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RDEU Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation of the Network Group Events with Emotional Factors

  • Guoqiang XiongEmail author
  • Xian Wang
  • Ying Yang
  • Yuxi Liu
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes on Multidisciplinary Industrial Engineering book series (LNMUINEN)

Abstract

At present, network communication becomes more efficient and geographical restrictions barely exist. However, the network mass incidents tend to be multiple and frequent, which are mostly unexpected. In this paper, we point at studying the limitations of the traditional game theory in the players’ rational assumptions, and consider the influence of the irrational factors on the netizens behavior. Based on RDEU theory and evolutionary game theory, a RDEU evolutionary game model of group events on network is constructed. In addition, we studied the evolution mechanism of game Nash equilibrium under different emotional conditions and the numerical simulation of the model, which is carried out by using the numerical simulation method of Matlab. After that, the evolutionary equilibrium state of the game between the netizens in different emotional states of the network group events is analyzed. Finally, research results show that emotional factors have a great impact on the network behavior of group events; when the emotions of netizens are pessimistic, the game participants are more inclined to confrontational behavior, and will have both the conflicting herd effect, more prone to network mass incidents. In this case, it is more likely to produce group events on network.

Keywords

Network group event RDEU evolutionary game model Emotion Simulation 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guoqiang Xiong
    • 1
    Email author
  • Xian Wang
    • 1
  • Ying Yang
    • 1
  • Yuxi Liu
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Business AdministrationXi’an University of TechnologyXi’anPeople’s Republic of China

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