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Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism

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Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 14)

Abstract

The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e. judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.

Keywords

Moral bayesianism Moral uncertainty Moral reasoning Conditionalization Commutativity The lottery paradox 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the Israeli Science Foundation (grant number:1042/13). I thank Richard Bradley, Christian List and two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy and PPEThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

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