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The Middle Class and Political Representation: The Risk of Globalization Slowing Down

  • Antimo VerdeEmail author
Chapter
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Abstract

Here we are at the epilogue of our story. In this final chapter, the middle class and the lower-middle class—the very losers of globalization —organize themselves politically. They are successful since they are the vocal majority of the society. As such, they are able to attract the protection of the right and extreme right parties but also the protection of the left parties. At this point another protagonist is placed side by side social classes and parties, crossing them: populism. The alliance between social classes and political parties gives rise to risks of globalization slowdown: this is the thesis of the book.

Keywords

Political representation Political conflict in Western Europe Rise and fall of middle class Populism 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Tuscia UniversityViterboItaly

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