An Analytical Framework for the Conflict Coordination Mechanism of Knowledge Network

  • Qifeng WeiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes on Multidisciplinary Industrial Engineering book series (LNMUINEN)


Whether the conflict coordination mechanism works effectively directly affects the achievement of the goal of the knowledge network, and is related to both the existence of the knowledge subject itself and the knowledge network. Based on principal-agent theory and game theory, a theoretical framework of conflict coordination mechanism for knowledge network is constructed in this paper, which divides the conflict coordination mechanism into three levels: contract mechanism, self-implementation mechanism and third-party conflict coordination mechanism, then this paper makes a mathematical analysis on the theoretical framework. Results indicate that the adaptive behavior of the knowledge subjects within knowledge network evolves along with the conflict coordination mechanism framework; the conflict coordination of knowledge network contract is mainly embodied in the two aspects of benefit distribution and knowledge division; the implementation of conflict coordination relies mainly on relational contract mechanism and the trust mechanism; when the first two fail, the third party helps to relieve the relationship and make value judgments with a neutral position, in order to solve the fierce conflict.


Knowledge network Conflict Coordination mechanism Behaviors 



This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71602012), Social Science Planning Project of Sichuan Province (SC16C002), Soft Science Project of Sichuan Province (2016ZR0194), and Key Research Base Project of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Sichuan Province (CJY16-03 and Xq16C06).


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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Business SchoolChengdu University of TechnologyChengduPeople’s Republic of China

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