Abstract
Horror dogmatis was a strong (and perhaps the strongest) driving force behind Popper’s effort to formulate a new conception of reason identified with criticism. Dogmatism is inherent in all forms of justificationism; strategies seeking the confirmation of a theory are not only logically flawed and thus irrational, but tend to immunize theories against criticism. Dogmatism is also present in our expectations of (and strong belief in) regularities; Popper set out to solve Hume’s problem by treating the need for regularities as biologically inborn and by reformulating belief-sentences in terms of logic (according to the principle of transference). Dogmatism is dangerous in the social sphere, too. Holistic philosophies when practically implemented lead to authoritarianism and oppression. In sum, dogmatism – apart from being irrational – presents an obstacle to the growth of knowledge and to the emergence of the open society. Should critical rationalists adopt a mercilessly hostile attitude to dogmatism? Further, could dogmatism gradually diminish in the course of the evolution of mankind?
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Only this specific aspect of Kuhn’s philosophy of science is considered in this paper, leaving aside all other major differences between him and Popper, such as the long-term reign of normal science, the dominance of one single paradigm, incompatibility between paradigms, the relativity of truth and the reduction of scientific norms to the practice of the community.
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I would like to thank David Miller for extensive critical comments.
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Parusniková, Z. (2017). Horror Dogmatis. In: Bar-Am, N., Gattei, S. (eds) Encouraging Openness. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 325. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57669-5_4
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