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC . Verification Yearbook 2004, ed. Trevor Findlay, (London: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), 2004), p. 74; or in Ronan Bennet. 2008, Ten days to war. The Guardian.8 March. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/08/iraq.unitednations (accessed 2014, June 28).

  39. 39.

    The US and United Kingdom led the attack; however, a handful of other countries supported or participated in the war, such as Australia and Poland.

  40. 40.

    Iraq was already so substantially weakened from the first Gulf War and years of sanctions and isolation that the impact of the second war served to further destabilize the state and the region.

  41. 41.

    UNSC S/RES/1483, paras. 10, 18, and 20.

  42. 42.

    UNSC, S/RES/1483, para. 19.

  43. 43.

    UNSC, S/RES/1483, para. 11.

  44. 44.

    UNSC S/RES/1483, paras. 10 and 11.

  45. 45.

    UNSC S/RES/1483, para. 7.

  46. 46.

    UNSC S/RES/1483, para. 23.

  47. 47.

    This action triggered important judicial proceedings, of which the case Al-Dulimi and Montana Management, Inc. vs. Switzerland (No. 5809/08) is still being litigated before the European Court of Human Rights.

  48. 48.

    UNSC S/RES/1483, para. 20.

  49. 49.

    UNSC, S/RES/1483, para. 19.

  50. 50.

    UNSC, S/RES/1483, para. 3.

  51. 51.

    UNSC, S/RES/1483, para. 6.

  52. 52.

    UNSC S/RES/1518, paras. 1 and 2.

  53. 53.

    UNSC S/RES/1546, para. 17.

  54. 54.

    UNSC, S/RES/1546, paras. 21–22.

  55. 55.

    UNSC, S/RES/1546, para. 29.

  56. 56.

    There had been ongoing debate among US officials as to what to do with Iraq , particularly in Congress, which had introduced and passed resolutions to call for a quick end date and withdrawal of US forces. It also became a contentious platform during the 2004 and 2008 presidential election campaigns.

  57. 57.

    UNSC S/RES/1956, paras. 1 and 3.

  58. 58.

    UNSC S/RES/1957, para. 1.

  59. 59.

    UNSC S/RES/1958, para. 1.

  60. 60.

    UNSC S/RES/2107, paras. 2–3.

  61. 61.

    UNSC S/RES/743), para. 2.

  62. 62.

    Within the Council, a number of issues plagued decision-making in the unfolding crisis. Prominent among these was a severe lack of firsthand knowledge of what was happening on the ground. A priest who had travelled from the conflict zone to speak with Council members imparted his account to Venezuela’s Ambassador on the UNSC at the time, Diego Arria. Compelled by the priest’s observations of what was happening on the ground, Ambassador Arria arranged an informal gathering of other Council members to listen to the priest’s report. This informal process, dubbed the “Arria formula,” helped bypass the Council’s formality, connect Council members with those directly affected by conflict, and allow members to hear first accounts from those affected by decisions. The Arria formula continues to be used as a valuable source of information for Council members to help inform decision-making. See Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, Fourth ed. (Oxford UP, 2014), pp. 74–76; David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World, (Oxford UP, 2009), pp. 178–180.

  63. 63.

    UNSC S/RES/757, para. 4.

  64. 64.

    UNSC, S/RES/757, para. 6.

  65. 65.

    UNSC, S/RES/757, para. 5.

  66. 66.

    UNSC, S/RES/757, para. 7.

  67. 67.

    UNSC, S/RES/757, para. 8.

  68. 68.

    UNSC S/RES/757, para. 13.

  69. 69.

    “The Experience of the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions (Second Expert Seminar),” in Smart Sanctions, the Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions (Berlin: United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, 2000), pp. 22–23.

  70. 70.

    UNSC S/RES/787, para. 9.

  71. 71.

    UNSC S/RES/787, para. 10.

  72. 72.

    UNSC S/RES/787, para. 12.

  73. 73.

    UNSC S/RES/787, para. 13.

  74. 74.

    UNSC S/RES/769, para. 4.

  75. 75.

    UNSC S/RES/780, para. 2.

  76. 76.

    UNSC S/RES/820, paras. 12, 13, and 15.

  77. 77.

    UNSC, S/RES/780, paras. 21, 22, and 27.

  78. 78.

    UNSC, S/RES/780, paras. 24–25.

  79. 79.

    UNSC, S/RES/780, para. 28.

  80. 80.

    UNSC S/RES/827, para. 2.

  81. 81.

    UNSC S/RES/942, paras. 7–8.

  82. 82.

    UNSC, S/RES/942, para. 9.

  83. 83.

    UNSC, S/RES/942, paras. 10–11.

  84. 84.

    UNSC, S/RES/942, paras. 14.

  85. 85.

    UNSC, S/RES/942, para. 16.

  86. 86.

    UNSC S/RES/943 para. 1.

  87. 87.

    Bosco, pp. 180–181.

  88. 88.

    Cortright and Lopez , pp. 77–78.

  89. 89.

    UNSC S/RES/1031, paras. 1–2.

  90. 90.

    The subsequently created International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). revealed specific incidences and perpetrators for these cases. For more information consult the website of the court under Cases: http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4 (accessed 2017, January 10).

  91. 91.

    Webber, Mark, pp. 449–451.

  92. 92.

    UNSC S/RES/1160, paras. 8–9.

  93. 93.

    UNSC S/RES/1199, para. 4.

  94. 94.

    UNSC, S/RES/1199, para. 6.

  95. 95.

    UNSC S/RES/1203, para. 15.

  96. 96.

    Webber, p. 452.

  97. 97.

    Bosco, pp. 209–210.

  98. 98.

    The fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a NATO member raises the question of whose security was at stake. Since Kosovo was still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , Kosovars could not have been beneficiaries of such treaty obligations.

  99. 99.

    Webber, pp. 455–456.

  100. 100.

    UNSC S/RES/1244, para. 7.

  101. 101.

    See a discussion about arms embargo violations and KFOR ’s role in the Report of the Security Council Mission on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1244 —Report S/2000/363, 29 Apr. 2000. paras. 15 and 34.

  102. 102.

    UNSC, S/RES/1244, Annex I.

  103. 103.

    For a contemporaneous record, see for example, Stephen Kinzer, New York Times ; Slovenia and Croatia Get Bonn’s Nod; 24 December 1991, or Spiegel; Ein großer Erfolg für uns; 23 December 1991; Spiegel 52/1991.

  104. 104.

    Lucarelli, pp. 127.

  105. 105.

    Lucarelli, p. 31.

  106. 106.

    For a very detailed study, see Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; edited by Ewa Tabeau; Conflict in Numbers - Casualties of the 1990s Wars in the Former Yugoslavia (1991–1999); Testimonies Vol. 33.

  107. 107.

    Other OAS Member countries such as the neighboring Dominican Republic and Colombia were also known to violate the sanctions, greatly nullifying their effect. Carina Staibano, “Trends in UN sanctions: From ad hoc practice to institutional capacity building,” in International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System, ed. Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano, (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 42; Cortright , Lopez , and Dashti-Gibson, p. 91.

  108. 108.

    for a more detailed analysis see Thomas Friedman, New York Times ; Haiti ’s Coup: Test Case for Bush ’s New World Order; 4 October, 1991.

  109. 109.

    UNSC) S/RES/841 preamb. para. 11.

  110. 110.

    UNSC, S/RES/841, paras. 5–8.

  111. 111.

    UNSC, S/RES/841, para. 10.

  112. 112.

    Cortright , Lopez , pp. 92–93.

  113. 113.

    Cortright , Lopez , p. 93.

  114. 114.

    UNSC S/RES/873, para. 1.

  115. 115.

    UNSC S/RES/875, para. 1.

  116. 116.

    UNSC S/RES/917, para. 2.

  117. 117.

    UNSC, S/RES/917, paras. 3–4.

  118. 118.

    UNSC, S/RES/917, para. 5.

  119. 119.

    UNSC, S/RES/917, paras. 6–8.

  120. 120.

    UNSC, S/RES/917, paras. 9–11.

  121. 121.

    UNSC Letter S/1994/905, p. 2.

  122. 122.

    Report S/1994/828, paras. 16, 21, and 22.

  123. 123.

    UNSC S/RES/940, para. 4.

  124. 124.

    Charron , p. 59.

  125. 125.

    UNSC S/RES/944, para. 4.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Compliance and Capacity Skills International, New York, NY, USA

    Enrico Carisch, Loraine Rickard-Martin & Shawna R. Meister

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  1. Enrico Carisch
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  2. Loraine Rickard-Martin
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  3. Shawna R. Meister
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Carisch, E., Rickard-Martin, L., Meister, S.R. (2017). Humanitarian Collateral Costs: From Iraq to Yugoslavia to Haiti. In: The Evolution of UN Sanctions. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60005-5_11

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