Semantically-Secured Message-Key Trade-Off over Wiretap Channels with Random Parameters
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We study the trade-off between secret message (SM) and secret key (SK) rates simultaneously achievable over a state-dependent (SD) wiretap channel (WTC) with non-causal channel state information (CSI) at the encoder. This model subsumes all other instances of CSI availability as special cases, and calls for an efficient utilization of the state sequence both for reliability and security purposes. An inner bound on the semantic-security (SS) SM-SK capacity region is derived based on a novel superposition coding scheme. Our inner bound improves upon the previously best known SM-SK trade-off result by Prabhakaran et al., and to the best of our knowledge, upon all other existing lower bounds for either SM or SK for this setup. The results are derived under the strict semantic-security metric that requires negligible information leakage for all message-key distributions. The achievability proof uses the strong soft-covering lemma for superposition codes.
KeywordsWiretap Channel (WTC) Semantic Security (SS) Superposition Coding Secret Message (SM) Achievability Proof
The work of Alexander Bunin and Shlomo Shamai was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research And Innovation Programme, grant agreement No. 694630. The work of Z. Goldfeld and H. H. Permuter was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant no. 684/11), an ERC starting grant and the Cyber Security Research Grant at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. The work of Paul Cuff was supported by the National Science Foundation—grant CCF-1350595, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research—grant FA9550-15-1-0180.
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