Brexit: A Campaign and a Fatal Communication Disaster



Welfens analyzes the British EU referendum of 2016 and makes relevant comparisons with the information policy of the Cameron government in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. It is shown that the Cameron government’s information policy in the EU referendum fell considerably short of what one would expect, with crucial information from HM Treasury not communicated to the electorate—calling the legitimacy and clarity of the pro-Brexit majority into question. This chapter also delves into the background of Brexit, the key issues, and the motivations of voters—including nostalgia, wishful thinking, and nationalism. Welfens argues that an anti-EU sentiment should have been detected before the referendum and highlights a paradox that free capital flows and an unbiased referendum could be incompatible.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and Social SciencesBergischen Universität WuppertalWuppertalGermany

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