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Introduction

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Realist Thought and the Nation-State

Part of the book series: The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought ((PMHIT))

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Abstract

The introduction presents the key concepts of the book and explains how they are approached. The first part engages with the concepts of the nation, nationalism, and nation-state and explains why they are better understood as distinctly modern phenomena. The second part offers an overview of different approaches to realism and concludes with an exposition of the way realism is understood in this work. In the third part, the way realist thought has been so far connected to power and the nation-state is discussed. This is followed by two parts explaining how this book engages in intellectual history and justifying the selection of four seminal realist authors: E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, and John Mearsheimer. The final part briefly outlines the main argument that is developed in the following four chapters.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Colin Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the Past: With GPS,” Review of International Studies 25, Special Issue (Dec 1999): p. 182.

  2. 2.

    Ibid. p. 164.

  3. 3.

    Apart from the occasional article reminding students of international politics that questions of nations and nationalism should not be neglected there is not, as Stullerova explains, “an established niche area for those working on IR and nationalism”. Kamila Stullerova, “In the Footsteps of Karl Deutsch: On Nationalism, Self-Determination and International Relations,” International Relations 28, no. 3 (2014): pp. 320–322. See also the discussion by Martin Griffiths and Michael Sullivan, “Nationalism and International Relations Theory,” Australian Journal of Politics & History 43, no. 1 (1997): pp. 53–66. There is, however, a notable exception: James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

  4. 4.

    For a recent discussion of the problems associated with the often simplistic textbook representations of “realism” and “liberalism” see Lucian Ashworth, A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2014).

  5. 5.

    There is a goodly amount of work discussing the development of the study of nationalism, as well as the key authors, debates, and theories. See indicatively: Umut Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); David McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow’s Ancestors (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Paul Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2005); Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1983).

  6. 6.

    Özkırımlı, Theories of Nationalism, p. 3.

  7. 7.

    McCrone, Sociology of Nationalism, p. 3.

  8. 8.

    Özkırımlı, Theories of nationalism, pp. 72–142.

  9. 9.

    Ibid. pp. 143–168.

  10. 10.

    For an interesting critical summary of the debate see McCrone, Sociology of Nationalism, pp. 10–16.

  11. 11.

    Pantelis Lekkas, Playing with Time: Nationalism and Modernity (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 2001) (in Greek), pp. 12–17, pp. 54–87. In so doing, it also manages to somehow salvage the idea of immortality from the decline of the religious certainties of traditional societies. Benedict Anderson , Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 9–12.

  12. 12.

    One can add here the historically conditioned character of the usage of the terms “nation” and “nationalism” themselves. Whilst the word “nation” is indeed very old, it is only recently that it came to acquire its contemporary meaning. The term “nationalism ” first appeared in 1789. Pantelis Lekkas, Nationalist Ideology: Five Working Hypotheses in Historical Sociology (Athens: Katarti, 1996) (in Greek), pp. 73–96; Kenneth R. Minogue, Nationalism (London: Batsford, 1967), pp. 8–11; Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 14–18; Eugene Kamenka, “Political Nationalism—The Evolution of the Idea,” in Nationalism: the Nature and Evolution of an Idea, ed. Eugene Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 4.

  13. 13.

    Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), p. 101.

  14. 14.

    Lekkas, Nationalist Ideology, pp. 25–72.

  15. 15.

    John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 2–3. Breuilly adapted the somewhat more numerous propositions offered by Anthony Smith : Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 25. The last element of political independence is also implied in Gellner’s famous definition of nationalism as a principle “which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”: Ernest Gellner , Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 1.

  16. 16.

    Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6.

  17. 17.

    Ibid. pp. 6–7.

  18. 18.

    McCrone, Sociology of Nationalism, pp. 85–97.

  19. 19.

    Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 6.

  20. 20.

    Walker Connor, “A Nation Is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a… ,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 1, no. 4 (1978): p. 382.

  21. 21.

    The way I employ “nation-state” is therefore akin to the term “national state” that has been proposed by Smith as a more neutral term to describe states that are legitimised by nationalism, possess a measure of integration , but are not necessarily culturally homogenous. Given the wide usage of the term “nation-state ”, I opted for employing it in this broader sense rather than replacing it with the otherwise more accurate “national state”. Smith, Nationalism, pp. 16–18.

  22. 22.

    Mearsheimer was of course referring to -isms such as institutionalism and constructivism : John Mearsheimer, “The More Isms the Better,” International Relations 19, no. 3 (2005): pp. 354–359.

  23. 23.

    Seán Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: a Genealogy of Power Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 149–150. The term “neoclassical realism” was introduced by Gideon Rose in a review of works by Randall Schweller, Fareed Zakaria, William Wohlforth, and others to describe a variant of structural realism which integrates intervening variables at the domestic level. Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): pp. 144–172; for a summary of offensive vs. defensive realism see Jeffrey Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy,” International Security 25, No. 3 (2000): pp. 128–161. Stephen Brooks attempted to introduce the label “postclassical realism” in 1997 which, however, has not gained significant traction. Stephen Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organisation 51, no. 3 (1997): pp. 445–477.

  24. 24.

    Indicatively, Carr apart from a “classical realist” is also a “critical realist” for Babik and Falk, a “progressive realist” for Scheuerman, and a “utopian realist” for Howe.

  25. 25.

    Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 301–321.

  26. 26.

    Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For the differences between his variant of realism and classical realism see Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): passim.

  27. 27.

    Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 2–5.

  28. 28.

    For Fozouni, the key tenet of realism as derived from Morgenthau ’s work is the claim that “power optimisation is the only (i.e., a necessary and sufficient) determinant of international political behaviour”: Bahman Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): p. 481. Vasquez, based also on Morgenthau, identifies nation-state-centrism, the distinction between domestic and international politics, and the identification of international politics as the domain of struggle for power and peace as the three main assumptions of the realist paradigm: John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 52–59; John Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Vs Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): p. 899. In response to the latter, despite emphasising the diversity in realism that Vasquez neglects, Walt also identifies some key assumptions that all realists subscribe to, namely, state-centrism, international anarchy , and the centrality of power. Stephen Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): pp. 932–933. Keohane’s three realist fundamental assumptions are like Walt’s but he substitutes anarchy for the rationality assumption. Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Keohane, pp. 163–170. Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman also identify three “first principles” of realism: group-centrism, an understanding of politics as a domain of “perpetual struggle […] under conditions of general scarcity and uncertainty”, and the centrality of power as a means for groups to achieve their goals. Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven Lobell, and Norrin Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, ed. Steven E. Lobell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 14–15. Legro and Moravcsik offer a version of the realist paradigm that comprises three core assumptions: rational, unitary political units in anarchy; fixed and conflictual state goals; and primacy of material capabilities. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): pp. 9–18. For a critical evaluation of paradigmatic approaches to realism see Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 15–34. For the responses to the argument proposed by Legro and Moravcsik see Peter Feaver et al. “Brother, Can You Spare Me a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody ever a Realist?),” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): pp. 165–193.

  29. 29.

    Buzan et al., The Logic of anarchy, pp. 3–5; John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 45.

  30. 30.

    Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Keohane, pp. 204–254.

  31. 31.

    Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Keohane, p. 297; Richard Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests,” International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1981): pp. 204–236; Rob B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1 (1987): pp. 65–86.

  32. 32.

    Brent J. Steele, “‘Eavesdropping on Honoured Ghosts’: From Classical to Reflexive Realism,” Journal of International Relations and Development 10, no. 3 (2007): pp. 291–292.

  33. 33.

    Ibid. p. 273.

  34. 34.

    Duncan Bell, “Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond,” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009): pp. 6–8.

  35. 35.

    For works on Carr and Herz, Ibid: p. 7; fn 16. For Morgenthau see indicatively Michael C. Williams, ed. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).

  36. 36.

    William E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform (Cambridge: Polity, 2011); Molloy, Hidden History.

  37. 37.

    Duncan Bell, ed. Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). For a more recent attempt see the relevant special issue in International Politics: Hartmut Behr and Seán Molloy, eds. “Realism Reconsidered: New Contexts and Critiques,” International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013).

  38. 38.

    Bell, “Writing the World,” p. 7.

  39. 39.

    Stefano Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 111.

  40. 40.

    William E. Scheuerman, “The (Classical) Realist Vision of Global Reform,” International Theory 2, no. 2 (2010): pp. 246–282.

  41. 41.

    Stefano Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (2004): p. 537.

  42. 42.

    Idem. Also in Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” pp. 48–53.

  43. 43.

    Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” p. 544.

  44. 44.

    See indicatively: David Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): pp. 465–480; also Ken Booth’s introduction in John Mearsheimer et al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages On,” International Relations 19, no. 3 (2005): p. 337.

  45. 45.

    Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil,” pp. 467–471.

  46. 46.

    Ibid. p. 468.

  47. 47.

    Mearsheimer et al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages On,” p. 337.

  48. 48.

    Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 3–4; for the myth of the first debate see Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate?,” Review of International Studies 24, special issue (1998): pp. 1–15; Lucian Ashworth, “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a Revisionist History of International Relations,” International Relations 16, no. 2 (2002): pp. 33–51; and more recently Brian Schmidt, “Introduction,” in International Relations and the First Great Debate, ed. Brian Schmidt (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 1–15 and Peter Wilson, “Where Are We Now in the Debate About the First Great Debate?,” in International Relations and the First Great Debate, ed. Schmidt, pp. 133–151. Guzzini, despite advocating a narrow definition of realism, recognises that such an approach might be criticised for being “consciously skewed in favour of realism’s critiques”. See Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” p. 537.

  49. 49.

    Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 4.

  50. 50.

    Idem.

  51. 51.

    Jackson and Nexon for instance observed that “Participants may have overplayed […] claims about incommensurability, but their debates made clear that different theoretical and analytical commitments can generate different conclusions about world politics” and added that critics of “isms” often “tend to obscure the degree to which their own commitments are far from neutral when it comes to studying world politics”. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, “International Theory in a Post-Paradigmatic Era: From Substantive Wagers to Scientific Ontologies,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): pp. 545–547. See also Henry Nau, “No Alternative to ‘isms’,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): pp. 487–491.

  52. 52.

    Feaver et al. “Brother, Can You Spare Me a Paradigm?,” p. 173.

  53. 53.

    See Ludwig Wittgenstein , Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), paragraphs 65–69.

  54. 54.

    Feaver et al. “Brother, Can You Spare Me a Paradigm?,” p. 173.

  55. 55.

    Idem. Also in: Duncan Bell, “Introduction: Under an Empty Sky—Realism and Political Theory,” in Political Thought and International Relations, ed. Bell, p. 3; Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 16; and particularly Jones’ paraphrase of Wittgenstein’s passage on games to account for realism: Charles Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 5–6; p. 6, fn 8.

  56. 56.

    From the paradigmatic readings outlined above it is only Fouzouni who singles out power optimisation as the core realist assumption whereas all other views include state-centrism in one form or another.

  57. 57.

    Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): p. 40; Felix Berenskoetter, “Thinking About Power,” in Power in World Politics, eds. Felix Berenskoetter and Michael J. Williams (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 1.

  58. 58.

    Barry Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 51; also see Molloy’s claim that the emphasis on power is perhaps the only thing that the paradigmatic reading of realism got right. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 145–147; Michael Williams too claims that “power is central to any understanding of realism”: Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 6.

  59. 59.

    For power as an essentially contested concept see Steven Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power,” in Power in World Politics, eds. Berenskoetter and Williams, p. 83. Since Dahl ’s attempt to define power, the inadequacy of previous efforts to capture the elusive character of power is best demonstrated by the continuous addition of “faces” to the concept. See Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 (1957): pp. 201–215; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (1962): pp. 947–952; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Peter Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power,” The Journal of Politics 54, no. 4 (1992): pp. 977–1007. Yet the concept remains controversial and elusive. Lukes attributes the controversy around power to the fact that it is a “primitive” concept—that is, a concept whose analysis would involve the utilisation of other also controversial concepts: Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds,” p. 93. For Ringmar’s claim that IR scholars possess poor understandings of power see Erik Ringmar, “Empowerment Among Nations: a Sociological Perspective,” in Power in World Politics, eds. Berenskoetter and Williams, p. 190.

  60. 60.

    For the complaint that domination by realist conceptions of power hindered the development of alternatives see indicatively: Berenskoetter, “Thinking About Power,” p. 1; Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” pp. 40–42. There are, however, other approaches to international relations that are centred around power. Buzan mentions feminism and Marxism as other schools that focus on power: Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,” p. 51. Power, albeit in its productive rather than coercive function, is also of cardinal importance for poststructuralism : Andrew Neal, “Michael Foucault,” in Critical Theorists and International Relations, eds. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 161–170; Jennifer Sterling-Folker and Rosemary E. Shinko, “Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide,” in Power in World Politics, eds. Berenskoetter and Williams, pp. 244–264.

  61. 61.

    Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 40; Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” pp. 16–18; David Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes et al. (London: Sage, 2013): passim; Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” pp. 535–538.

  62. 62.

    Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” pp. 202–203.

  63. 63.

    Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 40, pp. 49–51; Berenskoetter, “Thinking About Power,” p. 47; Ringmar, “Empowerment Among Nations,” pp. 190–191.

  64. 64.

    Baldwin in particular has contrasted the realist “elements-of-power” approach to the relational one forwarded by Dahl : Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” passim. While realists such as Mearsheimer have rejected Dahl’s conceptualisation , there are those who claim contra Baldwin that realists are in fact attentive to the relational aspects of power. Sterling-Folker and Shinko, “Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide,” p. 263: fn. 3; also Schmidt’s claim that different realists can subscribe to either one of the broad approaches Baldwin outlined or both: Brian Schmidt, “Realist Conceptions of Power,” in Power in World Politics, eds. Berenskoetter and Williams, passim.

  65. 65.

    This is revealed by the debate about the fungibility of power between realists and their critics. For a summary see Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” pp. 537–544; for a more detailed overview: David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): pp. 161–194. Realists who are more prone to emphasise the measurability of power derive the analogy largely from the construction of neorealism as a theory of international relations based on microeconomics. See Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” passim; and infra under Chap. 5 for Mearsheimer who also employs the analogy.

  66. 66.

    Schmidt, “Realist Conceptions of Power,” pp. 43–63.

  67. 67.

    Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 29–34.

  68. 68.

    See, for instance, Barnett and Duvall’s comments on E.H. Carr ’s realism and the comment of Guzzini on classical realists in general: Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” pp. 66–69; Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” p. 544.

  69. 69.

    Bell, “Under an Empty Sky,” p. 10.

  70. 70.

    See indicatively: Griffiths and Sullivan, “Nationalism and International Relations Theory,” pp. 53–66; Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” pp. 268–273. Also, the discussion in: Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 39.

  71. 71.

    Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 93–97; see also Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?,” pp. 12–13; for Mearsheimer’s similar take on states see infra Chap. 5.

  72. 72.

    Giplin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” pp. 313–318.

  73. 73.

    See the excellent summary in Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Waltz and World History: The Paradox of Parsimony,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): pp. 446–463; also Georg Sørensen, “‘Big and Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): pp. 223–239; John Gerald Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Keohane, passim.

  74. 74.

    Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 139–143.

  75. 75.

    Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, in particular Chaps. 2 and 3.

  76. 76.

    For Bell the state became so important for contemporary realism because of its increased prominence, which led to its conflation with sovereignty in the relevant literature. Duncan Bell, “Anarchy, Power and Death: Contemporary Political Realism as Ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies 7, no. 2 (2002): pp. 230–234. He repeated a similar point when addressing state-centrism in classical realism, concluding that “realism is not theoretically committed to any particular type of political association”. Bell, “Under an Empty Sky,” pp. 10–11; p. 10.

  77. 77.

    Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 1–14, pp. 17–63.

  78. 78.

    Buzan, “The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?,” p. 51.

  79. 79.

    Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 73–78, 127–128.

  80. 80.

    Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 17–63.

  81. 81.

    Molloy, Hidden History, passim.

  82. 82.

    Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, passim but in particular pp. 39–97.

  83. 83.

    Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): pp. 3–53; for a discussion of the applicability of Skinner’s framework in the study of international relations see Gerard Holden, “Who Contextualizes the Contextualizers? Disciplinary History and the Discourse About the IR Discourse,” Review of International Studies 28, no. 2 (2002): pp. 253–270.

  84. 84.

    Kenneth R. Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner’s Foundations,” Philosophy 56, no. 218 (1981): p. 544.

  85. 85.

    Idem.

  86. 86.

    Duncan Bell, “International Relations: the Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2001): p. 116.

  87. 87.

    He summarises his views as follows: “Even if he merely flips a coin in order to choose between these and other forms of methodological salvation being marketed, the historian will find that he has taken on board a cargo of philosophical theory on whose validity—not easily testable—his work as a historian will be dangerously dependent.” Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History,” p. 546; pp. 544–549.

  88. 88.

    Stephanie Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative Critique,” Political Studies 56, no. 3 (2008): p. 586.

  89. 89.

    Bell, “The Dawn of a Historiographical Turn?,” p. 116.

  90. 90.

    David A. Welch, “Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2003): p. 312.

  91. 91.

    Ibid. pp. 308–312.

  92. 92.

    Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” World Politics 18, no. 3 (1966): p. 361.

  93. 93.

    Henrik Bliddal, Casper Sylvest, and Peter Wilson, “Introduction,” in Classics of International Relations: Essays in Criticism and Appreciation, eds. Henrik Bliddal et al. (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 6–7.

  94. 94.

    Ibid. p. 6.

  95. 95.

    Lucian Ashworth, Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p. 7.

  96. 96.

    Ibid. p. 8. Ashworth applies this method to liberal internationalism .

  97. 97.

    Perhaps the typology of classics developed by Bliddal et al., despite being designed for texts, has some applicability to the authors of such texts too. For instance, their “undisputed classic” would describe the first element of the discussion presented here whereas the “overlooked classic” corresponds to the latter. Bliddal et al., “Introduction,” pp. 4–5.

  98. 98.

    Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 5.

  99. 99.

    Brian Schmidt, “A Modest Realist in a Tragic World: John J. Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” in Classics of international relations, eds. Bliddal et al., passim.

  100. 100.

    A notable exception was the special issue dedicated to John Herz in International Relations: Jana Puglierin, ed. “A Universalist in Dark Times: John H. Herz, 1908–2005,” International Relations 22, no. 4, (2008): pp. 403–528.

  101. 101.

    As Scheuerman put it, Herz is a “relatively neglected today but widely respected at midcentury figure”. Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 6.

  102. 102.

    See, for example, Scheuerman’s emphasis on Herz ’s work on technology and social acceleration: William E. Scheuerman, “Realism and the Critique of Technology,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 4 (2009): pp. 563–584.

  103. 103.

    Casper Sylvest, “The Conditions and Consequences of Globality: John H. Herz’s International Politics in the Atomic Age,” in Classics of international relations, eds. Bliddal et al., passim.

  104. 104.

    The statement belongs to the introduction of a two-part special issue dedicated to the work of Kenneth Waltz in International Relations. Ken Booth, “Introduction,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (2009): p. 180.

  105. 105.

    Michael C. Williams, “Waltz, Realism and Democracy,” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): pp. 328–340.

  106. 106.

    Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): pp. 54–57. Others are not persuaded. Waltz’s article was in fact penned as a response to a claim to the contrary by Colin Elman. See Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): pp. 7–53; Colin Elman, “Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz ,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): pp. 58–61; also the discussion in: Brian Rathbun, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): pp. 294–321.

  107. 107.

    Ashworth, Creating International Studies, p. 8.

  108. 108.

    Mearsheimer is only a “partial” exception because his early career overlapped with the late careers of Morgenthau and Herz , especially Herz.

  109. 109.

    I am here in agreement with the caveat of Williams in a similar project: “I am most certainly not arguing that they represent a linear progression in which each successive thinker incorporates and supersedes preceding ideas.” Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 16.

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    Konstantinos Kostagiannis

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Kostagiannis, K. (2018). Introduction. In: Realist Thought and the Nation-State. The Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59629-7_1

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