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Lay Theories of the Mind/Brain Relationship and the Allure of Neuroscience

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Abstract

Psychology is in the midst of a neuroscience revolution, with attributes deemed uniquely human—language, free will, moral responsibility, a notion of self—no longer exempt from material exploration. It is anybody’s guess whether this neuroscience endeavor to explain the human mind will succeed. In the meantime, what does seem clear is that neuroscience is everywhere these days, and that people—both expert and ordinary folk—are intrigued by its role in explaining the mind. Why is neuroscience so alluring? To ask this question is to ask about current lay theories of the mind/brain relation. To approximate an answer, I start by describing the allure of neuroscience (brain) explanations for psychological (mind) phenomena. Is the allure due to neuroscience’s status as a ‘real’ science? Or is it due to its reductive appeal? Next, I review the effect of neuroscience on judgments of responsibility and free will. Do ordinary folk shy away from free will and moral condemnation when actions are couched in terms of brain function? The next stop on our tour of uniquely human capacities is the notion of the self. Do ordinary folk believe that their brains are who they truly are? I conclude by exploring possible policy implications of the allure of neuroscience. How might it affect our funding of science, our education policy, and our mental health system?

Allure: the quality of being powerfully and mysteriously attractive or fascinating.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    These contortions include rejecting determinism to save free will (libertarians); conceding that the world is deterministic and thus acknowledging that that free will does not exist (hard determinists); or accepting determinism but still claim that free will is possible (i.e., compatibilism).

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  1. Psychology Department, Villanova University, 800 Lancaster Ave, Villanova, PA, 19085, USA

    Diego Fernandez-Duque

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  1. Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, USA

    Claire M. Zedelius

  2. Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Barbara C. N. Müller

  3. Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, USA

    Jonathan W. Schooler

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Fernandez-Duque, D. (2017). Lay Theories of the Mind/Brain Relationship and the Allure of Neuroscience. In: Zedelius, C., Müller, B., Schooler, J. (eds) The Science of Lay Theories. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57306-9_9

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