The Positive Account of Belief

  • Richard FloydEmail author


Here I set out my positive non-reificatory account of belief. Drawing heavily on the ordinary language tradition, I give what is essentially account of the use of a set of terms (primarily the noun “belief” and the verb “believe”), and relate this to the questions traditionally asked about the nature of belief. Initially I return to the subject of behaviourism, re-emphasising the distinction between the more extreme verificationist position, the arguments of Ryle and Wittgenstein, and view that I present in this chapter. I then present my account of the concept of belief and consider some problems and objections before reiterating the advantages of the non-reificatory approach.


Wittgenstein Ryle Dennett Lynne Rudder Baker Reification Belief Ordinary language Behaviourism Non-reificatory 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LancasterLancasterUK

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