The Foundations of Law in Hugo Grotius

Vauthier Borges de Macedo, Paulo Emílio

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59403-3_4

The Foundations of Law in Hugo Grotius

Paulo Emílio Vauthier Borges de Macedo⁴

Chapter
First Online: 29 August 2017

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Part of the book series: Studies in the History of Law and Justice ((SHLJ,volume 9))

Abstract

Hugo Grotius read Francisco Suárez. There are four passages in the De Jure Belli ac Pacis in which he expressly refers to the De Legibus. In addition, in an above-mentioned letter, we know that the Jurist from Delft admired the Jurist from Coimbra. This fact might go unnoticed in the midst of countless references that Grotius makes in his work. In fact, those quotations are marginal both to Natural Law and to the Law of Nations and their suppression would not compromise the understanding thereof. At first glance, these authors do not have much in common; although contemporaneous, they lived worlds apart: one a Catholic Theologian, the other a Calvinist Lawyer.

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Notes

1.
They are as follow DJBP. I, 4, 15, 1; II, 4, 5, 2; II, 14, 5; II, 23, 13, 2. They refer to: the duty to oblige the orders of an usurper monarch; the length of time of a custom in Civil Law; the non-applicability of Civil Law to the conventions of kings, and the impossibility of bilateral justice in war. The last two passages refer to the Law of Nations, while the rest deal with other issues. However, even in those, Suárez is presented as just another scholar who addressed the subject.
2.
In the following editions of DJBP, Grotius inserted more and more references, until the posthumous edition of 1646 (which essentially corresponds to the 1642 edition, except for some corrections, but no additions). See Reeves, 1925 p. 255. However, even in the first edition, that of Nicolas Buon, there are four references to Suárez. This means that during the initial phase of his work, Grotius already knew Suárez’s work and so these references were part of his original intent.
3.
Kosters (1925), pp. 39–43.
4.
Scott (1934), p. 184.
5.
Merêa (2004), pp. 178–179 and 181.
6.
That is James St. Leger’s opinion on the origins of Grotius’ impious hypothesis: he would have acknowledge it through Gabriel Vasquez’s take on Suárez’s work. See Leger, 1962, p. 132.
7.
Roelofsen, 1983, p 74.
8.
See Knight (1925), p. 289. Thomas (1999), p. 61 argues that Grotius considered his works on Theology to be the most important ones.
9.
Grotius (1728). III, 13, p. 202.
10.
Edwin Rabbie emphazises this “sensitivity of the century” with a curious story. In 1617, Petrus Cunaeus, a professor at Leyden University, published a book entitled De republica Hebraeorum. Purposefully, he avoided taking sides in the controversy. Nonetheless, the page in which the title of the book is found, in one of the exquisite pocket editions that made Elsevier publisher famous, also contains a drawing—in conformity with the purpose of the book, it must be said—of the two founders of the Jewish State: Moses and Abraham. At first glance, there is no problem there; it just so happens that among orthodox Calvinists, both characters were measured and Moses turned out to be a few millimeters taller than Abraham. The inevitable conclusion was that Moses represented the State and Abraham, the Church; therefore, the author wanted to infer the superiority of the former over the latter! (Rabbie, 1995–1996, pp. 97–98). Even King James I considered exaggerated the kind of subordination of the Church to the State demanded by Grotius.
11.
“Antiquam legem sunt que urgent pro ipso iure naturae: haud dubie mendose; multa enim eius veniunt ex Dei voluntate libera (…)” and “Alteram iuris speciem esse diximus ius voluntarium, quod ex voluntate originem ducit: estque vel humanum vel divinum.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 48 and I, 1, 13).
12.
“Et quamquam ius gentium particula est divini iuris, quam Deus nobis post peccatum reliquam fecit” (DIB. I, 1, 4).
13.
Thomas (1999), p. 85.
14.
The idea that Modern Ethics arose from the struggle against relativism is Richard Tuck’s classic thesis on Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes (1983, pp. 43–63). An evidence of that is that Grotius disagreed with Carneades in the existence of a Natural Law. In his later works, Tuck softened his view, but the idea remains in the essence of his thesis.
15.
See Besselink (1988), p. 86.
16.
“Unde apparet ius hoc quo ad implenda promissa obstringimur ex aeterna lege, hoc est ipsius Dei natura, proficisci, ad cuius imaginem homo est conditus.” (Grotii, 1928, p. 500).
17.
“Melius aliquanto illi et certius, qui ex sacis litteris ista malunt disceptari (…). Nam quae passim ex omnium gentium annalibus alii collegerunt, ut ad rem illustrandam plurimum, ita ad dijudicandum aut nihil aut parum valent, cum fere idem saepius fiat, quod male fit.” (DJPC, p. 6. The number of the page refers to Hamaker’s edition).
18.
“Videbam per Christianum orbem vel barbaris gentibus pudendam bellandi licentiam: levibus aut nullis de causis ad arma procurri, quibus semel sumtis nullam iam divini, nullam humani iuris reverentiam (…).” (DJBP. prolegomenon 28).
19.
Eikema Hommes (1983), p. 64.
20.
Vollenhoven (1925), p. 1.
21.
Berljak (1978).
22.
Bederman (1996), p. 4.
23.
Bederman (1996), p. 5.
24.
Barbeyrac (1724), pp. 43–46.
25.
Tuck (1979), p. 63.
26.
Bederman (1996), p. 5.
27.
“Poetarum et oratorum sententiae non tantum habet pondus: et nos saepe iis urimur non tam ut inde adstruamus sidem, quam ut his quae dicere voluimus ab ipsorum dictis aliquid ornamenti accedat.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 47).
28.
“Quibis successerunt quantum ingenio valeant saepe ostendunt: sed in infelicia et artium bonarum ignara saecula inciderunt: quominus mirum si inter multa laudanda aliqua et condonanda sunt. Tamen ubi in re morum consentiunt, vix est ut errent: quippe perspicaces admodum ad ea videnda quae in aliorum dictis reprehendi possunt” (DJBP. prolegomenon 52).
29.
DIB. I, 1, 1.
30.
Haggenmacher (2002), pp. 146–149.
31.
DJBP. prolegomenon 36.
32.
“(…) auctoritatem novorum Iurisconsultorum in responsis, quorum non pauca ad gratiam consulentium, nona d aequi bonique natura sunt composita” (DJBP. prolegomenon 38).
33.
Roelofsen (1983), p. 79.
34.
“Ego et hic et álibi veterum Christianorum sequor libertatem qui in nullius philosophorum iuraverant, non quod eis assentirentur qui nihil percipi posse dicebant, quo nihil est stultius; sed quod nullam esse sectam putarent quae omne verum vidisset, et nulla quae non aliquid ex vero. Itaque veritatem sparsam per singulos, sectasque diffusam, in corpus colligere, id vero existimabant nihil esse aliud quam vere Christianam tradere disciplinam.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 42).
35.
Bobbio, 1991, p. 28. By the age of 40, Hobbes accidently came across Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. He opened the book on the 47th proposition, and considered it absurd. However, the demonstration thereof referred to the previous proposition, which, in turn, referred to the one before, and so on up to the very first axiom, which was evident and uncontestable. Thanks to that, he fell in love with Geometry (Aubrey 1982, p. 152).
36.
Tuck (1983), p. 45.
37.
Wijffels (1995–1996), pp. 38–39.
38.
Haggenmacher (1983), pp. 47–48.
39.
Haggenmacher (2002), pp. 160–161.
40.
Haggenmacher (2002), p. 161.
41.
DJPC. pp. 1–4.
42.
“(…) l’aide des troix principaux genres oratoires mentionnés par Cicerón et Quintilien—iudicium, laudatio et deliberatio—et qui président respectivement aux troix discussions du Iustum, du Honestum et de l’Utile.” (Haggenmacher 1983, p. 57).
43.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 68. Grotius sent a letter to Galileo, claiming to admire his work. (See Grotii, Hugonis. Epistolae. Carta a D. Galilaeo Galilaei. n. 654, p. 266). However, Galileo’s works, The Assayer (1623), Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632) and Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Relating to Two New Sciences (1638) were written after the De Jure Praedae. Therefore, it is likely that Grotius, although interested, only partly followed the Modern revolution in the method.
44.
Dufour, 1980, p. 37.
45.
Dufour (1980), pp. 38–39.
46.
“(…) ‘Eorum sane quae scripta sunt nihil inter hostes valet; mores autem servantur ab omnibus, etiam cum ad extremum odii processerint.’ Ubi mores idem sunt, quod apud Tullium ‘non scripta sed nata lex’ (…)” (DJPC, p. 6).
47.
“Ordo autem instituto hic convenit, ut initio quid universim atque in genere verum sit videamus, idque ipsum contrahamus paulatim ad propositam facti speciem. Sed quemadmodum mathematici, priusquam ipsas demonstrationes aggrediantur, communes quasdam solent notiones, de quibus inter omnes facile constat praescribere, ut fixum aliquid sit, in quo retro desinat sequentium probatio, ita nos quo fundamentum positum habeamus, cui tuto superstruantur caetera, regulas quasdam et leges maxime generales indicabimus, velut anticipationes, quas non tam discere aliquis, quam reminisci debeat.” (DJPC, p. 6).
48.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 69.
49.
Vermeulen, 1983, p. 64.
50.
“(…) attigeunt pauci, universum ac certo ordinem tractavit hactenus nemo (…)” (DJBP. prolegomenon 1).
51.
“(…) sed ni omnes de uberrimo argumento paucissima dixerunt, et ita plerique ut sine ordine quae naturalis sunt iuris, quae divini, quae gentium, quae civilis, quae ex canonibus veniunt, permiscerent atque confunderent” (DJBP. prolegomenon 37).
52.
DJPC, p. 341 and DJBP. III, 25, 8.
53.
“Iniuriam mihi faciet si quis me ad ullas nostri saeculi controversias, aut natas, aut quae nasciturae praevideri possunt, respexisse arbitratur. Vere enim profiteor, sicut mathematici figuras à corporibus semotas considerant, ita me in iure tractando ab omni singulare facto abduxisse animum.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 58).
54.
“In toto opere tria maxime mihi proposui, ut definiendi rationes redderem quam maxime evidentes, et ut quae erant tractanda ordine certo disponerem, et ut quae cadem inter se videri poterant necerant, perspicue distinguerem (DJBP. prolegomenon 56).
55.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 452.
56.
“(…) notiones quasdam tam certas ut eas nemo negare possit, nisi sibi vim inferat. Principia enim eius iuris per se patent atque evidentia sunt, multo magis quam quae sensibus externis percibimus (…)” (DJBP. prolegomenon 39).
57.
DJBP. prolegomenon 40.
58.
“(…) sed ni omnes de uberrimo argumento paucissima dixerunt, et ita plerique ut sine ordine quae naturalis sunt iuris, quae divini, quae gentium, quae civilis, quae ex canonibus veniunt, permiscerent atque confunderent” (DJBP. prolegomenon 37).
59.
DJBP. I, 1, 9.
60.
“Artis formam ei imponere multi ante hac destinarunt: perfecit nemo: neque vero fieri potest nisi, quod non fatis curatum est hactenus, ea quae ex constituto veniunt a naturalibus recte separentur. nam naturalia cum semper eadem sint facille possunt in artem colligi: illa autem quae ex constituto veniunt, cum et mutentur saepe et alibi alia sint, extra artem posita sunt, ut aliae rerum singularium perceptiones.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 30).
61.
DJBP. I, 1, 12.
62.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 69.
63.
“(…) jus a Jove dictum, unde et jurare et jusjurandum, Jovisjurandum: aut quia vetere que nos jura dicimus, jusa, hoc est jussa dixerunt. Jubere autem potestatis est.” (DJPC, p. 8).
64.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 61.
65.
“Quid jus sit vidimus: unde iniuria etiam noscitur, generali scilicet notione, ut id significet quidquid non jure fiat. Qua igitur actione jus ad eum, cui secundum regulas ac leges competit, perducitur, haec justa est: quae secus, injusta.” (DJPC, p. 30).
66.
“Est autem iniustum quod naturae societatis ratione utentium repugnat.” (DJBP. I, 1, 3, 1).
67.
Tadashi (1993), p. 33.
68.
“Qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid iuste habendum vel agendum.” (DJBP. I, 1, 4).
69.
Villey (1962), p. 221.
70.
“(…) ius vocari facultas quaedam moralis, quam unusquisque habet vel circa rem suam vela d rem sibi debitam” (DL. I, 2, 5).
71.
DJBP. I, 1, 4-6.
72.
DJBP. I, 1, 4 and 7.
73.
Tuck (1979), p. 75.
74.
DJPC, pp. 67–68.
75.
DJPC, pp. 10 and 15.
76.
“Regula actuum moralium obligans ad id quod rectum est” (DJBP. I, 1 9, 1).
77.
Tadashi (1993), pp. 35–36.
78.
DJBP. prolegomenon 3.
79.
“Because you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in your ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another’s good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the opposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own.” (Platão. 1976, p. 65).
80.
“(…) iura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse varia pro moribus, et apud eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata: ius autem naturale esse nullum: omnes enim et homines et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri: proinde aut nullam esse iustitiam; quoniam sibi noceat alienis commodis consulens.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 5).
81.
Tuck (1983), p. 44.
82.
Hobbes (1983), Chapter XIV, p. 78.
83.
Hobbes (1983), pp. 74–78.
84.
Hobbes (1983), pp. 78, 79, 86.
85.
“(…) inclinação consciente, que pressupõe a apreciação de motivos determinantes, a preferência racional por uma ordem dentre as muitas ordens possíveis” (Reale 2000, p. 105).
86.
“Homini vero perfectae aetatis, cum circa similia similiter, agere norit, cum societatis appetitu excellente, cujus peculiare solus inter animantes instrumentum habet sermonem, inesse etiam facultatem sciendi agendique, secundum generalia praecepta, par este intelligi, cui quae conveniunt ea jam sunt non omnium quidem animantibum, sed humanae naturae congruentia.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 7).
87.
“Librum de Cive vidi. Placent que pro Regibus dicit. Fundamenta tamen quibus suas sententias superstruit, probare non possum. Putat inter homines a natura esse bellum et alia quaedam habet nostris non congruentia” (Grotii, Hugonis. Letter to Willem de Groot of April 1643. Briefwisseling XIV, p. 199).
88.
“Vitam tueri et declinare nocitura liceat” and “Adjungere sibi quae ad vivendum sunt utilia eaque retinere liceat” (DJPC, p. 10).
89.
“Cum igitur res conditas Deus esse fecerit et esse voluerit, proprietates quasdam naturales singulis indidit, quibus ipsum illud esse conservaretur et quibus ad bonum suum unumquodque, velut ex prima originis lege, duceretur. Unde principium totius naturalis ordinis recte poetae et philosophi veteres amorem statuerunt, cujus prima vis primaque actio reciproca est in se ipsum. Qua ratione culpandum non est quod secutus Academicos Horatius utilitatem justi et aequi prope matrem dixit.” (DJPC, p. 9 and Tuck 1983, p. 52).
90.
“At vero non satis conservationi operum suorum provisum Deus credidit, si suam duntaxat incolumitatem cuique commendaret, nisi et rem alteram alterius commodis vellet consulere, ut cuncta inter se velut aeterno foedere consentirent. Seneca: ‘alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibis vivere’. Duplex itaque est amor, sui et alterius, quorum ille cupidinis, hic amicitiae dicitur.” (DJPC, p. 11).
91.
DJPC, p. 12.
92.
Berljak (1978), pp. 47–57.
93.
De Officiis. III, vi, 28.
94.
“Seneca: ‘ut omnia inter se membra consentiunt, quia singula servari totius interest, ita homines singulis parcent, quia ad coetum geniti sunus. Salva autem esse societas, nisi amore et custodia partium non potest.’ Idem álibi: ‘Securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est.’ Haec est illa hominum inter se cognatio, illa mundi civitas, quam tot tantisque praeconiis veteres philosophi nobis commendat, praesertim Stoici, quorum sententiam etiam Cicero exsequitur: ex qua et illud est Florentini: ‘cum cognationem quandam inter nos natura constituerit, consequens esse ut hominem homini insidiari nefas sit; quod ille optime ad jus gentium refert.’” (DJPC, p. 13).
95.
Tuck (1999), p. 36.
96.
De Amicitia, 20 (Portuguese translation, s/d, p. 112).
97.
Tuck (1999), p. 37. Also De Inventione. I. 2, 2.
98.
De Officiis. I. 16, 51–52. Evidently, Cicero emphasizes the fact there are obligations between strangers. Nonetheless, the examples he gives (giving water, sharing fire, giving good advices) are much simpler duties than the ones among friends.
99.
“Nefas est nocere patriae: ergo cive quoque, nam hic pars patriae est (sanctae partes sunt si universum venerabile est) ergo et homini, nam hic in maiore tibi urbe civis est. Quid si nocere velint manus pedibus, manibus oculi?” (De Ira. II. 31, 7).
100.
“Ne quis alterum laedat” and “Ne quis occupet alteri occupata. Haec lex abstinentiae, illa innocentiae est: inde vitae securitas oritur, hinc dominiorum distinctio, celeberrimumque illud Meum et Teum” (DJPC, pp. 13–14).
101.
“(…) ordo legum primo loco et deinceps positarum ostenderit bonum suum prius esse alieno, (…) sibi ut quisque melius esse velit quam alteri, quo et illa spectant, ‘Proximus egomet mihi, tunica pallio propior’” and “(…) tamen ubi quaeritur de bono singulorum et de bono omnium, quorum utrumque recte bonum suum dicitur, si quidem et omnes unum sunt aliquid, bonum illud omnium potius esse debet, quatenus ei scilicet et bonum inest singulorum” (DJPC, p. 21).
102.
Shaver (1993), pp. 63–83.
103.
Tuck (1999), p. 100.
104.
Winkel (2000), p. 395.
105.
Korkman, 1999/2000, p. 83.
106.
Grotius does oppose to that notion. When resorting to cultural diversity, Carneades seems to consider Natural and Civil Law only and not the jus gentium. (DJBP, prolegomenon 17). However, Grotius does not elaborate this law more than these few words in the prolegomena. This is not out of contempt: once he distinguishes the Law of Nations from Natural Law and thus leaves the Roman orbit behind, Grotius chooses to study this source of the law of war throughout the rest of the book.
107.
“(…) nam homo animans quidem est, sed eximium animans, multoque longius distans a caeteris omnibus quam caeterorum genera inter se distant: cui rei testitmonium perhibent multae actionis humani generis propriae. Inter haec autem quae homini sunt propria, est appetitus societatis, id est communitatis, non qualiscunque, sed tranquillae et pro sui intellectus modo ordinatae cum his qui sui sunt generis.” (DJBP 1625. which would be a part of prolegomenon 6).
108.
“(…) quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque convictum hominum ac societatem (…)” (De Finnibus, IV, 18. In the English translation Cicero, 2001, p. 96).
109.
“Quod ergo dicitur natura quodque animal ad suas tantum utilitates ferri, verum esto de caeteris animantibus et de homine antequam ad usum eius quod homini proprium est, pervenerit: quanquam et de animantibus caeteris haec addenda est exceptio, quod quaedam utilitatum suarum studium, partim foetuum suorum, partim aliorum sibi congenerum respectu aliquatenus temperant: quod in illis quidem procedere credimus ex principio aliquo intelligente extrinseco, quia circa actus alios istis neuriquam difficitores par intelligentia in illis non apparet: Homini autem, cum circa similia similiter agat, messe principium quoddam internum par est intelligi, cui quae conveniunt ea sunt non omnium quidem animantium, sed humanae naturae congruentia.” (DJBP 1625. Part of prolegomenon 6 and all of 7).
110.
Tuck (1999), p. 97.
111.
“(…) nam naturalis iuris mater est ipsa humana natura quae nos etiamsi re nulla indigerimus ad societatem mutuam appetendam ferret” (DJBP. prolegomenon 16).
112.
DJBP. I, 4, 7, 2 and 4 and II, 1, 18, 1.
113.
“Nam et caeterarum animantium quaedam utilitatum suarum studium, partim foetum suorum, partim aliorum sibi congenerum respectu e aliquatenus temperant quod in illis quidem procedere credimus ex principio aliquo intelligente extrinseco, quia circa actus alios, istis neutiquam difficiliores, par intelligentia in illis non apparet. Idemque de infantibus dicendum, in quibus ante omnem disciplinam ostendit se ad bene aliis faciendum propensio quaedam, prudenter a Plutarcho observata: sicut et in ea aetate misericordia sponte prorumpit. Homini vero perfectae aetatis, cum circa similia similiter, agere norit, cum societatis appetitu excellente, cujus peculiare solus inter animantes instrumentum habet sermonem, inesse etiam facultatem sciendi agendique, secundum generalia praecepta, par este intelligi, cui quae conveniunt ea jam sunt non omnium quidem animantibum, sed humanae naturae congruentia.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 7).
114.
Winkel (2000), p. 398.
115.
Winkel (2000), p. 395 and 401.
116.
“Qua ratione culpandum non est quod secutus Academicos Horatius utilitatem justi et aequi prope matrem dixit.” (DJPC, p. 9).
117.
“Homo vero, quia scientiam boni et mali habet, abstinet se a nocendo etiam cum incommodo suo.” (DJBP. I, 1, 11, 1).
118.
“Sed naturali juri utilitas accedit: voluit enim naturae Auctor nos singulos et infirmos esse, et multarum rerum ad vitam recte ducendam egentes, quo magis ad colendam societatem raperemur.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 16).
119.
“Verissimum illud, omnia incerta esse simul a iure recessum est.” (DJBP. prolegomenon 22).
120.
Shaver (1993), p. 73. He even mentions the passage DJBP. III, 10, 1; however, in this instance, Grotius is not referring to Charity, but to honor and honesty, principles that are found in both Epicureanism and Stoicism. For that reason, all the writers that he mentions are not religious men.
121.
DJBP. III, 18, 4.
122.
“Et haec quidem quae im diximus, locum haberent etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, non esse Deum, aut non curari ab eo negotia humana” (DJBP. prolegomenon 11).
123.
“Par cette conception, (…) Grotius degage le droit naturel de la théologie et de la métaphysique. In en fait matière à une étude scientifique portent sur la nature sociable de l’homme. C’est parce qu’il s’est attaché à cette conception el l’à repandue dans les esprits qu’il a pu ètre considéré comme le père du droit naturel.” (Basdevant, 1904, p. 233).
124.
Nussbaum (1953), p. 113.
125.
Crowe (1993), pp. 32–34.
126.
Chipman (1983), p. 71.
127.
Vecchio (1962), p. 262.
128.
Leger (1962), p. 61.
129.
Leger (1962), p. 132.
130.
Leger (1962), pp. 98–110.
131.
“Error est non minus vetus quam pestilens, quo multi mortales, ii autem maxime, qui plurimum vi ataque opibus valent, persuadent sibi, aut, quod verius puto, persuadere conantur, justum atque injustum non suapte natura, sed hominum inani quadam opinione, atque consuetudine distingui.” (GROTIUS, Hugo. The Freedom of the Seas, or the right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in the East Indian Trade. Trad. Ralph van Deman Magoffin. Introduction by James Brown Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1916. p. 1. Henceforth, ML).
132.
Leger (1962), pp. 141–142.
133.
Thomas (1999), p. 72.
134.
“Ius naturalis est dictatum rectae rationi,s indicans actui aliqui, ex eius convenientia aut disconvenientia cum ipsa natura rationali, inesse moralem turpitudinem, aut necessitatem moralem, ac consequenter ab auctore natura Deo talem actum aut vetari aut praecipi.” (DJBP. I, 1, 10, 1).
135.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 449.
136.
Grotius (1953), v. 1. I, 2, 1, p. 5.
137.
DJBP. I, 1, 10, 2.
138.
“Sicut ergo ut bis duo non sint quator nie a Deo quidem potest essiei, ita ne hoc quidem, ut quod intriseca ratione malum est malum non sit.” (DJBP. I, 1, 10, 5).
139.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 504.
140.
DJBP. I, 1, 10, 3.
141.
DJPC, pp. 8–9.
142.
Haggenmacher (1983), pp. 496–523.
143.
Negro, 1998, p. 17.
144.
“Et confirmatur, quia se per impossible non esset Deum, nullius obligaretur.” (De eo ad quod tenetur homo cum primum venit ad usum rationis, 1960, p. 1347. Segunda pars relectionis. 8).
145.
“Ad rationes autem in contrarium, Gregorius quidem Ariminensis in 3 d.34 tenet duo. Primum, dato per impossible quod non esset Deus, adhuc esset peccatum et malum morale. Secundum, dato quod nulla esset lex prohibitive divina, adhuc essent peccata. Infert corollarium, quod multa sunt peccata ita secundum se mala, quod non sunt mala, quia prohibita etiam lege divina. Fundamentum eius potissimum est, quia ad hoc quod quis male agat, satis est quod agat contra rectam rationem, sive humanam sive angelicam.” (De eo ad quod tenetur homo cum primum venit ad usum rationis. Segunda pars relectionis. 9, p. 1353).
146.
Besselink (1988), pp. 102–103.
147.
Hervada (1983), pp. 18–21.
148.
DJBP. I, 1, 9 and I, 1, 13.
149.
Antonino, 1986, p. 268. Book II, 11.
150.
Berljak (1978), pp. 94–99.
151.
Pufendorf (1703), II, 3, 19, p. 112.
152.
Haggenmacher (1983), p. 501.
153.
ST. 1-2 q. 93 a.1.
154.
“Quod Deus se velle significarit, id jus est.” (DJPC, p. 8).
155.
“Vitam tueri et declinare nocitura liceat” and “Adjungere sibi quae ad vivendum sunt utilia eaque retinere liceat” (DJPC, p. 10).
156.
DJPC, p. 12. This passage proves that, when writing De Jure Praedae, Grotius already knew and accepted the analogia entis.
157.
“Quod consensus hominum velle cunctus significaverit, id jus est” (DJPC, p. 12).
158.
DJPC, p. 13.
159.
“Ne quis alterum laedat” and “Ne quis occupet alteri occupata” (DJPC, pp. 13–14).
160.
“Malefacta corrigenda” and “Benefacta repensanda.” (DJPC, p. 15).
161.
“Quod se quisque velle significaverit, id in eum jus est” (DJPC, p. 18).
162.
“Ut singuli civis caeteros tum universos, tum singulos non modo non laederent, verum etiam tuerentur” and “Ut cives non modo alter alteri privatim aut in commune possessa non eriperent, verum etiam singuli tum quae singulis, tum quae universis necessaria conferrent” (DJPC, p. 21).
163.
“Quidquid respublica se velle significaverit, id in cives universos jus est” (DJPC, p. 23).
164.
“Quidquid respublica se velle significaverit, id inter cives singulos jus est” and “Ne civis adversum civem jus suum nisi judicio exsequatur” (DJPC, p. 24).
165.
“Ut magistratus omnia gerat e bono reipublicae” and “Ut quidquid magistratus gessit respublica ratum habeat” (DJPC, p. 26).
166.
“Quod se magistratus velle significavit id in cives universos jus est” and “Quod se magistratus velle significavit id in cives singulos jus est” (DJPC, p. 26).
167.
“Quidquid omnes respublicae significarunt se velle, id in omnes jus est” (DJPC, p. 26).
168.
“Ne respublica neu civis in alteram rempublicam alteriusve civem jus suum nisi judicio exsequatur” (DJPC, p. 27).
169.
“In judicando priores sint partes ejus reipublicae, unde cujusve a cive petitur. Quod si hujus officium cesset, tum respublica, quae ipsa cujusve civis petit, eam rem judicet.” (DJPC, p. 28).
170.
“Ut ubi simul observari possunt observentur: ubi id fieri non potest, tum potior sit quae est dignior” (DJPC, p. 29).
171.
DJBP. I, 1, 9, 2.
172.
DJBP. I, 1, 14, 1.
173.
DJBP. I, 1, 15-17.
174.
DJBP. prolegomenon 16.
175.
DJBP. II, 15, 8.
176.
DJBP. I, 1, 10, 4.
177.
Tadashi (1993), pp. 41–42.
178.
DJBP. I, 1, 10, 6.
179.
DJBP. I, 1, 10, 7.

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Vauthier Borges de Macedo, P.E. (2017). The Foundations of Law in Hugo Grotius. In: Catholic and Reformed Traditions in International Law. Studies in the History of Law and Justice, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59403-3_4

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