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Theory-Theory, Simulation, and Self-ascription

  • Richard FloydEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Here I consider the very popular view that commonsense psychology is a theory that posits unobserved processes and states (like beliefs) in order to explain observed behaviour. Here I take a look at how the Theory-Theory vs. Simulation debate bears on the question of reification. It turns out that simulationism does not solve the problem that theory-theory presents to the non-reificationist; there are theorists on both sides whose positions require mental states to be reified. Having given a brief survey of the debate I argue first that theory-theory is consistent with the non-reificatory view, and second that Gordon’s non-reificatory account of self-ascription is more plausible than the most prominent reificatory accounts.

Keywords

Theory-Theory Simulation Commonsense psychology Folk psychology Alvin Goldman Robert Gordon Jane Heal Peter Carruthers 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LancasterLancasterUK

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