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The Positive Account of Belief

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Abstract

Here I set out my positive non-reificatory account of belief. Drawing heavily on the ordinary language tradition, I give what is essentially account of the use of a set of terms (primarily the noun “belief” and the verb “believe”), and relate this to the questions traditionally asked about the nature of belief. Initially I return to the subject of behaviourism, re-emphasising the distinction between the more extreme verificationist position, the arguments of Ryle and Wittgenstein, and view that I present in this chapter. I then present my account of the concept of belief and consider some problems and objections before reiterating the advantages of the non-reificatory approach.

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Correspondence to Richard Floyd .

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Floyd, R. (2017). The Positive Account of Belief. In: The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4_5

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